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I. INTRODUCTION
What obligations should the media have to promote the public interest in
their programming decisions? The advent of digital television has occasioned
a fresh look at this question.1 While fierce controversy has broken out over
proposals to require broadcasters to give political candidates free airtime
during election contests, little critical examination has attended a key
1. The report of the President’s Advisory Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of
Digital Television Broadcasters (known colloquially as the “Gore Commission” or the “Advisory
Committee”) recommended voluntary industry action. Advisory Committee on Public Interest
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Charting the Digital Broadcasting Future: Final
Report of the Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters,
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ pubintadvcom.piacreport.pdf, at 44 (December 18, 1998)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee]. More recently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
requested public debate on the question. Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14
F.C.C.R. 21,633, available at 1999 WL 1211119, ¶ 8 (Dec. 20, 1999) (notice of inquiry) [hereinafter
Public Interest Obligations]. See also Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC
Chairman Kenard Identifies Eleven Principles for Broadcasters in Serving the Public Interest (Jan. 18,
2001) (on file with author).
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question: Should the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) use its
regulatory powers directly to try to improve the quality of news reporting by
the broadcast media?
Historically, the FCC’s most well-recognized discourse-enhancing
content regulation was the fairness doctrine, which required every broadcast
licensee to provide balanced coverage of controversial issues of public
importance.2 The Commission jettisoned the doctrine in the 1980s, opining
that although fairness and balance in reporting were legitimate goals,
government regulation of the broadcast media to achieve those ends was
unwise as a matter of policy and irreconcilable with the First Amendment.3
One might have thought that direct content regulation of news and
informational reporting would be laid to rest with the demise of the fairness
doctrine. But CBS’s long travails arising out of its 1994 broadcast on anti-
Semitism in post-Soviet Ukraine— only recently settled in 1999 after
litigation before the Commission and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia4— raise the question again of whether the FCC should
revive content-based regulation designed to improve the quality of news
reporting. The complaint against CBS by a group of Ukrainian-Americans
that a 60 Minutes program had exaggerated the extent of Ukrainian anti-
Semitism drew upon the Commission’s long-standing but largely overlooked
policy against news distortion.5 Under that policy— which was not eliminated
with the fairness doctrine— proof of deliberate news distortion, staging, or
slanting may adversely affect a broadcast licensee’s ability to renew or
transfer its license.
In the course of CBS’s legal battle, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the news
distortion doctrine very expansively in Serafyn v. FCC.6 Although the FCC
2. For the Commission’s descriptions of the doctrine, see, for example, Inquiry into the General
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,317-344 (May 14,
1984); The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of
the Communications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691
(1976), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5052 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulation Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad.
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 148-53 (1985) (analyzing the constitutional reasons and policy rationales
for repealing or modifying the fairness doctrine).
4. 60 Minutes: The Ugly Face of Freedom (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 23, 1994). See Roma
Hadzewycz, CBS and Ukrainian Americans Sign Settlement Agreement Regarding “The Ugly Face,”
UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, available at http:www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1999/189902.shtml (May 2,
1999).
5. See Serafyn v. CBS, 149 F.3d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
6. See id.
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had summarily rejected the complaint in 1995,7 the D.C. Circuit vacated the
Commission’s decision and remanded the matter, suggesting that the agency
revise its entire approach to news distortion. Under the D.C. Circuit’s
plaintiff-friendly method, much that had been heretofore excluded as
evidence of distortion would be rehabilitated. The parties’ settlement of the
CBS matter leaves on the books an invitation for virtually plenary review of
news content by the FCC whenever somebody armed with a contending
version of events complains to the authorities that a news or informational
program was inaccurate.
Although the Commission did not traditionally define the scope of the
news distortion doctrine or historically display great zeal in its enforcement
against licensees, its decisions reiterated the principle that news distortion
was “a most heinous act against the public interest.”8 Particularly in light of
the expansive interpretation of the doctrine in the D.C. Circuit’s recent
Serafyn decision, there is reason to think that CBS’s experience may not
prove exceptional.
Historically, the FCC has justified its interest in regulating news quality
by reference to democratic norms. The assumption of the news distortion
policy is that democracy requires an informed citizenry armed with accurate
information and faith in press integrity. Critics claim that both such needs are
currently unmet. There is much public grousing by both conservatives and
liberals about news bias in the mass media. New developments— ranging
from the sensationalism of tabloid and “reality” television programming to
the increasing consolidation of media entities— also inspire regulatory
intervention. For those with the impulse to perfect public discourse, the
elimination of the fairness obligation has created a regulatory void asking to
be filled by a revived and invigorated news distortion policy designed to
address the current critiques of news bias.
This Article seeks to expand the current debate over broadcasters’
obligations by examining the news distortion doctrine and ultimately
proposing that it be eliminated. Ideally, of course, the policy would do no
more than deter broadcasters from presenting reenactments and staged events
as the real thing. However, the policy is highly unlikely to operate ideally.
Indeed, at best it could involve the Commission in investigating and second-
guessing editorial judgments made by the media in presenting the news. At
worst, the policy could provide the basis for punishing deviations from an
“official” version of events established by courts and administrative agencies.
7. WGPR, Inc. and CBS, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140, 8146-48 (1995) (application procedure),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1225.
8. CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
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The D.C. Circuit’s newly revived news distortion prohibition— generated
by insufficient deference to the Commission— would extend the traditional
doctrine in three problematic ways. First, it would allow a governmental
agency to draw inferences of a broadcaster’s subjective intent to distort from
“obvious” or “egregious” errors9— without recognizing that such judgments
in virtually any controversial case entail the authoritative selection of
“truths”. In an irony the court simply did not recognize, the Serafyn case
itself presents an object lesson in the harms of the new approach to news
distortion: the very points the court suggests may have been “obvious” or
“egregious” errors, such as the supposed mistranslation of an ethnic reference
to Jews from Ukrainian to English,10 are neither. Instead, they implicate both
the harrowing history of the Holocaust and the cultural contextualism that
makes translation so difficult an enterprise.
Second, the new version of the policy would permit courts and
administrative agencies to second-guess broadcasters’ editorial choices in
news programming, allowing negative inferences to be drawn from reporters’
refusals to consult an interested party’s proffered expert.11 The FCC and the
courts would find a deliberate intent to distort from a broadcaster’s failure to
“assure” itself of the accuracy of an “inflammatory” charge,12 although no
one could define what would make a charge inflammatory nor what would
be necessary to assure accuracy.
Third, the new approach would give undue weight to certain types of
circumstantial evidence such as highly manipulable after-the-fact indicia of
viewer reactions. The new judicial gloss on the news distortion policy would
also lead too easily to inferences of general patterns of distortion from thin
circumstantial evidence of slanting regarding a single program.
In sum, the reinvented news distortion doctrine would undermine the very
democratic norms marshaled in its defense. Particularly in light of the
complex relation between news and the exercise of democratic citizenship,
we should hesitate to support a regulatory policy that effectively grounds
government censorship on an unrealistic view of news production.
Few of us today believe that there is only one version of any particular
news story. Perspective is inherent in any account of events. At a minimum,
error is inevitable. Yet the Serafyn court’s approach could well suggest that
the FCC should concern itself with whether a particular broadcaster gave the
“right” slant to a particular news story. This expansive interpretation of the
9. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1222.
10. 149 F.3d at 1222-24.
11. Id. at 1223.
12. Id. at 1224.
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news distortion rule is a far more dangerous precedent, in terms of state
censorship, than the fairness doctrine in its traditional guise ever would have
been.
By particularly threatening the investigative and newsmagazine formats
of electronic journalism, the court’s interpretation of the news distortion rule
also undermines the democratic value of a diversity of press traditions.
The call for regulating news programming to enhance public discourse
could receive support from second-generation regulatory rationales justifying
an active FCC. While attention to the justification for FCC content regulation
at first focused on whether the constitutionally disparate treatment of
broadcast and print media could be justified by reference to the scarcity of
the spectrum as a resource,13 the conclusion that scarcity could not bear the
regulatory weight spawned not complete regulatory abdiction, but a second
generation of regulatory analysis. In this postscarcity era, the issue became
whether and to what extent content regulation is justified (regardless of the
form of media) on the basis of regulatory rationales other than scarcity.14
Media theorists of the second generation have attempted to resuscitate the
regulatory enterprise, whether relying on a theory of broadcasting as a public
forum, a notion of media impact (particularly on children), a principle that
the free allocation of spectrum by the government should entail a quid pro
quo, or an argument about correcting market failure. Many have justified
such an approach on an affirmative theory of the First Amendment.15 The
Clinton-era FCC itself observed that “[g]iven the impact of their
programming and their use of the public airways, broadcasters have a special
13. For descriptions of the scarcity rationale and its critique, see generally THOMAS G.
KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994); ITHIEL
DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical
Scarcity, Rent Seeking and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1997); Charles W. Logan,
Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast
Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687 (1997); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An
Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899 (1998).
14. See generally RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
(Corn-Revere ed., 1997); Lili Levi, On the Mixed Cultures of Regulation and Deregulation, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 515 (1998) (reviewing RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS, supra); Logan, supra note
13.
15. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 52-78 (1996) [hereinafter FISS, THE
IRONY]; OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE
POWER 154-58 (1996) [hereinafter FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 311, 366-72 (1997); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA.
L. REV. 795, 795-98 (1981); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82
GEO. L.J. 373, 373 (1993).
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role in serving the public.”16 Thus, what is currently at stake is the second
generation question of what kinds of content regulations should be
considered both constitutional and good policy in the postscarcity world.
Media observers who decry such obligations point to the extraordinarily
expanded marketplace of informational offerings.17 They doubtless take
solace in the deregulatory turn portended by Michael Powell’s recent
appointment to the FCC chairmanship by the Republican White House.18
Yet, those who support regulatory requirements will bide their time, insisting
that the importance of television requires democracy-enhancing rules to
promote informed public debate.19 This Article contends that even these new
regulatory rationales should not be read to support an invigorated policy of
penalizing news distortion. To the extent that they do support such a policy,
this Article demonstrates the danger of their openness and expansiveness.
Part II.A of this Article describes the Commission’s traditional news
distortion policy. Part II.B describes the D.C. Circuit’s extension of the news
distortion policy in its recent decision in Serafyn v. FCC.
Part III.A argues that the D.C. Circuit’s judicial reinterpretation errs both
procedurally, in failing to accord adequate deference to the FCC’s
application of its news distortion doctrine, and substantively, in adopting
significantly expanded definitions of extrinsic evidence of deliberate news
distortion. This Part contends that the court’s invigorated and extended
interpretation of the news distortion doctrine necessarily entails judicial
establishment of official truth in the most controversial and contested of
situations.20 Part III.B argues that a news distortion policy functions as an
unjustifiable extention of administrative power that allows an end-run around
the constitutional and common law limitations of defamation law. The Part
16. Public Interest Obligations, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
17. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 75-76 (1997); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE,
JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 103-74, 237-75 (1994); Jim Chen, The Last Picture
Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1419-
20 (1996); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 401-03 (1989); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133-35 (1990) [hereinafter Hazlett, Rationality of U.S.
Regulation]; Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 220 (1996) [hereinafter Hazlett, Explaining the
Telecommunications Act]; Hazlett, supra note 13, at 905-08.
18. Stephen Labaton, Bush Appoints Powell’s Son to Lead F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at
1; Stephen Labaton, New F.C.C. Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001 at C1.
19. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 15.
20. The Article provides an Appendix with a detailed analysis of the Serafyn complainants’
specific claims of distortion as a concrete method of illustrating the difficulties posed by the court’s
proposed new approach to FCC control of news distortion.
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compares the news distortion policy to the evidentiary standards in
defamation law and demonstrates that an administrative prohibition on news
distortion cannot be positioned as an acceptable analog to the actual malice
rule of constitutionalized defamation law.
Part IV examines the costs and benefits of two possible fallback positions:
one, a regulatory recommitment to the traditional news distortion doctrine,
and the other, a narrowed regulatory alternative limited to clearly staged
news. The argument concludes that the doctrine should be abandoned even as
traditionally limited, and that a news rigging fallback is not likely to be
administrable.
Having concluded the explicitly doctrinal analysis of the specific news
distortion policies of the FCC and the D.C. Circuit, Part V addresses the
underlying policy question by setting out the contending democratic values
implicated by the issue. Part V.A lays out the policy arguments in support of
regulating news distortion, focusing on the modern reality of public
ambivalence toward the press and the argument that systemic structural
constraints on the media will inevitably lead to news distortion unless the
FCC steps in to improve television news. Part V.B also observes that the
expansive, postscarcity regulatory rationales developed by the Clinton-era
FCC could in theory serve to bolster interventionist impulses.
Part V.B then contends that, regardless of the value of accurate news
reports to an informed public in a democracy, administrative attempts to
prohibit news distortion present far more serious dangers for democracy than
permitting news reporting to develop without regulatory content review.
Specifically, Part V.C explains the ways in which the news distortion
doctrine presents a greater threat to a free press than did the fairness doctrine.
It describes the ways in which the news distortion policy impels the
government to intrude into the editorial process and select a particular
reading of a news account and to propose an authoritative account of events.
It argues that these results are both doctrinally problematic under the First
Amendment and also run the risk of inaccuracy, particularly with regard to
contested historical events. The Part warns against media regulations that
provide only the illusion of neutrality without substantively ensuring press
integrity. The argument characterizes structural factors that are likely to skew
governmental accounts of the truth, including strategic uses of the
administrative process by parties seeking to suppress speech. Shifting focus
from the harms of regulation to the affirmative democratic benefits of diverse
press traditions, Part V.C contends that conscientious application of the news
distortion policy is likely to have a particularly chilling effect on certain
kinds of news reporting. While the Article recognizes the democratic values
that may be undermined by slanted news reports, it ultimately concludes that
Washington University Open Scholarship
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those democratic values are better served by a free press constrained only by
structural regulation, evolving journalistic norms, and the willingness of
competing media to monitor their industry.
II. HISTORY OF THE FCC’S NEWS STAGING AND DISTORTION POLICY
For years, the FCC has quietly maintained on its books a policy
prohibiting broadcast licensees from engaging in news distortion, rigging,
and slanting.21 Adopted in response to criticisms of news distortion by the
electronic press, the policy purports to target deliberate slanting and rigging
of news reports.22 Such a policy would clearly contravene the First
Amendment if applied in the context of the print press. Yet this explicitly
content-based regulatory tool has received little critical attention in the
broadcast context both because of the constitutionally distinct role of
electronic media and because of the FCC’s relative reticence in enforcing the
policy.
The constitutionally different role of the electronic press is by now an old
story.23 As for the minimalist scope of FCC enforcement, the account below
will explain that the high burden imposed on complainants (to show
deliberate news slanting or staging) led to a small number of news distortion
hearings since the 1940s.24
Recent judicial developments at the D.C. Circuit cast doubt on the
continuing viability of such a moderate regulatory approach. The FCC today
faces a choice. Under one option, the Commission could revise and
aggrandize the news distortion policy along the invasive lines of the new
judicial model. Under another option, the FCC could attempt (vainly) to craft
an extremely narrow doctrine focused only on fabricated news events. Under
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
23. Since the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the
scarcity of broadcast frequencies has been used to justify lesser First Amendment protections for the
broadcast than the print media. See supra note 13 for a review of scarcity as a justification for
broadcast regulation. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (using scarcity as a
rationale for defending FCC’s fairness doctrine against constitutional attack) with Miami Herald Publ.
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting economic concentration as a rationale for upholding
right of reply obligation for print press). While scarcity as a regulatory justification has been the
subject of much criticism, see supra note 13, and while the FCC has undertaken numerous
deregulatory initiatives since the 1980s, see, e.g., Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC’s Recent Approach
to Structural Regulation of the Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 582-92 (2000)
(describing some deregulatory initiatives), First Amendment arguments have not displaced the
regulatory impulse entirely. Scarcity has been eclipsed by other regulatory rationales under which
various degrees of regulatory intervention into the electronic media have been proposed and justified.
See discussion infra Part V.A.
24. See infra Part II.A.
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still another possibility— one recommended in this Article— the FCC could
eliminate the policy altogether.
A. The Doctrine Prior to Serafyn v. FCC
1. The 1940s
The Commission never formally adopted a rule prohibiting news staging
and distortion. Instead, its policy was almost glancingly inaugurated in its
seminal Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees25 and was then
developed by common law method. Amidst the extensive discussion of the
need for fairness in broadcasting and the goal of developing “an informed
public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas
concerning the vital public issues of the day,”26 the FCC in the Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees warned: “A licensee would be abusing
his position as a public trustee . . . were he to withhold from expression over
his facilities relevant news or facts concerning a controversy or to slant or
distort the presentation of such news.”27
Although there doubtless have been instances of news distortion and
suppression since radio’s inception,28 the first major case to reach the
Commission’s attention was KMPC, Station of the Stars.29 The Commission
there ordered a hearing about the Radio News Club of Hollywood’s
complaint that G.A. Richards, a “hard-shell conservative,” had forced
KMPC’s news staff to distort and suppress news and had fired noncomplying
employees.30 This was not a case about indirect news slant or failure to cover
the implicit story underlying an event. The evidence collected during the
KMPC hearing reflected an extraordinarily clear and explicit scenario of
‘news management’ for particular ideological ends.31 If ever there was a case
25. 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254-55 (1949).
26. Id. at 1249.
27. Id. at 1254-55.
28. In his book about the FCC, long-time FCC division chief William Ray recounts that WLW,
Cincinnati, the most powerful station in the United States in the 1930s, fired its news writer because he
challenged the station management’s directive that labor disputes not be mentioned in the news.
WILLIAM RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIO-TV REGULATION 13 (1990).
29. 7 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 788 (1951); see RAY, supra note 28, at 11-13.
30. RAY, supra note 28, at 11-12. See also Nat’l Broad. Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713, 720 n.5 (1968)
(recounting KMPC story in context of conflict of interest opinion).
31. Richards’ directives to the staff required them to slant all news in favor of Republicans,
present Douglas MacArthur in “the most favorable light,” “refer to President Truman as a
‘pipsqueak,’” link the name of 1948 Progressive party candidate Henry Wallace to communism, “use
no favorable news” about the Roosevelt family and “‘certain minority groups’ (meaning Jews, who
Richards believed were ‘susceptible to communism’),” “make no unfavorable mention of the KKK,”
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calling for FCC denial of a licensee’s renewal request for content reasons,
this was it. Although the case never reached a final decision because
Richards’ death mooted the matter, the concurring opinions of Chairman Coy
and Commissioner Hennock made clear that the FCC would consider
denying a license renewal on grounds of news suppression or distortion:
We recognize that the personal equation inevitably enters into the
selection and broadcasting of news items, but conduct which
manifests a disregard of the goal of objectivity in news presentation
cannot help but adversely effect character qualifications under the
Communications Act.32
2. Development of the Policy in the 1960s
The FCC waited until the 1960s and 1970s— against a background of
congressional hearings about news bias and distortion33 and complaints from
viewers about the liberal slant of network news coverage34— to articulate a
and use the newspaper editorials and conservative columns Richards selected as items of hard news.
RAY, supra note 28, at 12.
32. KMPC, Station To the Stars, 7 Rad. Reg. (P & F) at 798 (Comm’rs Coy and Hennock,
concurring). William Ray found KMPC to be of “considerable significance since it indicated that the
FCC would consider denying license renewal to a station if the owner suppressed or distorted news to
serve private interests or prejudices.” RAY, supra note 28, at 12-13.
33. See, e.g., Inquiry into Alleged Rigging of Television News Programs: Hearings Before the
Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d
Cong. (1972) (regarding allegedly staged news reports); House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce Proceeding Against Frank Stanton and Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., H.R. Rep. No. 349, 92d
Cong. (1971); Subpoenaed Material re: Certain TV News Documentary Programs, Hearings Before
the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
92d Cong., ser. 16, 20-150 (1971) (regarding CBS program, The Selling of the Pentagon); The
Columbia Broad. Sys. Television Program on “Hunger in America”: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Dep’t of Agric. and Related Agencies Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 91st
Cong. 53 (1969) (regarding CBS program, Hunger in America); Deceptive Programming Practices:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong. (1968) (regarding CBS program, Pot Party on WBBM); STAFF OF SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 91ST
CONG., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON REPORT ON PM TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1968 (Comm. Print 1969) (regarding the three television
networks’ coverage of the 1968 Democratic national convention). See also Timothy B. Dyk & Ralph
E. Goldberg, The First Amendment and Congressional Investigations of Broadcast Programming, 3
J.L. & POL. 625 (1987) (cataloguing hearings about accuracy and fairness of broadcasts); Note, The
First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 751-52 (1972) (noting
proposed congressional bills to control news staging).
34. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 755-56 (1983) (rejecting argument that
WPFW deliberately distorted its news coverage “to conform to its ‘ultra-leftist political philosophy’”);
Henry Buchanan, 42 F.C.C.2d 430 (1973) (applying the fairness doctrine to respond to news distortion
complaint against CBS Evening News report on Nixon money-laundering that purported to rest claim
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news distortion and staging policy. As the D.C. Circuit recounted
approvingly in Galloway v. FCC,35 the Commission articulated a policy
against rigging, slanting, staging, and distorting the news in a series of cases
involving network news coverage in the late 1960s.36 The policy was part of
the Commission’s attempt to “particularize” broadcasters’ general statutory
duty to operate in the public interest.37
In a challenge to a CBS investigative news program in which the network
had erroneously identified a baby’s death as resulting from malnutrition, the
Commission took the position that “[r]igging or slanting the news is a most
heinous act against the public interest— indeed, there is no act more harmful
to the public’s ability to handle its affairs.”38 While it adopted the policy of
acting to protect the public interest in connection with such staging, the
Commission also recognized that “in this democracy, no government agency
can authenticate the news, or should try to do so.”39
Thus, the Commission insisted that it could only act against “deliberate
distortion,” rather than simply “mere inaccuracy or difference of opinion.”40
The FCC assured broadcasters that it would not “question the legitimate
editorial decisions of the broadcaster.”41 The Commission made clear that
disagreement with a licensee’s news judgment was not sufficient for a
finding of distortion.42 This approach applied both to the licensee’s news
of news distortion on the “common knowledge” of CBS’s liberal and anti-Administration bent).
35. 778 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 23. As the Galloway court pointed out, the policy is not grounded on a more specific
statutory duty not to distort news.
38. CBS program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (involving claim that CBS
news documentary about malnutrition misdescribed a child as having died from hunger rather than
from complications attendant on premature birth).
39. Id.
40. Galloway, 778 F.2d at 20; CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150-51
(1969) (“[W]e do not consider it appropriate to enter the area where the charge is not based upon
extrinsic evidence but rather on a dispute as to the truth of the event (i.e., a claim that the true facts of
the incident are different from those presented.) The Commission is not the national arbiter of truth.”).
See also Christopher William Jones, Note, FCC Regulation of Broadcast News: First Amendment
Perils of Conflicting Standards of Review, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1226 (1980) (describing doctrine and
arguing that the FCC should use the stringent news distortion standard for fairness doctrine complaints
as well).
41. Galloway, 778 F.2d at 20.
42. See, e.g., Storer Broad. Co., 41 F.C.C.2d 792, 814 (1973); Radiohio, 38 F.C.C.2d 721, 741
(1973), aff’d sub nom. CBS v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad.
(NCCB), 32 F.C.C.2d 824, 825 (1971); Complaint Concerning the CBS Program “The Selling of the
Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 152 (1971); Universal Communications Corp., 27 F.C.C.2d 1022, 1025-
26 (1971); Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 654 (1969).
As the Commission put it in Howard L. Gifford, 50 F.C.C.2d 125, 125 (1974), the licensee “‘is . . .
constantly called upon to make choices between types of programming, and then, within each type, to
choose a format and content.’” (quoting Citizens Communications Center, 25 F.C.C.2d 705, 707
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judgment with regard to scope of coverage and its judgments about
newsgathering techniques.43 In an often-quoted declaration, the Commission
rejected any role in truth-assessments:
[T]he Commission has never examined news coverage as a censor
might to determine whether it is fair in the sense of presenting the
‘truth’ of an event as the Commission might see it. The question
whether a news medium has been fair in covering a news event would
turn on an evaluation of such matters as what occurred, what facts did
the news medium have in its possession, what other facts should it
reasonably have obtained, what did it actually report, etc. . . .
[H]owever appropriate such inquiries might be for critics or students
of the mass media, they are not appropriate for this Government
licensing agency. . . . We do not sit as a review body of the ‘truth’
concerning news events.44
Most significantly, the Commission took the position that the distortion or
(1970)). The Commission has taken this position even when one political candidate charges that the
station’s coverage has unfairly promoted the candidacy of his or her opponent. See, e.g., Penny Manes,
38 F.C.C.2d 308, 312 (1972), recon. denied, 42 F.C.C.2d 878 (1973); Charles L. Smith, 36 F.C.C.2d
690, 690 (1972) (rejecting a news distortion claim based on the station’s failure to cover petitioner’s
candidacy— even though the father of the petitioner’s opponent owned the station); WTAR Radio-TV
Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 812, 829-30 (1970) (denying an attempt to enlarge issues to include news
distortion in a mutually exclusive renewal application proceeding because of lack of evidence of
station directive to reduce coverage of public figure for station’s economic benefit).
43. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 32 F.C.C.2d at 824-25. Indeed, the Commission denied
NCCB’s request for reconsideration of its proposal that programming alterations made in direct and
proximate response to government pressure would be considered to violate the terms of license. The
Commission stated that “there is nothing inherently ‘wrong’” with pressure exerted on broadcasters by
“outside sources— by government officials, public figures, private groups, etc., all urging the
importance of some development or emphasis on some particular viewpoint or spokesmen in making a
news or public affairs presentation.” Id. Were the Commission to meddle in that process, the agency
stated, it:
would be placed in an intolerable position in trying to determine whether any decision to
broadcast certain material should be construed as “capitulation to government pressures . . .” etc.
Adoption of your proposal would seriously affect the freedom of licensees in deciding what
material to broadcast, particularly material suggested by government officials the broadcast of
which may well be in the public interest.
Evaluation of news “pressures,” from whatever source, is for the journalistic judgment of the
licensee. The Commission does not interfere with that journalistic judgment . . . . We thus will not
hold evidentiary hearings here to determine, perhaps largely on credibility grounds, exactly what a
public official said to a broadcast journalist and whether the latter “distorted” the news. This is a
quagmire where Government intervention is far worse than any abuse involved.
Id. at 825.
44. Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 655 (addressing
charges that the network coverage of the convention was staged and produced to reflect an
antigovernment and anti-Vietnam war bias).
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staging must be deliberate and intentional45 and the complainant must be able
to produce “substantial”46 or “significant”47 extrinsic evidence of such
deliberate and knowing distortion.48 The Commission has defined extrinsic
evidence as evidence other than the broadcast itself, including written or oral
instructions from station management to fabricate or distort the news.49
While the Commission has never sought to articulate a general definition of
“extrinsic” evidence, it has provided examples: “evidence that a newsman
had been given a bribe, or had offered one to procure some action or
statement,”50 outtakes,51 written memoranda “readily establishing whether
there has been a rigging of news,52 or “testimony, in writing or otherwise,
from ‘insiders’ or persons who have direct personal knowledge of an
intentional attempt to falsify the news.”53
The Commission made clear early on that it “did not mean the type of
situation, frequently encountered, where a person quoted on a news program
complains that he very clearly said something else. The Commission cannot
appropriately enter the quagmire of investigating the credibility of the
45. As the Galloway court puts it: “The key elements of this standard are, first, that the distortion
or staging be deliberately intended to slant or mislead.” Galloway, 778 F.2d at 20.
46. See Jones, supra note 40, at 1237 & n.74 (citing relevant cases therein).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., KMAP Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 241, 244 (1979); Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965
(1978); Melvin Pulley, 58 F.C.C.2d 1224, 1226-27 (1976); Northwestern Ind. Broad. Corp., 57
F.C.C.2d 686, 694 (1975), applic. denied, 65 F.C.C.2d 73 (1976), aff’d as modified, 65 F.C.C.2d 66
(1977); Sun Newspapers, Inc., 41 F.C.C.2d 988, 989 (1973); The Evening News Assoc., 35 F.C.C.2d
366, 394 (1972); Letter to Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 591-92 (1969); CBS Program “Hunger in
America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 755-56 (1983).
50. Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d at 151.
51. The term “outtakes” refers to material videotaped in connection with a story but not
ultimately broadcast in the aired program.
As discussed below, the Commission did not use the potential evidentiary weight of outtakes to
confer a right on complainants to obtain outtakes from broadcasters. The statement in the text merely
refers to the potential evidentiary value of outtakes obtained by complainants without compulsion.
Aside from public domain evidence or materials provided by a disgruntled employee, complainants
often receive outtakes from other participants in a story. For example, a person who has been
interviewed by a broadcaster may have the tape of her interview and may independently choose to
share it with a news distortion complainant.
52. Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d at 151.
53. Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d at 965; Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d at 592. In Star Stations of Ind.,
Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 105-09, aff’d sub nom. Star Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
the Commission denied a renewal application because, inter alia, the general manager of the station
testified that the station’s principal owner instructed him to slant news reporting in favor of a
senatorial candidate. In Michael D. Bramble, 58 F.C.C.2d 565, 577-78 (1976), the Commission
rejected a news suppression complaint after the agency’s own field investigation had not adequately
supported a former newsman’s claims that the station’s top management had directed the suppression
of news.
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newsman and the interviewed party in such a type of case.”54 Nor did the
Commission find generalized suggestions of media bias to suffice under the
extrinsic evidence standard to lead to an inference of news distortion in a
particular case.55 Nor are claims of past history56 or inferences from
competitive positions57 or claims of “news management” to further the
station’s economic interests in a “news war”58 sufficient for an inference of
54. Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d at 151.
55. See, e.g., Henry M. Buchanan, 42 F.C.C.2d 430, 430-33 (1973) (rejecting complainant’s
attempt to rely on prior charges of CBS’s anti-Administration liberal bias to substantiate news
distortion complaint). Ulster-American Heritage Foundation, 96 F.C.C.2d 1246, 1246-48 (1984)
(rejecting news distortion claims in connection with coverage of Ireland, including claim of inevitable
pro-British bias because the station aired a program produced by anti-Ulster governments).
56. For example, in Sun Newspapers, Inc., 41 F.C.C.2d 988 (1973), the complainant argued that
WCCO had distorted its news coverage to help its affiliated newspaper and hurt the competitive
newspaper in town. Id. at 988. The Commission rejected the claim of anticompetitive news distortion
because the complainant did not present extrinsic evidence. The Commission did not give credence to
the argument that WCCO’s prior anticompetitive activities in other contexts should be viewed as
extrinsic evidence. Id. Sun Newspapers can be read narrowly as relying on the fact that WCCO
adequately answered those anticompetitive news distortion charges in the previous license renewal
proceedings. However, the fact that the Commission did not choose to give any weight to the “‘serious
public interest questions,’” id. at 989 (quoting Midwest Radio-Television, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 625
(1970)), that had been raised in the renewal proceeding is, at least, suggestive of the Commission’s
stringent approach to inferences about extrinsic evidence.
In Yellow Freight System, Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d 741 (1979), aff’d, 656 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1981), the
Commission addressed distortion claims about NBC news coverage of truck safety programs. Id. at
741. Yellow Freight claimed that the reporter, who had previously written articles for a dissident
teamster’s group newsletter, had a conflict of interest that established a motive for intentional
distortion. Id. at 757. The Commission credited the reporter’s affidavit specifically denying those
charges, but said that, even if he had written such articles in the past, such activity should not
constitute the kind of “stake which must be brought to public attention.” Id. “[I]ndeed, to do so would
involve the Commission in making impossible judgments as to whether a reporter already has an
opinion on a subject he is covering.” Id. This dictum is particularly instructive because, as is discussed
below, the Commission does have a policy of requiring disclosure of economic conflicts of interest.
57. See, e.g., Telegraph-Herald, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1233, 1233-35 (1976) (rejecting argument that
rival station’s sensationalized and unflattering news reports about complainant were undertaken to
damage the competing station’s good will). In Telegraph-Herald, the Commission rejected the
complainant’s inferences that its competitor “must have had knowledge” of matters affected by its
programming. Id. at 1234. That claim is very close to the standard that the D.C. Circuit seems to have
adopted in Serafyn, however.
58. See Am. Broad. Cos. (KGO-TV) 56 F.C.C.2d 275 (1975), recon. denied, 60 F.C.C.2d 509
(1976). In KGO-TV, petitioners, to deny the station’s application for renewal, argued that the licensee
had adopted news editorial policies that amounted to news management because it was involved in a
“news war.” Id. at 275. These policies included airing tabloid news stories and “happy talk” preferred
by the general population. Id. at 1275-76. Petitioners asserted that such programming, designed to
improve ratings and advertising revenues, promoted the station’s individual economic interest above
its duty to program for the public interest. Id. at 276. The petitioners presented “extrinsic evidence” in
the form of quotes from news clippings detailing the degree to which the station used news consultants
and promised testimony from employees if the matter were set for hearing. Id. The Commission noted
that the petitioners had not identified any specific instances or situations where the station “ignored a
news event or distorted the news to achieve its own selfish ends. . . . [M]uch of petitioners’ evidence
does not relate specifically to KGO-TV but to the news practices generally at many stations.” Id. at
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deliberate distortion. The Commission has refused to set cases for hearing—
even if they concern broadcasts full of mistakes— if there is no significant
extrinsic evidence that the errors were something more than “honest
mistakes.”59 At points, the Commission has flatly stated that it “will not infer
an intent to distort.”60
The Commission has also eschewed inquiry into the editing practices of
broadcasters. In a decision involving a CBS program that prompted a
congressional hearing into news practices,61 the agency opined:
It would be unwise and probably impossible for the Commission to
lay down some precise line of factual accuracy— dependent always on
journalistic judgment— across which broadcasters must not stray. . . .
Any presumption [to being the national arbiter of truth] on our part
276. The Commission then held the following:
We will not interfere with the exercise of the licensee’s news judgment where, as here, there is no
showing that it consistently and unreasonably ignored important matters of public concern.
Also, absent a showing that the licensee has surrendered its news and programming discretion
to another party, the Commission finds no issue raised by the fact that ABC uses a news
consultant or that it seeks primacy in its market. Broadcasting is a competitive business, and the
Commission would not make it otherwise, believing that the public is best served by having its
problems, needs, and interests met by a variety of presentations, all competing to give the most
preferred and beneficial service.
Id. at 276-77. See also Florida Power & Light Co., 95 F.C.C.2d 605, 605-12 (1983) (denying
complaint alleging that a radio station engaged in news distortion to boost ratings).
59. See, e.g., Vincent P. Dole, M.D., 54 F.C.C.2d 508, 513-14 (1975) (rejecting news distortion
claim despite numerous apparent errors in documentary on methadone because the Commission found
nothing to suggest that the errors were not due to “honest mistakes”).
60. Pacifica Foundation, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 756 (1983). See also Peter Gimpel, 3 F.C.C.R. 4575
(1988) (refusing to find that complainant’s assertion of nationwide news blackout of anti-Shah reports
could be supported by putting two and two together). The Gimpel Commission stated:
[Y]ou have merely provided a comparative survey of American and European press coverage of
the Black Friday massacre, congressional testimony concerning government disinformation
programs, and various facts which you hypothesize support your theory of a nationwide cover-up.
These fall short of actual “insider” information concerning this specific news story, e.g., affidavits
from employees of the networks attesting to orders from top management to intentionally distort
the number of victims of the Black Friday massacre. Without such “insider” information,
Commission intervention in such matters would pose a significant intrusion upon the
broadcaster’s First Amendment rights . . . .
Id. at 4576.
61. The CBS program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971). The controversial
documentary won a Peabody Prize and an Emmy Award, but garnered harsh criticism by Vice
President Agnew. Id. at 165-68 (separate statement of Comm’r Nicholas Johnson) (describing and
citing sources about political controversy regarding program). See also Dyk & Goldberg, supra note
33 (arguing that Congress has overstepped the boundaries of its investigative authority in violation of
the First Amendment). It should be noted that the Selling of the Pentagon case involved editing
practices rather than the broadcast of false statements. 30 F.C.C.2d at 151-52. For similar
representative holdings about the limits of the news distortion policy, see, for example, CBS “Hunger
in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150-52 (1969); Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l
Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 (1969).
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would be inconsistent with the First Amendment and with the
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be “uninhibited, robust, [and] wide-open.” . . . It would
involve the Commission deeply and improperly in the journalistic
functions of broadcasters.
This function necessarily involves selection and editorial
judgment. And, in the absence of extrinsic evidence, documentary or
otherwise, that a licensee has engaged in deliberate distortion, for the
Commission to review this editing process would be to enter an
impenetrable thicket. On every single question of judgment, and each
complaint that might be registered, the Commission would have to
decide whether the editing had involved deliberate distortion.62
Thus, short of “situations where the documentary evidence of deliberate
distortion would be sufficiently strong to require an inquiry— for example,
where a ‘yes’ answer to one question was used to replace a ‘no’ answer to an
entirely different question,”63— the Commission declared its desire to
“eschew the censor’s role,” because its intervention might well be “a remedy
far worse than the disease.”64 Given the apparent “splicing” of questions and
62.  See The Selling of the Pentagon, 30 F.C.C. 2d at 152-53.
63. Id. at 152-53 (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 153 (citations omitted). The Commission refused to find a policy violation even when a
station deleted the remarks of a controversial guest speaking about the Vietnam war. See Mark Lane,
37 F.C.C.2d 630, 634 (1972) (refusing to find that station’s act in deleting audio portion of guest’s
comments, pursuant to legal counsel’s instructions to avoid a libel suit, should be treated as
impermissible censorship under § 326 of the Communications Act). Reiterating that a licensee’s
programming decisions must be based on his obligation to serve community needs, the Commission
stated that it would be “concerned if a licensee rejected ‘a presentation of views on the basis of a
policy that he never presented views with which he disagreed.’” Id. at 633 (quoting Letter to
Honorable Richard L. Ottinger, available at 31 F.C.C.2d 847 (1971)). Nevertheless, the agency found
that the decision to delete “does not appear to have been arbitrary, capricious or based upon a policy of
excluding views with which it disagreed.” Id. at 634. In a strongly worded dissent, Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson chastised the Commission for ignoring the station’s “policy on program
discrimination” and forgiving the station for its misleading statement that technical difficulties caused
the bleeping out of the audio. Id. at 634-35.
In The Selling of the Pentagon, the Commission did effectively rebuke CBS for its editing
practices, noting:
[The network] failed to address the question raised as to splicing answers to a variety of questions
as a way of creating a new “answer” to a single question. The very use of a “Question and
Answer” format would seem to encourage the viewer to believe that a particular answer follows
directly from the question preceding.
30 F.C.C.2d at 153. Thus, the Commission encouraged broadcasters to “examine their own processes,
to subject them to the kind of hard critical analysis that is characteristic of the best traditions of the
journalistic profession.” Id. at 153-54.
Yet, the Commission staff has rejected complaints of biased editing leading to misimpressions
about interviewee statements. See, e.g., Citizens for Abraham D. Beame, 41 F.C.C.2d 155, 159 (1973).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/1
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
2000] REVIVAL OF THE FCC’S NEWS DISTORTION POLICY 1023
answers in the Selling of the Pentagon case itself, this approach suggests a
rather narrow ambit for the news distortion policy.65
Moreover, to violate the news distortion policy, the distortion must be
about a significant matter and not merely something trivial or incidental.66
The Commission has explicitly stated that it “tolerates . . . practices [such as
staging and distortion] unless they “affect[ ] the basic accuracy of the events
reported.”67 The Commission made clear that peripheral acts of puffery and
“window dressing” would not materially deceive the public and therefore
would not be characterized as distortion.68
In addition, the Commission has explained that even if there is extrinsic
evidence of deliberate distortion or staging, it will not threaten the license
unless it involves “the licensee or its top management.”69 The involvement of
“news employees of the station,” without more, might lead to further
Commission inquiry “in appropriate cases,” but “unless our investigation
reveals involvement of the licensee or its management there will be no
Also, the Commission found that discrepancies between a broadcast report and a newswire account
was not evidence of distortion because the reporter did not unreasonably ascribe the discrepancies to a
different newswire story by the same service. RKO General, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 367, 369 (1975). See
also Jones, supra note 40, at 1237-41 & nn.78-99 (summarizing the FCC’s various categories of news
distortion and describing the application of the extrinsic evidence standard in each context).
65. Presumably, the Commission would conclude otherwise were the editing practices to lead to
a significant alteration of the statements from those broadcasts.
66. See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
67. Id. (quoting WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 386 (1978)).
68. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d at 386 (1978) (distinguishing “props or attempts at
window dressing which concerned the manner of presenting the news without affecting the basic
accuracy of the events reported”) (emphasis in original); Oscar B. White, 87 F.C.C.2d 954, 960 (1981)
(rejecting news staging claim regarding a program about a then-pending jail bond issue which included
a segment of a documentary prepared by bond proponents in which county employees were depicted
as prisoners because segment was “relatively minor” and incidental to the entire program); Ubiquitous
Corp., 51 F.C.C.2d 780, 794 (1975) (granting only short-term renewal as a result of nonprogramming
problems, but expressly refusing to set limits on broadcaster’s use of “hyperbole” in programming);
Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 25 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 413, 420 (1972).
69. The Black Producer’s Ass’n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1922 (1979). See also Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26
F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969) (“We would be particularly concerned were the extrinsic evidence to reveal
orders to falsify the news from the licensee, its top management, or its news management.”); CBS
Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150 (1969) (no hazard to license status if
management not involved).
In Network Coverage of the Democratic National Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969), the
Commission stated the following:
[T]o place the license in jeopardy for the occasional isolated lapse of an employee would be unjust
where the licensee has adequately discharged its responsibilities, might tend to discourage
broadcast journalism, and might thus be at odds with the very reason for our allocation of so much
scarce spectrum space to broadcasting— our realization of the valuable contribution it can make to
an informed electorate. . . . Accordingly, in the absence of licensee direction or an abdication of
licensee responsibility, a hearing on the license renewal would not be called for.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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hazard to the station’s licensed status.”70 Under those circumstances, “[t]he
matter should be referred to the licensee for its own investigation and
appropriate handling.”71
Finally, the Commission has refused to hold evidentiary hearings when
there is conflicting testimony:
In these circumstances [where there are different recollections], it is,
we believe, inappropriate to hold an evidentiary hearing and upon that
basis (i.e., credibility or demeanor judgments), make findings as to the
truth of the situation. The truth would always remain a matter open to
some question, and unlike a tort or contract case, where a judgment
must be made one way or another, that is not the case here.72
The distortion and staging cases that the Commission heard during this
period may best be classified into two categories: claims about staging or
rigging, and claims about news suppression or slanting. The staging or
rigging complaints consist of two subcategories: (1) fabricated news or
hoaxes and (2) news obtained at the news organization’s request or behest.73
70. Black Producer’s Ass’n, 70 F.C.C.2d at 1922. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d
119, 128 (1973) (refusing to take further action on instances of staging by CBS stations because top
management was not involved). However, even if licenses are not placed in jeopardy, a threshold
showing of undisclosed conflicts of interest may be considered in a mutually exclusive application
context as “relevant to [the station’s] past broadcast record.” Nat’l Broad. Co. (KNBC), 21 F.C.C.2d
195, 203 (1970), pet. granted in part, 21 F.C.C.2d 611 (1970).
71. Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d at 151. The Commission requires broadcasters to investigate
news staging claims thoroughly. In the infamous Pot Party case— in which Congress held a hearing on
a CBS program about pot smoking on college campuses in the 1960s— the Commission rebuked the
station for its reliance on an inexperienced reporter and its inadequate investigation of staging charges.
Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party (Pot
Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 137 (1969). See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d at 128 (chiding
CBS for failing to investigate and unearth information on its own about staging claims in connection
with six programs and for only discovering significant facts after being confronted with facts by FCC);
Am. Broad. Co., 45 F.C.C.2d 41, 47 (1973) (characterizing ABC as “remiss” in one of its
investigations of staging claims in connection with a school disturbance).
72. Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d at 147. See also RKO Gen. Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 367, 371
(1975) (declining to add news falsification and lack of supervision issues to hearing because factual
conflict existed between complainant and station personnel in addition to a lack of evidence that
management was involved); Student Ass’n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo, N.Y., 40 F.C.C.2d
510, 518 (1973) (refusing to issue declaratory ruling that ABC’s refusal to air an anti-Vietnam
program during football half-time was censorship and finding it inappropriate to hold a hearing when
there is conflict of memory). Cf. Black Producer’s Ass’n, 70 F.C.C.2d at 1927-28 (avoiding discussion
of the effect of conflicting testimony as to whether ABC news personnel had asked gang members to
fight in connection with Youth Terror: The View from Behind the Gun because staged scenes were not
“significant” and there was no indication that staging was attributable to management).
73. By “fabricated news,” I refer to events made up by the media. The emblematic example of
this is Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke’s Pulitzer prize-winning fabricated story, Jimmy’s World.
See, e.g., John Leo, Bloopers of the Century, COLUM. JOURN. REV., Jan. 1, 1999, at 38. For more
recent examples, see, for example, Judith Sheppard, Playing Defense, AMER. JOURN. REV., Sept. 1998,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/1
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
2000] REVIVAL OF THE FCC’S NEWS DISTORTION POLICY 1025
The slanting cases involved claims that the station’s news programming gave
viewers the wrong idea about the truth of events reported. In turn, the
slanting claims were made in two sorts of contexts: (1) claims of suppression
of news and lack of coverage of newsworthy events for either ideological or
economic reasons, and (2) claims that the coverage, when it did occur, was
misleading, unfair, or incomplete.74
Specifically with regard to staging or rigging, the Commission attempted
to carve out a narrow and identifiable definition for its enforcement. The
agency was most consistently harsh in imposing sanctions for the broadcast
of entirely fabricated information and broadcast hoaxes.75 With regard to the
at 48. By contrast, news staging refers to situations in which reported events really happen but only
because the news media have prompted or requested them.
74. For claims of news slanting in the licensee’s private interests, see, for example, Miami Valley
Broad. Corp., 78 F.C.C.2d 684 (1980) (regarding suppression of Fonda promotion of antinuclear
movie because of GE’s nuclear power interests); Tri-State Broad., 59 F.C.C.2d 1240, 1244 (1976)
(regarding allegation that broadcaster “delayed, altered, distorted, or censored important news stories
that might displease commercial advertisers or threaten [the broadcaster’s] relationship with the
business and political community”); Messrs. S.J. King, Joe Faison, and Thomas Bagley, 51 F.C.C.2d
65, 65 (1975) (regarding complaint that licensee broadcast “auditorials” advocating licensee’s position
in litigation with local government); Mr. Clifford H. Wilmath, 43 F.C.C.2d 1266 (1973) (regarding
complainant’s allegation that CBS slanted 60 Minutes piece on mobile homes because CBS owned
49% of a Florida development corporation); Gross Telecasting, Inc., 14 F.C.C.2d 239 (1968)
(regarding complaint that licensee slanted editorials against opposing party in a business dispute);
Nat’l Broad. Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713 (1968) (regarding complaints that NBC reporter Chet Huntley
slanted reports against the meat industry); KIRO, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 673 (1976) (propagandizing
for Mormon Church during ostensibly objective news programming).
75. See, e.g., FCC Letter of Admonishment to Radio Station WALE-AM, 7 F.C.C.R. 2345
(1992) (admonishing station for false report that employee had been shot); FCC Letter of
Admonishment to Radio Station KROQ-FM, 6 F.C.C.R 7262 (1991) (admonishing station for murder
confession hoax); Walton Broad., Inc. (KIKX), 78 F.C.C.2d 857, 866 (1980) (rejecting a station’s
license renewal application because the station broadcast a “cynical hoax” consisting of false
announcements and promotions regarding the imaginary kidnapping of a disc jockey which
“needlessly shocked KIKX’s listening audience and interfered with police operations”), recon. denied,
83 F.C.C.2d 440 (1980), aff’d, 679 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Action Radio, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 803,
809 (1975) (granting short-term renewal to station that, inter alia, broadcast suburban temperatures
without knowing the temperature). See also WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d 251, 266 (1981) (refusing
renewal for hoax and fraudulent billing). In WMJX, the Commission stated:
This case . . . falls beyond the ‘core area’ of licensee discretion (journalistic decisions regarding
what is news, the editing process, and news commentary). Where, as here, the danger is
manipulation of the news to further the licensee’s business interests, rather than the manipulation
of the news to create a biased or one-sided impression upon public issues, there is less potential for
censorship and the Commission need not be as hesitent in imposing a sanction. Even under the
more demanding standard, however, there is ample evidence to support the finding of an intent to
deceive. The record discloses that Hamill authored the four news items in question, and that he did
so with knowledge of their falsity.
85 F.C.C.2d at 266. Cf. KWK Radio Inc. v. FCC, 337 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (affirming license
revocation for fraudulent treasure hunt). The Commission has even adopted a specific rule prohibiting
broadcast hoaxes that are harmful to the public. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Broad. Hoaxes, 7
F.C.C.R. 4106 (1992) (summarized at 57 Fed. Reg. 28,638-02 (June 26, 1992) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
1026 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1005
more subtle forms of staging, the Commission explicitly recognized three
realities: (1) that news events can be— and, in the instance of news
conferences, are by definition— staged by participants in order to trigger
press scrutiny; (2) that the subjects of news reporting often modify their
behavior because of television coverage; and (3) that news production often
requires “stage managing”76 as a result of technological needs. Bowing to
those realities, the Commission sought to distinguish those types of staging
from the kind of heinous news manipulation it sought to inhibit.77 The
Commission “viewed its proper area of concern to be with those activities
which are not a matter of journalistic judgment or gray area, but rather
constitute the deliberate portrayal of a significant ‘event’ which did not in
fact occur but rather is ‘acted out’ at the behest of news personnel.”78
Even if the event were “real” and not acted out at the behest of news
personnel, improper staging would also occur if the event had been induced
to occur by the press.79 Otherwise, said the Commission, “the matter would
§ 73.1217)) (adopting section 73.1217 Broadcast Hoaxes, which permits the Commission to levy fines
against violators, in addition to issuing letters of admonition or instituting revocation proceedings
available under the traditional news distortion policy). See also Justin Levine, A History and Analysis
of the Federal Communications Commission’s Response to Radio Broadcast Hoaxes, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 273 (2000); Letter to KSLX-FM (MMB, Oct. 2, 1989) (admonishing station for false report that
station had been taken hostage), cited in Broadcast Hoaxes, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,638 (June 26, 1992)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217).
76. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
77. As the FCC stated in Network Coverage of the Democratic National Convention:
We are not considering “staging” in the sense that persons or organizations may engage in certain
conduct because of television— whether a press conference or a demonstration. . . . In a sense,
every televised press conference may be said to be “staged” to some extent; depiction of scenes in
a television documentary— on how the poor live on a typical day in the ghetto, for example— also
necessarily involves camera direction, lights, action instructions, etc. The term “pseudo-event”
describes a whole class of such activities that constitute much of what journalists treat as “news”.
Few would question the professional propriety of asking public officials to smile again or to repeat
handshakes, while the cameras are focussed upon them. In short, while there can, of course, be
difficult gray areas, there are also many areas of permissible licensee judgment in this field.
The staging of the news with which we are here concerned is neither an area coming clearly
within the licensee’s journalistic judgment nor even a gray area.
16 F.C.C.2d 650, 656 (1969). See also The Black Producer’s Ass’n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1921-22 (1979)
(describing staging policy).
78. Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 413, 414 (1972); Democratic Nat’l
Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 657.
79. Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party
(Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 134 (1969).
WBBM-TV could . . . properly use television coverage of a pot party to point up graphically the
widespread nature of this drug violation on college campuses. But it had to be a pot party which
was being held, whether or not WBBM-TV was there to televise it— one to which it was truly
invited. The licensee could not properly induce the holding of a pot party.
But see Taft Broad. Co., 2 F.C.C.R. 6622, 6624 (1987) (finding no extrinsic evidence of news staging
where reporter advised complainant’s dissatisfied customers that station would be filming the filing of
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again come down to a judgment as to what was presented, as against what
should have been presented— a judgmental area for broadcast journalism
which [the FCC] must eschew.”80
With respect to claims about slanting or distortion, the Commission has
given the shortest shrift to arguments regarding overall programming
suppression and bias.81 Even with regard to claims that particular programs
lawsuits at the courthouse on a particular day, invited customers to join others at the courthouse, and
“encouraged and assisted the disgruntled customers to file their complaints”), recon. denied, 3
F.C.C.R. 6489 (1988).
The Commission seems to envision a distinction between staging on the one hand and permissible
news coverage of a future event on the other hand. The distinction may be something like the
difference between a reporter asking, “Please hold a pot party for us,” and “We heard you’re having a
pot party tomorrow and would love to be invited.” This distinction is somewhat problematic, however.
The media’s request to be invited to the pot party might affect the “when, where, and if” of the
participants’ decisions if their planned event could benefit from public exposure. Moreover, the agency
also prohibits media inducement of events, without defining the parameters of such inducement and
where it fits in the staging and news coverage continuum. It is at least partly because of the
impossibility of drawing clear lines among these notions that this Article argues for the complete
elimination of the news distortion doctrine rather than an attempt to craft a narrower news staging
alternative. See discussion infra Part IV.
80. Democratic Nat’l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d at 657-58.
81. Thus, the Commission has not credited claims of overall liberal media bias without
significant extrinsic evidence. Cf. Am. Security Council Educ. Found. Against CBS, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d
366, 370 (1977), aff’d, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim of fairness doctrine violation by
CBS news in connection with national security coverage). In most instances, the Commission has
similarly rejected arguments that coverage of (and programs of interest to) the station’s African
American community or women viewers has been suppressed for ideological reasons. See, e.g., Nat’l
Org. for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dr. Paul Klite, 12 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 79
(1998), available at 1998 WL 208060 (rejecting contention that racial and gender stereotyping
constitute evidence of intent to distort); The Providence Journal Co., 12 F.C.C.R. 2883, 2890 (1997)
(rejecting petition to deny transfer grounded on claims of biased reporting of campaign issues and the
African American community in general); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 83 F.C.C.2d 302 (1980) (same),
recon. dismissed, 86 F.C.C.2d 1 (1981); License Renewal Applications of Certain Broad. Stations
Licensed to and Serving the District of Columbia, 77 F.C.C.2d 899 (1980) (rejecting claim that the
licensee’s structuring of its newsgathering process led to a result that would, by definition, reduce the
coverage of issues of interest to the community’s minority residents); Field Communications Corp., 68
F.C.C.2d 817 (1978); WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994, 996-97 (1977) (rejecting petition to deny renewal
despite allegations of programming tending to “perpetuate a perceived link between blacks and crime”
because complainant presented no evidence of abuse of professional news judgment); N.Y. Times
Broad. Service, Inc., Station WREG-T.V., 63 F.C.C.2d 695, 703-06 (1977) (regarding news coverage
of Memphis’ African American community), recon. denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 340 (1977); Newhouse
Broad. Corp., 61 F.C.C.2d 528, 532 (1976) (charging, inter alia, “gross misrepresentation and
distortion of the coverage of news, especially for the Black community”), modified by 73 F.C.C.2d 186
(1979); KSD/KSD-TV, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 504 (1976), recon. granted in part, 73 F.C.C.2d 186 (1979);
Radio Station WKRA, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 727 (1976) (refusing to deny renewal despite allegations that
the station failed to cover events of interest in the African American community); CBS, Inc., 57
F.C.C.2d 505 (1976) (rejecting news distortion claim based on station’s failure to program for women
viewers), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Los Angeles Women’s Coalition for Better Broad. v.
FCC, 584 F.2d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cosmos Broad. of La., Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 320, 325-27 (1975)
(finding no extrinsic evidence to support claims about news suppression, including charges of
inadequate programming for African American community); Wichita County Human Relations
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demonstrate ideological bias, the Commission has taken a rather skeptical
approach:
[T]he complaint is frequently received that “Commentator X has given
a biased account or analysis of a news event” or that the true facts of
Comm., 50 F.C.C.2d 322 (1974) (rejecting news suppression claims based on station’s failure to
broadcast complainant’s city council appearance); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 903 (1974)
(denying complainant’s petition to deny renewal alleging station’s failure to serve the needs of
Philadelphia’s African American community); Cmty. Coalition for Media Change, 45 F.C.C.2d 1051
(1974) (rejecting news distortion claim in connection with negative portrayal of African Americans in
news programming and a misleading partial broadcast of an interview with an African American
congressman), aff’d, 50 F.C.C.2d 304, 306-07 (1974) (criticizing general manager’s lack of candor but
concluding that it “would be inappropriate for this Commission to take action on the basis of a broad
and vague claim that a station has portrayed a particular ethnic group negatively”); Universal
Communications Corp., 27 F.C.C.2d 1022, 1026 (1971) (rejecting allegation of suppression of news of
interest to African American community on ground that charges merely evidenced disagreement with
broadcaster’s news judgments). See also Rudolph P. Arnold, 52 F.C.C.2d 405 (1975) (rejecting claims
that suppression of news about women candidates violated the fairness doctrine).
In Screen Gems Stations, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 252 (1974), recon. denied, 51 F.C.C.2d 557 (1975),
complainants claimed that ABC suppressed news about a contoversy over the racism of the Sugar
Bowl sponsors to protect the station’s own economic interests in airing the game. Id. at 253-54. The
Commission stated:
Any time a producer, news director or editor decides not to print or broadcast a news story, he is,
in a sense, “suppressing” news. However, the “news suppression” we are concerned with arises
where the licensee’s decision is based on private rather than public interests, a determination that
must rest largely on questions of intent or motive. Because of First Amendment considerations,
we believe it is inappropriate for us to make inquiry into this sensitive area in the absence of
extrinsic evidence that a licensee has not been guided by the public interest standard.
Id. at 257. Cf. Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975) (rejecting renewal because
programming ignored needs of African American community, but inviting station to reapply because
of post-license reforms); Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 993, 995 (1971) (designating for
hearing a petition to deny renewal to a station that systematically suppressed news of the civil rights
movement because “news coverage of these marches and demonstrations would invite outside
agitators both black and white to take part and would serve to promote discord and violence among the
citizens of the community”), recon. granted, 31 F.C.C.2d 1080 (1971).
One commentator suggests that during this period, the Commission generally resolved “claims of
bias and advocacy” under the fairness doctrine standard and claims of “inaccuracy, news management
manipulation, and distortion” under the extrinsic evidence standard. Jones, supra note 40, at 1242
(citing to relevant cases therein). The commentator also complains quite sensibly that the Commission
has “provided little explanation of how it determines which standard will be applied to a particular
complaint.” Id.
Admittedly, the FCC’s dictum in WSNT did make clear that extrinsic evidence of a policy of
exclusion would trigger inquiry into slanting or distortion. In that case, the Commission required a
showing that the licensee “consistently failed to respond to issues or news events of public importance
it could not reasonably or in good faith ignore.” WSNT, 27 F.C.C.2d at 995. See also Nat’l Org. for
Women v. FCC (NOW), 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing this proposition in WSNT and
upholding FCC’s refusal to order evidentiary hearing on charges of insufficient coverage of women’s
issues news). However, WSNT and NOW did not call for application of this principle and it is thus
unclear what events would fall into the narrow category of issues the station could not “reasonably or
in good faith ignore.” WSNT, 27 F.C.C.2d at 995. From the facts of cases in which the FCC found that
there had not been intentional news distortion as a result of suppression, one could conclude that the
category of unavoidable issues was small indeed.
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the news event are different from those presented. You will appreciate
that in a democracy, dependent upon the fundamental rights of free
speech and press, no Government agency can authenticate the news,
or should try to do so. Such an attempt would cast the chill of
omnipresent government censorship over the newsmen’s
independence in news judgment. Were this the case a newsman might
decide to “play it safe,” and not broadcast a valuable news story or
documentary for fear he might later be held up to censure. This
Commission is thus not the national arbiter of the “truth” of a news
event. It cannot properly investigate to determine whether an account
or analysis of a news commentator is “biased” or “true.”82
On occasion, the Commission has affirmatively deployed its news
distortion policy, by requiring disclosure of reporter conflicts of interest.83
Even here, however, nondisclosure has not led to severe sanctions.84 Further,
82. Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969); see also Polly Sowell, 48 F.C.C.2d 494, 495
(1974) (quoting Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969)). Some early FCC precedent suggests that the
fairness doctrine would address the issue of “truth” by prompting the broadcast of contrasting views
which challenge the accuracy of broadcast material. See, e.g., Mobile Home News, Inc., 41 F.C.C.2d
603, 604 (1973) (rejecting mobile home industry’s fairness and news distortion complaints about 60
Minutes program on problems with mobile homes and finding that program contained enough
balance). See also Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 958, 961-62 (1973) (rejecting news distortion
claim but recognizing the possibility of a fairness doctrine claim about NBC’s program critical of
private pension plans because allegations of omitted information “challenge only the ‘truth’ or
accuracy of broadcast material”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 58 F.C.C.2d 361 (1976). One commentator notes that the
traditional justification for different standards of review under the fairness doctrine precedent and the
news distortion policy is that, while it may be the proper role of a regulatory agency to oversee the
“fairness” or ‘balance” of news reporting, it is not a proper role to become an insurer of its “accuracy”
or “truth”. Jones, supra note 40, at 1241 n.103 (citing to relevant cases therein).
83. See, e.g., Ubiquitous Corp., 51 F.C.C.2d 780, 795 (1975) (suggesting that station might
exercise more care to insure no conflict of interest issue could arise with respect to use of stringers);
Practices of Licensees and Networks in Connection with Broad. of Sports Events, 48 F.C.C.2d 235,
237-38 (1974) (Report and Order) (requiring licensees to disclose when sports announcers are paid and
controlled by parties other than the licensees and to require such personnel not to engage in intentional
distortion of sports news); Nat’l Broad. Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713, 715-17 (1968) (finding NBC
responsible for Chet Huntley’s failure to disclose his financial interest in cattle ranching in connection
with his on-air criticism of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967); Gross Telecasting, Inc., 14 F.C.C.2d
239, 240 (1968) (holding that licensee who editorialized on controversy about airport concession had
obligation to disclose extent of financial interest in the matter); Crowell-Collier Broad. Corp., 14
F.C.C.2d 358 (1966).
A licensee has an obligation to exercise special diligence to prevent improper use of its radio
facilities when it has employees in a position to influence program content who are also engaged
in outside activities which may create a conflict between their private interests and their roles as
employees of the station.
14 F.C.C.2d at 358.
84. For example, the short-term renewal the Commission granted the station in Ubiquitous Corp.
was not grounded on programming matters, and the NBC decision only required the network to revise
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while claims that licensee management has attempted to influence the news
in order to advance its own separate private interests has led to significant
Commission interest,85 the agency has subjected the purported evidence for
such claims to very searching review.86 Although the Commission has stated
in dictum that government intervention in news staging and distortion cases
might be acceptable “in the unusual case where the matter can be readily and
definitely resolved,”87 it has never given guidance on how to define such
unusual circumstances and does not seem to have encountered any in its
history of news distortion cases.
Thus, as the D.C. Circuit has noted, the FCC’s practice— regardless of the
passion of its rhetoric— “has given its policy against news distortion an
extremely limited scope.”88 In the few cases in which the Commission
required hearings or imposed sanctions for news programming practices,
complainants presented evidence of conscious staging, hoaxes, and failures
to disclose conflicts of interest.89 Because the Commission may “set the
scope of broadcast regulation,” the D.C. Circuit has historically deferred to
the Commission’s decisions in this area.90 In Galloway, the court specifically
articulated the rather unexceptionable view that, while the Commission has
establised a narrow scope for the news distortion doctrine, “it is not the role
of this court to question the wisdom of [the FCC’s] policy choices” so long
as they fall within the constraints of the Constitution and the agency’s broad
governing statute.91
its procedures. See also Am. Broad. Cos. (KGO-TV), 90 F.C.C.2d 395 (1982) (rejecting Synanon’s
petition to reject KGO-TV’s renewal application on grounds of news distortion, including claim that
reporter had violated conflict of interest policy by not disclosing his own status as a litigant in a civil
suit involving Synanon). Moreover, the Commission did not interpret its conflict of interest policy as
broadly as it might have— or as Commissioner Johnson recommended in the NBC case. See 14
F.C.C.2d at 718-33 (Comm’r Johnson, dissenting). In other words, the Commission did not take the
opportunity presented by the NBC case to opine more generally on the subtle pressures that corporate
owners with non-news economic interests may exert on news operations. Commissioner Johnson
would have initiated a general Commission inquiry into the effects of conglomerate corporate
ownership on broadcast licensees’ news programming. Id. at 731-32.
85. See, e.g., Tri-State Broad. Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1240 (1976) (rejecting accusation that station
slanted news in favor of its advertisers).
86. In some cases, for example, claims have been made that news was suppressed or
sensationalized because the broadcaster desired to improve its ratings. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light
Co., 95 F.C.C.2d 605 (1983) (rejecting FPL’s claim of news distortion in connection with coverage of
proposed utility rate increase). Particularly when the complainant has a point of view tied to its own
economic interests, the Commission does not appear to be too quick to credit news distortion claims
unsupported by significant evidence.
87. CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 147 (1969).
88. Galloway v. FCC, 788 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
90. Galloway, 788 F.2d at 21.
91. Id.
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It has been argued that the FCC’s onerous threshold requirements are
excessive and effectively nullify the news distortion policy.92 However, the
Galloway court quickly dismissed this argument. In the court’s view, the
Commission’s policy of requiring a “substantial prima facie case” before
proceeding against a broadcaster “reflect[ed] an appropriate respect for First
Amendment values.”93
Thus, prior to Serafyn, the D.C. Circuit took an extremely deferential
approach to the FCC’s application of the news distortion policy. In
Galloway, for example, while the court implied that it did not necessarily
approve of CBS’ 60 Minutes “production techniques”— and while it opined
that “[p]erhaps the broad public interest standard would justify a stricter
policy”— it nevertheless affirmed the FCC’s choice of approach to the
issue.94 Because none of the “playacting” CBS used affected the “basic
accuracy of the events reported,”95 the Galloway court found no violation of
the FCC’s policy.
B. The Recent Judicial Transformation of News Distortion: Serafyn at the
FCC and the D.C. Circuit
The Commission’s conservative approach to the regulation of news
distortion recently came under the D.C. Circuit’s disapproving judicial
scrutiny in connection with another 60 Minutes broadcast. The following
section describes the story of the program’s judicial travails in detail in order
to demonstrate the significant shift in content-regulation policy portended by
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. The section also provides a transcript of the
broadcast to situate the reader and to serve as an object lesson in the
difficulties entailed by an attempt to apply an invigorated news distortion
policy.
1. Procedural History
On October 23, 1994, CBS broadcast a 60 Minutes segment entitled The
Ugly Face of Freedom about the resurgence of anti-Semitism in post-Soviet
Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
(UCCA) and two Ukrainian-Americans— Alexander Serafyn and Oleg
Nikolyszyn— filed petitions seeking to block various CBS ownership
92. For example, this was one of the plaintiff’s arguments in Galloway. Id. at 22-23.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id.
95. 788 F.2d at 21 (quoting WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 386 (1978)).
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changes on the ground that the program demonstrated CBS’s news distortion,
personal attacks, and failure to program in the public interest.96 The FCC
denied all the complainants’ claims, and the appeal of some of those denials
formed the basis for the D.C. Circuit’s unprecedented extension of the
Commission’s news distortion doctrine in Serafyn v. FCC.97
On remand from the D.C. Circuit, the parties jointly requested that the
FCC’s proceedings be stayed pending settlement discussions. Ultimately, the
96. On November 10, 1994, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc. (UCCA) filed a
“personal attack” rule complaint with the FCC regarding The Ugly Face of Freedom. The FCC’s Mass
Media Bureau rejected the personal attack complaint on February 8, 1995. See Joint Pet. for FCC
Approval of Settlement Agreement at 2, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). The
Commission denied the UCCA’s application for review of the Mass Media Bureau’s decision on July
10, 1995. Ukrainian Congress Comm. of Am., 10 F.C.C.R. 11,948, 11,949 (1995).
On October 27, 1994, CBS filed an application with the FCC to approve the assignment of
WGPR-TV (now WWWJ-TV), Detroit, Michigan, from WGPR, Inc. to CBS. On December 22, 1994,
while the UCCA personal attack complaint was still pending, Alexander Serafyn filed a petition to
deny CBS’s application for consent to the assignment of WGPR-TV on the basis of the 60 Minutes
segment. Oleg Nikolyszyn filed a similar petition to deny CBS’s proposed acquisition of WPRI-TV, a
television station in Providence, Rhode Island, on the same basis. The FCC’s staff granted the WPRI-
TV application, subject to the Commission’s action in the WGPR-TV application. See Joint Pet. for
FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement at 2, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
When the FCC rejected Serafyn’s petition to deny the WGPR-TV application in WGPR, Inc., the
Commission also removed the condition on the grant of the WPRI-TV application. See WGPR, Inc., 10
F.C.C.R. 8140, 8146 nn.15-16, 8149 (1995). Serafyn and Nikolyszyn both appealed the FCC’s
decision in the D.C. Circuit. See Joint Pet. for FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement at 3, WGPR,
Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
In the meantime, CBS and Westinghouse Electric Corporation entered into a merger agreement
and filed an application with the Commission on August 3, 1995, to approve the transfer of control of
CBS’s broadcast licenses to Westinghouse. On September 1, 1995, Serafyn filed a petition to deny that
application, followed by a “petition to defer action” filed on November 2, 1995. This was presumably
because on October 25, 1995, both Serafyn and UCCA jointly filed a “petition to revoke or set for
hearing” all of the CBS station licenses. The FCC denied all three pending Serafyn, UCCA, and
Nikolyszyn petitions in its decision approving the CBS/Westinghouse transfer application.
Stockholders of CBS, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 3733 (1996), recon. dismissed, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,746 (1996).
Serafyn and UCCA then appealed this denial to the D.C. Circuit, which consolidated the appeal
with the earlier filed appeals. See Joint Pet. for FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement at 3, WGPR,
Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
On July 22, 1996, Westinghouse and Infinity Broadcasting Corporation filed an application with
the FCC for approval of the transfer of Infinity’s radio stations to CBS. In response, Serafyn and
UCCA filed a petition to deny and a motion to stay pending appellate review on August 26, 1996. The
Commission denied the Serafyn/UCCA claims relating to the Infinity transfer in its December 26,
1996 decision approving the transfer of the stations. Stockholders of Infinity Broad. Corp., 12
F.C.C.R. 5012 (1996). Serafyn and UCCA did not appeal that decision.
The D.C. Circuit considered the three consolidated appeals involving The Ugly Face of Freedom
and issued a decision on August 11, 1998, vacating and remanding the Commission’s decision in
WGPR, Inc. and affirming its decision in Stockholders of CBS. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1225
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
97. Serafyn filed a “Request for Order to Cease and Desist Unlicensed Operation of Television
Station WWJ-TV and Motion for Sanctions” on January 4, 1999. CBS filed its opposition to that
request on January 14, 1999. See Joint Pet. for FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement at 3, WGPR,
Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
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parties agreed to settle their disputes on April 21, 1999 and the Commission
approved their proposed settlement.98 The terms of the settlement call for
CBS to pay the complainants’ $328,000 of legal fees and expenses.99
2. Situating the Issue: A Transcript of The Ugly Face of Freedom
In order best to illustrate the dangers of an enhanced news distortion
doctrine, the transcript of the CBS 60 Minutes segment follows:
MORLEY SAFER, co-host: The collapse of communism, the breakup
of the Soviet Union has brought independence and a measure of
freedom to more than a dozen new states. The most powerful is
Ukraine, a nation of 52 million people, the world’s third largest
nuclear power, and now free after 300 years of outside rule. But
Ukraine is hardly a unified entity. The south, Crimea, wants
independence. The eastern part feels the pull to Russia. And the west,
where we go tonight, is on a binge of ethnic nationalism. “Ukraine for
Ukrainians” can have a frightening ring to those not ethnically correct,
especially in a nation that barely acknowledges its part in Hitler’s final
solution.
[Footage of Flower Garden Square]
SAFER: [Voiceover] In a flower-garden square in the city of Lvov,
just about every day of the week, the sounds of freedom can be heard,
men and women giving voice to their particular view of how the new
independent Ukraine should be governed. They disagree about plenty,
but do have two things in common: their old enemy, Russian
communism, and their old, old enemy, the Jews.
Unidentified Man #1: [Through translator] We Ukrainians not have to
rely on American and kikes.
[Footage of men studying]
SAFER: [Voiceover] Yaacov Bleich left the United States five years
ago to take over as the chief rabbi for the Ukraine.
Rabbi YAACOV BLEICH [Ukraine]: There is, obviously, a lot of
hatred in these people that are— that are expounding these things and
saying, you know— obviously if someone, you know, screams, “Let’s
98. See Hadzewycz, supra note 4.
99. Id.
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drown the Russians in Jewish blood,” there really isn’t much love lost
there.
[Footage of men studying; a march; war footage of Jews being
rounded up; a photograph of children; Simon Wiesenthal; a
photograph of bodies]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The Jews of Lvov have reason to be concerned.
These are the kinds of scenes they’ve been seeing lately, Ukrainian
ultra-nationalist parties asserting themselves now that Soviet
communism is gone. Their chants and banners mimic another more
fearsome time. The place they’re marching in was once called “Adolf
Hitler Square.” The same square greeted Hitler’s troops 50 years ago
as liberators. Thousands of Ukrainians joined the SS and marched off
to fight for Nazism. In the process, they helped round up Lvov’s Jews,
helped march more than 140,000 of them to extinction, virtually every
Jew in Lvov. Among those who watched in horror was a young man
who was to become the world’s number one Nazi hunter, Simon
Wiesenthal. Now living in Vienna, he remembers that even before the
Germans arrived, Ukrainian police went on a three-day killing spree.
WIESENTHAL [Nazi Hunter]: And in this three days in Lvov alone,
between 5000 and 6000 Jews were killed.
SAFER: I get the impression from people that the actions of the
Ukrainans, if anything, were worse than the Germans.
MR. WIESENTHAL: About the civilians, I cannot say this. About the
Ukrainian police, yes.
[War footage; footage of an SS reunion]
SAFER: [voiceover] Many of the Ukrainian men of Lvov who
marched off as members of the SS never returned, killed fighting for
Hitler. But last summer, a good number of the survivors, veterans of
the SS Galician Division, did return for a reunion laid on by the Lvov
City Council. Ukrainian SS veterans now living in Canada, the United
States, and Ukraine. Nowhere, certainly not in Germany, are the SS so
openly celebrated. And for this reunion, Cardinal Lubachivsky, head
of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, gave his blessing, just as a
predecessor did to the SS more than 50 years ago. Did you not hold a
ceremony here for the Galician SS?
CARDINAL LUBACHIVSKY [Head of Ukrainian Catholic Church]:
Yes.
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SAFER: For the— the men who fought with the Germans.
CARDINAL LUBACHIVSKY: Yes.
SAFER: And— and they— you held a Mass for these people.
CARDINAL LUBACHIVSKY: No. See, we didn’t fight anybody
here. We fought against the Russians in Austria and Yugoslavia, and
we were under Germans. We had to do whatever they want. We could
not— we couldn’t do anything that we want ourselves, really.
SAFER: But even before the Germans entered Lvov . . .
CARDINAL LUBACHIVSKY: Yes.
SAFER: The Ukrainian militia, the police, killed 3,000 people in 2
days here.
LUBACHIVSKY: It is not true.
[War footage]
SAFER: [voiceover] It’s horribly true to Simon Wiesenthal. Like
thousands of Lvov Jews, his mother was led to her death by the
Ukrainian police. These are remnants of a film the Germans made of
Ukrainian brutality. The German high command described the
Ukrainian behavior as “praiseworthy.”
MR. WIESENTHAL: [voiceover] My wife’s mother was shot to death
because she could not go so fast.
SAFER: [voiceover] She couldn’t keep up with the rest of the
prisoners?
MR. WIESENTHAL: Yes. She was shot to death by a Ukrainian
policeman because she could not walk fast.
[Footage of a train; a photograph of two women]
SAFER: It was the Lvov experience that compelled Wiesenthal to
seek out the guilty, to bring justice.
MR. WIESENTHAL: Because I feel guilty that I survived. Why you
and why not the others? Was people that was— better than you, they
was more intelligent than you, they could give the society more than
you are doing. And this complex was so that I must speak— speak in
the name of these people, they cannot speak more because they was
murdered.
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[Footage of barbed-wire fences]
SAFER: [voiceover] The names Auschwitz and Belsen and
Buchenwald may be better known, but this place, the Janowska Road
Camp in the city of Lvov, barely a mile from the opera house, has its
share of infamy.
Two hundred thousand Jews from the city and surrounding
communities were killed here. Today, it serves as a prison for
common criminals. Nothing marks what happened here.
[Footage of a large rock; a ravine; dogs; people carrying flowers; a
woman cleaning a grave]
SAFER: [voiceover] There is a stone next door to the camp. This was
a place called the Sands, a killing ground where 200,000 bodies were
dumped into a ravine. It’s been filled in, and is now used as a school
for training police dogs. In Western Ukraine at least, Hitler’s dream
had been realized. It was juden-frei, free of Jews. In the 50 years since,
Jews have drifted in from other parts of the old Soviet Union, about
7,000 now in Lvov. For some Ukrainians, that’s 7,000 too many.
RABBI BLEICH: Yeah. Well, that’s not a secret. They’re saying that
they want the Jews out. They want the Jews out, they want the
Russians out, and they want everybody else out that’s not an ethnic
Ukrainian.
[Footage of Una Unso marching; a ceremony]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The group marching is Una Unso, a political
party whose motto is ‘force and order.’ Three of its members,
including the man shouting orders, were elected members of
Ukraine’s national parliament. A sister party, the Social Nationalists,
calls for the need to liquidate certain people. Most of the parties had
their own newspapers. The most popular, and the only daily, is called
For a Free Ukraine. It blames the Jews for Ukraine’s current
economic condition. The editor-in-chief says his paper is not anti-
Semitic, but he also says:
UNIDENTIFIED MAN #2: [Through Translator] Ukrainian villagers
who represent the spirit of the Ukraine have long considered the Jews
to be exploiters, and this is reflected in jokes and anecdotes. In terms
of the Soviet Union, which is abbreviated SSSR, that stands for “three
kikes and one Russian.”
RABBI BLEICH: There’s an article that came out just two weeks ago
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where they tried to prove that Lenin was really Jewish and his real
name was really Heim Goldman. But there was an article by
Cherbatuk calling for mass murder and extermination of all Jews or
Russians who don’t leave the country by a certain time. People here
have been trained to believe the press, so they’ll believe that Lenin
was Jewish. And they’ll believe that— you know— anything else that
they’re told because they read it and they saw it in print. So they are
frightening.
[Footage of men studying]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The message is clear to Lvov’s Jews. They’re
leaving as quickly as they can get exit permits. There have been
incidents. Rabbi Bleich’s apartment was firebombed.
RABBI BLEICH: There have been a number of physical attacks. In a
small town, two elderly Jews were attacked at knifepoint and stabbed
because they are Jews and because of the myth that all Jews must have
money hidden in their homes. The same thing was in west Ukraine,
the Carpathian region. These are very, very frightening facts, because
it’s— again, that stereotype that we mentioned before, when that leads
someone to really— to— to stab an older couple and leave them
helpless, and— you know, they left them for dead, that means that we
have serious problems.
[Footage of women dancing]
SAFER: [Voiceover] As troubling to Jews as nasty incidents and
verbal abuse are the heroes and symbols chosen by this new nation.
Street names have been changed. There is now a Petlyura Street. To
Ukrainians, Simon Petlyura was a great general, but to Jews, he’s the
man who slaughtered 60,000 Jews in 1919.
[Footage of a statue of Roman Shukeyavitch, a ceremony; statue of
Stephan Bandera, street name signs; plaques]
SAFER: [Voiceover] Roman Shukeyavitch is also memorialized. He
was deputy commander of the SS Division Nightingale. And then
there’s Stephan Bandera. To Ukrainians, Bandera is the father of the
modern state. Peace Street in Lvov has been renamed Bandera Street.
He’s considered a great patriot, even though the Jews remember him
as the leader of a notorious army of murderers.
RABBI BLEICH: Now when someone puts up as his hero someone
who we consider a murderer, and you respect them even though you
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understand you are not respecting him because he was a murderer,
whatever, that does send shivers down— you know, down your spine.
[Footage of a farmer working his field; women working a field;
nuclear weapons; troops marching]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The western Ukraine is fertile ground for hatred.
Independence only underlines its backwardness; uneducated peasants,
deeply superstitious, in possession of this bizarre anomaly: nuclear
weapons capable of mass destruction thousands of miles away, the
Soviet legacy Western Ukraine also has a long, dark history of
blaming its poverty, its troubles, on others.
MAN #2: [Through Translator] Kikes have better chances here than
even the original population.
SAFER: Than the Ukrainians.
MAN #2: [Through Translator] Yes. This newspaper considers the
government’s chief task should be the well-being of the Ukrainian
population, first and foremost.
[Footage of a church]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The cardinal’s deputy, Monsignor Dacko, denies
traditional anti-Semitism in the Ukraine, but in his next breath, he tries
to explain it.
Monsignor DACKO [Deputy Cardinal]: The Jews in— in our history
predominantly identified themselves the ruling class. For example, in
the city of Lvov itself, before 1939, one-third of the population was
Jewish, and practically the entire businesses were in their hands. And
in the eyes of the peasants, to strong— some extent, the Jews was—
was looked upon as an exploiter of this population. Nevertheless,
Ukrainian— Ukraine, as a political force, never had the means or the
strength, if I could put it brutally, to— to combat or to even— to
persecute the Jews. What happened during World War II is a sad
history and there were also Ukrainians who were guards or perhaps
persecuted the Jews. But identifying the Ukrainians as a strictly anti—
anti-Semitic society is an injustice.
[Footage of a church service; men praying; marchers]
SAFER: [Voiceover] The church and government of Ukraine have
tried to ease people’s fears, suggesting that things are not as serious as
they might appear; that Ukrainians, despite the allegations, are not
genetically anti-Semitic. But to a Jew living here, or to one who only
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remembers the place with horror, such statements are little comfort
among the flickering torches of Lvov.
MR. WIESENTHAL: Not to believe . . .
SAFER: What’s your reaction to this?
MR. WIESENTHAL: They have not changed.100
3. The FCC’s Decision
In keeping with its traditional approach, the WGPR Commission
commenced with the explanation that the Commission “will not attempt to
judge the accuracy of broadcast news reports or to determine whether a
reporter should have included additional facts” because “[s]uch
authentication by the Commission would ‘cast the chill of omnipresent
government censorship’ over the broadcasters’ independent news judgment,”
and then limited its jurisdiction to consideration of extrinsic evidence of
intentional news distortion.101 The Commission reiterated that its assessment
of news distortion allegations would “focus[ ] on evidence of intent of the
licensee to distort, not on the petitioner’s claim that the true facts of the
incident are different from those presented.”102
The FCC characterized Serafyn’s complaint in his petition to deny CBS’s
application for assignment of WGPR-TV as resting on twelve instances of
alleged news distortion in The Ugly Face of Freedom:
(1) [T]he out-of-context comments from an interview with Rabbi
Yaakov Bleich; (2) the decision “not to accept any help” from a
Professor Luciuk, who offered his services to the program editor and
producer; (3) the “hundreds” of post-broadcast letters sent to CBS by
various persons; (4) the “intentional mistranslation” of the Ukrainian
word for “Jew” as “kike;” (5) the false claim that the Galicia Division
was responsible for the killing of Jews in Ukraine; (6) the questionable
war footage and “discredited” photograph; (7) the footage of Boy
Scouts as “evidence” of Nazism in the Ukraine; (8) the militaristic
soundtrack over the footage of Ukrainian Boy Scouts; (9) the “falsely
stated” representations that Ukrainian peasants are in possession of
nuclear weapons; (10) the “slandering” of the memories of former
100. 60 Minutes: The Ugly Face of Freedom (CBS news broadcast, Oct. 23, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
101. WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. at 8147 (internal citations omitted).
102. Id.
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Ukrainian leaders; (11) the “falsely” stated representations that Jews
are leaving Ukraine because of the anti-Semitism of the Ukrainians;
(12) the lack of basis for the allegation that Ukrainians are “genetically
anti-Semitic.”103
In rejecting Serafyn’s request for a hearing, the Commission asserted that
the proffered evidence had not satisfied the “threshold extrinsic evidence
standard in order to elevate its allegations to the level of ‘substantial and
material’ questions of fact.”104 The Commission acknowledged that this
burden of pleading was “quite heavy,” but asserted that it had “intentionally
made it so” because any lesser burden “would thrust the Commission into ‘an
impenetrable thicket’ of reviewing editing processes and adjudging editorial
judgment, a function inconsistent with the First Amendment and with the
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
‘uninhibited, robust, [and] wide-open.’”105
Specifically, the Commission dismissed nine of the twelve enumerated
instances of alleged news distortion as not constituting extrinsic evidence.106
103. Id. at 1846-47. The initial Serafyn petition to deny argued that CBS failed to program for the
needs of the Ukrainian-American community; that the program constituted news distortion in violation
of the news distortion policy; and that the Commission should not act on the assignment application
until the Commission had resolved the pending personal attack complaint against CBS (about the same
program). In making these arguments, the Serafyn petition relied on generalized conclusions about
news distortion in the program; it did not contain the specific twelve allegations of news distortion
listed by the Commission. Effectively, the details of the complaint were laid out in two appendices to
the petition: one, under the letterhead of the Ukrainian Heritage Defense Committee, characterizing the
“CBS allegations countered by the facts,” Petition to Deny Ex. 8, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140
(1995) (No. 94-1027); and the other, a thirty-eight page letter from Lubomyr Prytulak to Laurence A.
Tisch, then-President of CBS, dated November 15, 1994, Petition to Deny Ex. 9, WGPR, Inc., 10
F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). What is puzzling about the FCC’s list of the twelve alleged
inaccuracies quoted above is that they appear to be a compilation based on the two exhibits to the
petition to deny. However, the exhibits to the petition include several claims of inaccuracy not
mentioned in the list compiled the Commission. For example, the exhibits to the petition took umbrage
with the following claims in addition to those set out by the Commission: The portrayal of Ukraine as
being “on a binge of ethnic nationalism;” that Ukraine is “a nation that barely acknowledges its part in
Hitler’s final solution;” reference to “an unnamed leader of the Ukrainian Catholic Church who gave
his blessing to the SS;” and numerous direct and indirect allegations about the accuracy of Simon
Wiesenthal’s account of his experiences during the Holocaust. Petition to Deny Ex. 9, WGPR, Inc., 10
F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
104. WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. at 8147. The Commission characterized Serafyn as arguing that a
hearing should be designated because his petition produced sufficient information to raise a
“substantial and material question of fact.” Id. In response, the Commission determined that an
allegation of news distortion would raise a “material question” only if the complaint were
accompanied by extrinsic evidence of possible deliberate distortion of the news. Id.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id. The Commission said: “The remaining nine instances either constitute disputes as to the
truth of the event, that is, that the facts of a given incident are different from those presented, or
‘embellishments concerning peripheral aspects’ of news reports, or ‘attempts at window-dressing
which concern the manner of presenting the news.’” Id. (citations omitted).
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The remaining three items that the Commission addressed as extrinsic
evidence were: (1) the comments of Rabbi Bleich; (2) CBS’s prebroadcast
refusal to utilize complainants’ proposed expert Professor Luciuk; and (3) the
letters of protest to CBS sent by “hundreds” of persons. The Commission
first rejected the contention that outtakes of his entire interview showed
Rabbi Bleich’s broadcast comments to have been distorted and taken out of
context.107 It found that the context in which the Rabbi’s negative remarks
were used— including framing comments by Morley Safer and the overall
focus of the program— were sufficiently limiting.108 Nor did the Commission
find an intent to distort because CBS did not include the positive statements
that Rabbi Bleich made in his interview: “We believe that the determination
of what to include and exclude from a given interview constitutes the
legitimate ‘journalistic judgment’ of a broadcaster, a matter beyond the
Commission’s ‘proper area of concern.’”109 In sum, the Commission held
that “the outtakes of the rabbi’s interview failed to demonstrate CBS’s intent
to distort.”110
The Commission concluded that the other two remaining pieces of
external evidence also fell far short of demonstrating intent to distort:
Neither the Professor nor the letter-writers are “insiders,” that is,
employees or members of management of CBS. Nor are they persons
with direct personal knowledge of intent to falsify. Moreover,
determinations as to which experts to utilize is a decision solely within
the province of the broadcaster. And letters sent by viewers
subsequent to the broadcast is evidence clearly incapable of going to
intent, because intent is a state of mind accompanying an act, not
following it. Serafyn’s extrinsic evidence in total, therefore, does not
satisfy the standard for demonstrating intent to distort.111
The Commission also rejected Serafyn’s claim that The Ugly Face of
Freedom was “an indicator of [CBS’s] inability to meet public interest
107. According to Serafyn, the outtakes “show that CBS expunged Rabbi Bleich’s preliminary
comments indicating that anti-Semitism in Ukraine is a trait of only ‘the nationalists, the negative
nationalists, or the rightists,’ but left in the actual broadcast only his [negative] follow-up comments.”
Id.
108. WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. at 8147-48.
109. Id. at 8147 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 8147-48. Indeed, the Commission stated that although it could conceive of situations of
news distortion where the documentary evidence of deliberate distortion would be sufficiently strong
to call for an inquiry— for example, where a “yes” answer to one question was used to replace a “no”
answer to an entirely different question— this type of situation “clearly” was not presented in the
Serafyn context. Id. at 8148.
111. Id.
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programming responsibilities,” concluding that he had not shown “a pattern
of prejudice” in the network’s programming.112
4. The D.C. Circuit’s Expansion of the News Distortion Policy
The D.C. Circuit, effectively assuming the truth of all the claims made by
the complainants,113 vacated the FCC’s order and remanded the matter to the
agency “[b]ecause the Commission neither applied the correct standard nor
provided a reasoned explanation in its decision [not to designate a hearing on
Serafyn’s petition to deny CBS’s license application].”114 The court read the
appeal both as charging the Commission with improper application of its
news distortion standard115 and as implicitly objecting to the news distortion
standard itself insofar as it imposes “an impossible burden” on
complainants.116 Accepting that approach, the Serafyn opinion criticized the
FCC’s evidentiary standard, its analytic method, its narrow interpretation of
extrinsic evidence, and its dismissive handling of the evidence it deemed
proper to consider.
In finding arbitrary and capricious the Commission’s decision not to set
CBS’s license application for a hearing,117 the court chastised the agency for
giving “illogical or incomplete” reasons for finding the complainant’s
extrinsic evidence nonprobative.118 Although the Serafyn court did not
purport to articulate a general news distortion standard in the Commission’s
stead, the opinion’s detailed discussion of the evidence submitted in the case
and the court’s criticism of the FCC’s dismissive handling of the complaint
in fact reveal the outlines of a model for a new type of news distortion policy,
crafted by the D.C. Circuit as an alternative to the Commission’s traditional
approach.
The D.C. Circuit’s new model has four elements. First, under this new
approach, extrinsic evidence of intent to distort is transformed for the first
time from a subjective to an objective test by permitting inferences of
distortive intent to be drawn from “obvious and egregious” factual
112. Id.
113. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
114. Id. at 1216.
115. Serafyn argued that “the Commission misapplied the extrinsic evidence standard by
mischaracterizing some evidence as non-extrinsic, failing to discuss other evidence he presented,
analyzing each piece of extrinsic evidence separately rather than cumulatively, and requiring him to
prove his case rather than simply to raise a material question.” Id. at 1219.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court vacated the Commission’s decision, having “conclude[d] that the agency has
failed adequately to explain its decision not to set the application of CBS for a hearing.” Id.
118. Id. at 1221.
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inaccuracies. Second, the court’s approach permits the FCC and courts to
second-guess broadcasters’ editorial choices in their sources and the depth of
their research. Indeed, it imposes affirmative obligations on broadcasters,
enforceable by administrative sanctions, to investigate truth whenever a story
involves “inflammatory” claims. Third, it gives increased evidentiary weight
to certain kinds of indirect evidence such as complaint letters and parties’
expectations and reactions. Fourth, it both permits inferences of a general
pattern of distortion from a single program whose claimed inaccuracy is
established by circumstantial evidence, and relies on such circumstantial
evidence of general patterns of distortion to justify inferences of deliberate
distortion in particular programs. This is a radical new direction for news
distortion policy.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE “NEW” NEWS DISTORTION POLICY
The D.C. Circuit’s new approach is inconsistent with the First
Amendment, administrative law norms, and the traditional tort law of group
libel.119 The court’s approach, as applied to the facts of Serafyn itself,
ironically demonstrates the inevitability of embroiling the administrative
agency and courts in the authoritative selection of truth.
A. The Enhanced Dangers of the D.C. Circuit’s New Model of News
Distortion
Because the D.C. Circuit’s vision of an appropriate news distortion policy
must be extracted from the fact-intensive analysis in the opinion (and
because the Serafyn facts themselves undermine the opinion) the following
analysis explores much of the evidentiary detail in Serafyn.
1. Insufficient Deference to the Commission’s Hearing Standard
The D.C. Circuit’s approach to reviewing FCC decisions has varied over
the years from skeptical to extremely deferential. The court’s refusal to defer
in this case sounds a particularly troubling note regarding the present judicial
and administrative relationship. The court’s nondeferential attitude is
particularly puzzling when the policy at issue is the administrative agency’s
own creation, the agency’s application is consistent with its prior history, and
119. For an early critique of the constitutional and policy problems of regulating news inaccuracy
beyond the traditional FCC approach to news distortion, see Note, The First Amendment and
Regulation of Television News, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 759-63 (1972).
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the result promotes First Amendment values.
From the agency’s “muddled discussion,” the Serafyn court concluded
that the Commission had not applied the appropriate hearing standard120 but,
instead, had effectively required the complainant to prove his case at the
complaint stage (rather than merely showing enough evidence then to raise a
substantial question whether a hearing should be granted).121 The court
stated:
Although we do not propose to determine just how much evidence the
Commission may require or whether Serafyn has produced it, which
are matters for the Commission itself to determine in the first instance,
we can safely say that the quantum of evidence needed to raise a
substantial question is less than that required to prove a case.122
With respect to the Commission’s method of analyzing the proffered
evidence, the court expressed concern that the agency had improperly failed
to consider all the evidence together but, rather, appeared to have “analyzed
each piece of evidence in isolation only to determine, not surprisingly, that
no item by itself crossed the threshold.”123
While the Commission’s opinion may not be a model of clarity on the
evidentiary issue, the D.C. Circuit erred in second-guessing the agency’s
application of its policy in Serafyn. Under section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, courts must uphold agency action unless the administrative
decision is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”124 Such judicial review is
120. The court characterized the proper standard as consisting of whether the petitioner’s
allegations: (a) made out a prima facie case; and (b) raised a substantial and material question of fact
regarding the licensee’s ability to serve the public interest. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court interpreted the Commission’s decision to have “requir[ed] Serafyn to
‘demonstrate’ that CBS intended to distort the news rather than merely to ‘raise a substantial and
material question of fact’ about the licensee’s intent[.]” Id. This was seen effectively as the
Commission saying “‘that it will look into the possible existence of a fire only when it is shown the
existence of a fire’” rather than simply “‘when it is shown a good deal of smoke.’” Id. (quoting
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In rejecting this
approach, the court reiterated the following definition of prima facie sufficiency:
[T]he degree of evidence necessary to make, not a fully persuasive case, but rather what a
reasonable factfinder might view as a persuasive case— the quantum, in other words, that would
induce a trial judge to let a case go to the jury even though he himself would (if nothing more
were known) find against the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis
in original).
123. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220.
124. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
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“tolerant,”125 “highly deferential,” and “presume[s] the validity of agency
action.”126 The court plays only a “limited” role in its review of FCC denials
of petitions to deny license applications filed pursuant to section 309(d)
because “‘the Commission’s discretion and expertise [are] paramount’ in this
sphere.”127 Indeed, there is “no doubt that Congress intended to vest in the
FCC a large discretion to avoid time-consuming hearings.”128
Instead of engaging in this deferential review, however, the Serafyn court
substituted its own judgment for that of the agency and— even more
improperly— rejected the agency’s expert decision not to infer deliberate
intent to distort from “objective” evidence of “obvious and egregious”
error.129 Whatever the outer limits of judicial deference to agency action, the
court’s decision to revise the news distortion doctrine usurped the
Commission’s administrative role.
To the extent that Serafyn’s problematic lack of deference to the
Commission’s process evinces a more general tolerance of judicial second-
guessing of risk-averse administrative decisions in the sensitive context of
speech regulation, such tolerance is unnecessary and, indeed, ironic. Rather
than reversing speech-suppressive acts by administrative agencies, the court,
in the context of the news distortion policy, has adopted an inevitably
speech-suppressive procedural approach.
Under section 309(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, any interested
party may petition the FCC to deny a broadcast license application.130 The
petition, which must be supported by an affidavit of a person with personal
knowledge, must contain “specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that
the petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant of the application would be
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest, convenience, and
necessity].”131 If the FCC finds that the petition to deny presents “a
substantial and material question of fact,” it must designate the case for
hearing.132
According to the Serafyn court, the Commission interprets section 309 as
125. Sarasota-Charlotte Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 976 F.2d 1439, 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
126. Sarasota-Charlotte Broad. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1442. See also Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615,
618 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
127. David Ortiz Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 941 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Gencom
Inc. v. FCC, 832 F.2d 171, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
128. Gencom Inc., 832 F.2d at 181 (quoting Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834,
835 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
129. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
130. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1999).
131. Id.
132. Id. §§ 309(d)-(e) (1999).
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erecting a “two-step barrier to a hearing.”133 First, a petition to deny must
contain specific allegations of fact that, taken as true, establish a prima facie
case that grant of the application would not serve the public interest. This
inquiry is akin to a judge considering a motion for a directed verdict: “[I]f all
the supporting facts alleged in the affidavits were true, could a reasonable
factfinder conclude that the ultimate fact in dispute had been established.”134
Second, the petition’s allegations, when taken together with opposing
evidence before the Commission, must raise a substantial and material
question of fact as to whether grant of the application would serve the public
interest.135 At this step, such a substantial and material question is raised
when “the totality of the evidence arouses sufficient doubt on the [question
whether grant of the application would serve the public interest] that further
inquiry is called for.”136
The apparent complexity and technicality of this standard are largely due
to the fact that both courts and the FCC often use short-hand phrases to
describe the section 309 hearing standard. In simply quoting statutory
elements such as “prima facie case”137 and “substantial and material question
of fact,”138 the judicial and administrative reformulations lose sight of, and
even misdefine, the ultimate fact at issue at each step of the inquiry.
In the first step of the analysis, the Commission must decide, given all the
facts in the complainants’ pleading, whether there would be a prima facie
case to deny the license application. In a news distortion case like Serafyn,
then, the first question must be whether the complainant established a prima
facie case that the FCC should revoke the licenses or should reject the
transfer applications on the basis of the claim of news distortion in the
petition. If not, there is no need to engage in the expense of a hearing. If, on
the other hand, a finding of intentional news distortion in the 60 Minutes
program could trigger the revocations and license denials, then the inquiry
must go to the second level.
At the second level, the Commission must look at all the evidence—
including the licensee’s responsive affidavits— to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence of a substantial and material factual dispute as to warrant
further investigation. The “ultimate fact” at issue at this stage would be
whether there is substantial evidence of deliberate and intentional distortion.
133. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1216.
134. Id. at 1216 (quoting Gencom, Inc., 832 F.2d at 181).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
137. See, e.g., Dr. Paul Klite, 12 Communications Reg. (P & F) 79, available at 1998 WL 208060
(F.C.C. Apr. 30, 1998) (describing standard in such terms).
138. Id. (quoting hearing standard in § 309(e) of the Communications Act).
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The FCC has decided that the kind of evidence it will assess to determine
whether there is substantial evidence of intentional distortion is extrinsic
evidence of intent to falsify, and not speculative inferences from
circumstantial evidence.139
Pursuant to this standard, one could argue that the FCC would have saved
itself a lot of trouble by simply deciding the case in CBS’s favor at the first
level of the Serafyn court’s two-pronged standard rather than going on to the
second prong. As to the first element of the hearing standard, hearings on
license petitions should only be designated if the petitioner’s claims, taken as
true, would justify rejection of the license application. Given the limited
scope of the news distortion doctrine as applied, however, it is difficult to
conclude that the Commission would use a single finding of news distortion
to reject a license application. Such a result is unlikely, particularly when the
Commission has dismissed news distortion claims even in light of evidence
of repeated failings.140 The complainants’ own lawyer admitted in oral
argument before the D.C. Circuit that license revocation would not
realistically result from the distortion in a single program.141 The
Commission could well find that admonishment and monitoring would be
the appropriate sanctions.142 It is reasonable to assume on the basis of
Commission precedent that a single instance of news distortion— particularly
139. See supra text accompanying notes 45-60.
140. For example, news distortion claims have frequently been made regarding network
programming. See supra Part II.A and cases cited therein.
141. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(No. 95-1385) (statement of Arthur Belendiuk).
The Commission has lesser standards that it can apply that can punish CBS. There is no
pattern. . . .
Distortion is distortion. If they intended to do it, . . . one option is for the Commission to take
CBS’ licenses away. But let’s be realistic. That’s not going to happen, okay? The Commission can
sanction. For our purposes, that’s enough. We want the record clear. We want to be able to have
our day in Court and say look, these things that you said are lies . . . . [I]f the Commission comes
out with a finding that says that they clearly distorted the news and admonishes them to go no
further, we’ll be satisfied.
Id.
142. There are examples of letters of admonishment sent to broadcasters regarding news content.
See, e.g, Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1982)
(pointing to example in WBBM-TV); KMAP, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 470, 477 (1977), recon. denied, 72
F.C.C.2d 241 (1979); supra note 54 (citing relevant cases therein). See also WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d
251, 275 (1981) (denying license renewal to station that aired numerous hoaxes and suggesting that
“[a]lthough any single deceptive broadcast here, standing alone, may not justify denial of renewal,
together the improprieties demonstrate . . . callous disregard of licensee responsibility”). Even in Pot
Party, one of the seminal cases in the news distortion area, the Commission required the station to
revise and publicize its policies regarding staging. See Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1
and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party (Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 140 (1969). See also
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 119 (1973) (admonishing CBS for performing inadequate
internal investigations following accusations of slanting and distortion).
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without the kind of extrinsic evidence on which the Commission traditionally
relies— would not place CBS’s overall programming proposals into
question.143 The FCC’s opinion did not make this point clearly enough,
however, and led to the Serafyn court’s erroneous conclusion that the
Commission “conflated the first and second steps [and] applied the wrong
standard in judging the sufficiency of the evidence.”144
In any event, the court also misinterpretated the second prong of the
Commission’s standard, regarding the substantiality and materiality of the
factual question triggering a hearing.145 The Commission’s hearing-
triggering requirement of “substantial extrinsic evidence or documents that
on their face reflect deliberate distortion”146 is not, as the Serafyn court
thought, an unreasonable requirement that a petitioner wholly prove his case
prior to hearing. Rather, it is an entirely supportable administrative decision
that the news distortion policy should have “an extremely limited scope,”147
applied only in the most egregious cases in which there is significant, explicit
evidence of the licensee’s intent to distort. The Serafyn court only found the
Commission’s approach unreasonable because of an improper conclusion,
implicit in the opinion, that the Commission should have found enough
“smoke” in the particular evidence presented to justify the administrative
search for “fire.”148 The court made a substantive determination that the
143. See supra Part II.A.2. See also infra Part III.A.4.b (discussing the Serafyn court’s assessment
of the evidence supporting a claim of generalized programming distortion).
144. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220.
145. CBS’s refusal to submit affidavits responding to the Serafyn complainants’ charges may well
have exacerbated the court’s (and the FCC’s) confusion when applying the hearing standard. Even if
the Commission had progressed to the second stage of the analysis, the court might have found it more
difficult to second-guess the agency’s weighing of the conflicting affidavit evidence in the event CBS
had filed such explanatory responses. While CBS’s concern about opening the door to editorial review
by the Commission is understandable, the history of the Commission’s traditional approach to news
distortion suggests that much more press-friendly consequences would have followed than those
suggested in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
146. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards
of the Communications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 21 (1974), recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d
691 (1976), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
147. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
148. The court suggests that the Commission here:
misapplied its standard in a way reminiscent of the problems in Citizens for Jazz: “The statute in
effect says the Commission must look into the possible existence of a fire only when it is shown a
good deal of smoke; the Commission has said that it will look into the possible existence of a fire
only when it is shown the existence of a fire.”
Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
The court’s reference to Citizens for Jazz is inapposite. Citizens for Jazz involved a claim that the
parties to a transfer application lied to the Commission when they stated in their application that they
would continue the station’s jazz format and then changed their programming to country and western
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inferential evidence in the case was sufficient to trigger a hearing. This
finding in Serafyn is far from the court’s purported deference to the
Commission’s role in weighing evidence. The court’s approach challenges
the Commission’s evidentiary standard, despite its admission of the
Commission’s discretion to make prudential decisions in the area. 149
The key issue in news distortion cases is intent. Other than the
disagreement as to the ultimate question, there were no factual disputes
regarding intent in Serafyn. The petitioners did not adduce any direct
evidence of CBS’s intent to distort. The court relied on “objective”— that is
to say, indirect and inferential— evidence, requiring the petitioner effectively
to show only “obvious” inaccuracy. The “objective” evidence simply
involved claimed inaccuracies in the 60 Minutes broadcast.150 This does not
within six months of the transfer. Id. at 393. All parties agreed that allegations of misrepresentation
were material to the license renewal, so the only issue was the substantiality of the disputed facts. Id. at
394. Moreover, there was both extrinsic evidence— an affidavit by a former employee— and
circumstantial evidence of pretransfer plans to change format. Id. at 393-94. Even so, the court did not
find the circumstantial evidence so strong as to justify reversing the Commission’s decision: “None of
them is necessarily inconsistent with an innocent view of events, and the inference of guilt was directly
refuted by sworn affidavits of no intent to change format, which the Commission was required to
weigh in the balance.” Id. at 396. The court’s only difficulty with the Commission’s decision was that
the agency had required the evidence to establish clear, precise, and indubitable proof of
misrepresentation, rather than simply raising a substantial question concerning that proposition. Id.
Effectively, the Commission had applied the “merits of decision” standard rather than the hearing
standard. Id. at 397. It was in that context that the court concluded: “It would be peculiar to require, as
a precondition for a hearing, that the petitioner fully establish (in the face of the applicant’s contrary
affidavit evidence) what it is the very purpose of the hearing to inquire into . . . .” Id. at 397.
That was not the situation in Serafyn at all, however. Correctly interpreted, the Commission in the
Serafyn cases simply imposed on complainants the burden of showing the agency “a good deal of
smoke.” Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Citizens for Jazz, 775 F.2d at 397 (emphasis added)).
Even more importantly, there is a significant difference between petitions to deny for
misrepresentation to the Commission and those for news distortion. An applicant’s intentional
misrepresentation to the Commission is virtually always factually verifiable. The representations at
issue are usually of a factual nature and pertain to the applicant’s own past or future activities. The
Commission could rationally change the misrepresentation standard to a “material inaccuracy”
standard. See Brian C. Murchison, Misrepresentation and the FCC, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 403, 450-54
(1985). It does not matter whether the misrepresentations are about a significant or insignificant
matter; knowing lies to the Commission, even about unimportant matters, impeach the character of the
license applicant. See David Ortiz Radio Corp. v. FCC, 941 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1991). By
contrast, news distortion is a much vaguer notion, requiring the complainant to establish both the truth
of the underlying statement and the deliberateness of the licensee’s false portrayal. The issue of the
proper standard to apply is only relevant when it concerns something significant. Given the
unavoidable perspectivalism of news reporting and the inevitable substantive disagreements about
truth in contested situations, news distortion presents a completely different situation than
misrepresentation. Moreover, First Amendment and free speech policies are not directly implicated in
the misrepresentation context in the same fashion as in the news distortion area.
149. The court noted: “[W]e do not propose to determine just how much evidence the
Commission may require or whether Serafyn has produced it, which are matters for the Commission
itself to determine in the first instance . . . .” 149 F.3d at 1220.
150. To the extent that the Serafyn complainants relied on Citizens for Jazz to support the notion
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meet the statutory standard of substantial and material factual disputes. There
was no factual evidence, of the kind traditionally required by the
Commission in news distortion cases, of CBS’s deliberate intent to distort.
The Commission has explicitly rejected the proposition that it should infer an
intent to distort from evidence allegedly showing that a program contained
factual inaccuracies.151
that the Commission must draw inferences of distortive intent from circumstantial evidence of factual
inaccuracies in deciding whether to hold a hearing, the precedent does not stretch so far. First, the
court in Citizens for Jazz admitted that hearings were not “invariably required” when the disposition of
a petition to deny depends on inferences drawn from undisputed facts, rather than a dispute as to the
facts themselves. 775 F.2d at 395. In the court’s view, “[a] weak inference can no more raise a
substantial question regarding the ultimate fact than can a weak factual showing.” Id. The court’s point
was that the Commission erred in concluding that no hearing should be designated when
circumstantial evidence was uncontested. A hearing should be designated so long as the totality of the
evidence— including uncontested circumstantial evidence— supported the possibility that the licensee
had engaged in intentional misrepresentation.
Second, there was conflicting extrinsic evidence of intent to misrepresent in Citizens for Jazz. It is
logical for the Commission to address inferences from circumstantial evidence in such circumstances.
This is completely different from the facts in Serafyn where there was no parallel extrinsic evidence.
Third, the Citizens for Jazz court did not suggest that “obvious and egregious error” should be
considered evidence of intent to misrepresent. Although the format change occurred very shortly after
the license transfer in that case, two executives with expertise in country and western music had been
recently promoted, and the economic circumstances the transferee used to justify the format change
were known for a number of years before the transfer. Nevertheless, the court agreed with the
Commission that such evidence led only to “weak” inferences of intent to misrepresent. 775 F.2d at
395.
Finally, the Citizens for Jazz opinion made clear that “nothing in our opinion is meant to cast
doubt upon the validity of past Commission decisions denying evidentiary hearings, or to establish a
new and more stringent standard for such denials.” Id. at 398. See also Gencom Inc. v. FCC, 832 F.2d
171, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that “the drawing of inferences from undisputed facts is the
Commission’s province” and finding that the agency’s decision not to draw an inference of
misrepresentation in that case was reasonable).
151. In Central Intelligence Agency, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1544, 1549 (1985), the complaining
party asked the Commission to “hold that deliberate distortion is evident because material broadcast
. . . was false, and that circumstantial evidence indicates [that the licensee] must have known it to be
so.” The Commission held that “[t]he fact that elements of a news story may have been wrong is
irrelevant for purposes of appropriate Commission scrutiny . . . . The Commission will simply not infer
an intent to distort.” Id.
The Commission did not designate a hearing in the Anti-Defamation League case, in which a
licensee broadcast programming included anti-Semitic statements and specific personal attacks. See
Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 7 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 565, 565 (1966), reh.
denied, 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967), aff’d sub nom. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, Pac.
Southwest Reg’l Office v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Commission did not impose any
burden of verification on the station, arguing that such a rule would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Id. The agency simply renewed the station’s license despite its finding that such
programming technically violated the then-applicable fairness doctrine. Id. The reasoning behind this
result was grounded in First Amendment policy. The Commission deemed a hearing unnecessary
because there was no dispute as to the facts, but simply one as to the proper inferences to be drawn
from uncontroverted facts. For purposes of the statutory requirement of a substantial factual dispute,
the Commission did not define “factual dispute” as going to the question of whether the licensee
intentionally broadcast knowingly false statements. It interpreted the “factual dispute” requirement
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News distortion claims raise particularly thorny issues because
application of the doctrine necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns.
It is entirely proper for the Commission to decide that it should strongly resist
administrative hearings in the context of such claims because of the obvious
chilling effect on expression— a chilling effect not directly at issue in the
context of hearings for different kinds of petitions to deny.152 The Serafyn
court’s approach to the evidence required to trigger hearings in news
distortion cases is inconsistent with First Amendment norms.
There is nothing inherently improper in an administrative decision to
adopt different trigger points for hearings in different contexts. Different
Commission rules and policies implicate different balances between First
Amendment concerns and regulatory objectives. It stands to reason that the
agency can tailor its approach to hearings differently depending on the
balance of First Amendment concerns. The agency must have the discretion
to do so, particularly when applying an administratively-adopted policy
rather than a statutorily mandated rule. If the Serafyn plaintiffs could show,
for example, that they had been treated differently than plaintiffs in other
news distortion cases, then the court’s concerns would be justifiable. But if,
for example, all the plaintiffs can point to is the agency’s adoption of a
particularly high threshold for a prima facie case in the context of all news
distortion complaints, then the court’s second-guessing of the agency’s
narrowly, focusing only on whether the petitioner and licensee agreed that the offending programs and
language had actually been aired. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commission’s licensee-protective
approach on appeal. 169 F.2d at 172.
The same approach should apply in the Serafyn context. Serafyn and CBS agreed that The Ugly
Face of Freedom had aired and contained the statements to which Serafyn objected. They disagreed on
two points: (1) whether the statements were substantially accurate, and (2) whether, even if the
statements were inaccurate, CBS deliberately and intentionally aired knowingly false statements to
deceive the public. The second issue is the relevant one under news distortion policy. As to that issue,
there was no extrinsic evidence of deliberate intent to distort of the kind the Commission traditionally
required in news distortion cases. The Serafyn court could only find that declining to designate a
hearing was reversible error if it assumed that CBS’s “obvious” error resulted from deliberate
deception. The Commission has rejected such an approach in the past. Moreover, if obvious anti-
Semitic falsity was insufficient to trigger Commission sanction in Anti-Defamation League because of
fundamental First Amendment principles, a hearing would be unjustified in the Serafyn context as
well.
152. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has previously stated that Congress intended to vest in the FCC “a
large discretion to avoid time-consuming hearings.” Gencom, 832 F.2d at 181 (quoting Southwestern
Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). If the FCC is empowered to avoid
hearings merely because they are time-consuming, it must necessarily be empowered to resist them
when they would entail much more constitutionally significant costs. The D.C. Circuit itself has
opined that the “limited scope” of the news distortion policy “is consistent with the principles of the
First Amendment and congressional intent to allow licensees the maximum editorial freedom
consistent with their role as public trustees.” Galloway, 778 F.2d at 18.
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decision seems inconsistent with basic principles of administrative law.153
The effect of the Serafyn court’s interpretation of the requisite evidentiary
standard is to increase the number of news distortion hearings, to enhance the
chilling effect of FCC intervention into broadcast content, and ultimately to
minimize the willingness of news organizations to comment on contested and
controversial issues.
Clearly, the Commission has chosen to subject news distortion
complainants to an onerous evidentiary burden. That burden is unlikely to be
met because the necessary evidence is almost always under the defendant’s
control. It is admittedly difficult for complainants to obtain extrinsic evidence
about broadcasters’ subjective intent without the opportunity for discovery.
In addition, a highly discretionary standard admittedly gives the FCC a
tremendous amount of power— in principle, if not in application— to wield
against broadcasters with whom members of the agency disagree.154
But the solution to these effects is not necessarily to second-guess the
Commission’s judgment about the scope of the news distortion policy or to
insist that the FCC make the policy more stringent and invasive. The
Commission has the authority to decide that it should not regulate news
distortion at all. Its choice to regulate only the clearest and most provable
examples should not be, under those circumstances, subject to searching
153. The news distortion policy is wholly a creation of the FCC— a policy designed to effectuate
the goals of the Communications Act, but nowhere required by the statute. In any event, Chevron
establishes that if the enabling statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue before an
administrative agency, a reviewing court must give deference to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute so long as that interpretation is reasonable. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court’s apparent and recent retreat from Chevron
deference in the context of informal agency statutory interpretations in Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000), is not particularly relevant here. In Christensen, the Court faced the issue of
whether deference was due to an unreasonable statutory interpretation in a Department of Labor
opinion letter. Five members of the Court refused to grant anything more than “Skidmore deference” to
such an opinion letter— according respect to the interpretation only to the extent the interpretation had
the “‘power to persuade.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
The majority also held that, although an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to
deference, such deference is only warranted when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. Id.
Whatever its effect on the reach of Chevron in general, Christensen would not excuse the
reviewing court from deferring to the FCC’s interpretation of its news distortion policy or the agency’s
standard for holding a hearing in connection with a claim under that policy. The news distortion
context is entirely distinct from the statutory interpretation at issue in Christensen. Ultimately, it could
be said that the Christensen Court thought that the single opinion letter at issue in that case was simply
wrong in its statutory interpretation; Chevron should not apply because the statute was insufficiently
ambiguous. Here, the FCC’s interpretation of its own policy is far more consistent with First
Amendment strictures than a less deferential standard of review would be in the news distortion
context.
154. This is not to say that the FCC would not have even more power over broadcasters if it
adopted a standard— as the D.C. Circuit suggested in Serafyn— that would make news distortion
hearings more common.
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review by the D.C. Circuit.
The Commission’s traditional approach to news distortion can best be
explained by remembering that its policy is not designed simply to enhance
truth.155 Rather, the news distortion policy is supposed to balance two
important interests— press freedom and the availability of unbiased
information to the public.156 The Commission’s rationale for a high
evidentiary burden is thus press-protective. By setting a high standard for a
hearing, the Commission enhances the press’s editorial independence even
though its rule allows more actual distortion to go unremedied. If the agency
were to adopt an evidentiary standard other than the high standard it has
chosen, a much greater degree of intrusion into the editorial processes of the
press would necessarily follow. Such an alternative standard would then
become another example of situations in which subjective intent standards as
applied interact with procedural requirements to produce results much less
press-protective than suggested by the courts’ value rhetoric.157 If the door to
automatic discovery were to be opened as a result of the argument that the
current standard ties complainants’ hands excessively, an analogously press-
suppressive effect may be predicted.
Moreover, the Serafyn court’s suggested lowering of the threshold
amount of extrinsic evidence required to trigger a hearing actually creates a
trap for both complainants and broadcasters. Since the ultimate standard for
the imposition of sanctions for news distortion is very stringent, a lowered
standard at the prehearing stage simply invites all parties to engage in
invasive discovery and expensive motion practice in circumstances in which
the complainants would have little likelihood of ultimately prevailing. The
net result would be to impose extensive governmental review of broadcast
content without actually eliminating unsavory news practices that do not
reach the high level of news distortion or staging under the Commission’s
policy.158
155. See, e.g., Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969);
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1985); CBS Program “The Selling of the
Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971); Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969); CBS Program “Hunger
in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143 (1969).
157. For example, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979), the Supreme Court opened the
door to invasive discovery in the defamation context. This may be a logical extension of the subjective
standard for defamation of public officials. This access to the editorial process may have a more
chilling effect on press operations than the original threat of libel damages under tort standards
applicable in the days before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan constitutionalized defamation doctrine
with its subjective intent standard. 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
158. Admittedly, some ideological plaintiffs may find the prospect of an expensive proceeding to
be a very powerful tool for settlement and programming coercion.
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There is nothing in the Communications Act of 1934 (and certainly not in
its 1996 counterpart) that would specifically require the Commission to adopt
a news distortion policy.159 There is also nothing in the Act that prohibits the
Commission— if it decides to adopt such a policy— from choosing, as a
prudential matter, a higher evidentiary standard for a finding of its violation.
Thus, the Serafyn court can be faulted for suggesting that the news distortion
policy have different substantive content than the Commission’s
interpretation of its own discretionary policy.
2. A New Requirement: Unwarranted Inferences from Evidence of
“Obvious or Egregious” Factual Inaccuracies
One of the most significant consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to
defer to the FCC’s application of its news distortion policy in Serafyn was
the court’s suggestion that the Commission revise its news distortion review
process. The Serafyn court urged the Commission on remand to consider
whether the broadcast contained any errors that were sufficiently “obvious
and egregious to contribute to an inference about CBS’s intent, and therefore
to qualify as “extrinsic evidence.”160 Starting from the proposition that “the
inaccuracy of a broadcast can sometimes be indicative of the broadcaster’s
intent,”161 the court suggested the following standard:
Without deciding whether Serafyn’s arguments about individual facts
are correct, or even specifying what standard the Commission should
use when analyzing claims of factual inaccuracy, we must point out
that an egregious or obvious error may indeed suggest that the station
intended to mislead. . . . Our point is only that as an analytical matter a
factual inaccuracy can, in some circumstances, raise an inference of
such intent. The Commission therefore erred insofar as it categorically
eliminated factual inaccuracies from consideration as part of its
determination of intent.162
The leap from “obvious” error to intent to distort is the real D.C. Circuit
error in Serafyn. This shift by the court substitutes a “clear error” standard for
the traditional “intent to distort” standard. Regardless of the court’s
159. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994).
160. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 1223.
162. Id. at 1223-24. The court explained that it did not mean that the Commission had to
investigate every claim of factual inaccuracy: “[I]f the broadcaster had to do historical research or to
weigh the credibility of interviewees, for example, then any alleged inaccuracy is almost certainly
neither egregious nor obvious.” Id. at 1224.
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continuing references to the extrinsic evidence standard, the shift to a clear
error yardstick effectively makes extrinsic evidence of the usual sort
irrelevant— or at least unnecessary— in most circumstances. The best
“extrinsic evidence” of error is a set of well-known counter-sources (rather
than letters from angry viewers, for example). Such counter-sources no doubt
will be easily identified whenever the news report is about a controversial
matter.
The Serafyn opinion itself serves as an object lesson in the futility of
identifying “obvious” errors in the context of controversial news reports. By
definition, controversial news reports are the very accounts that contain the
most complexity, ambiguity, and interpretive possibility and that lead to the
most heated opposition. They are the very stories that will likely be widely
covered in the media.163 People with conflicting ideologies can easily
characterize contested issues as simply being inaccuracies about facts.
Involving the Commission and the courts in an assessment of those sorts of
claims is not only constitutionally suspect, but also simply a bad idea. It is
particularly troubling when used selectively against one influential media
source among many addressing a controversy.
a. The Translation of “Zhyd”: An Instance of the Translator’s
Dilemma
As its “chief example” of the allegedly “obvious” error in The Ugly Face
of Freedom, the court referred to:
the apparent mistranslation of “zhyd” as “kike.” Such a highly charged
word is surely not used lightly. Of course, translation is a tricky
business, and it is axiomatic that one can never translate perfectly.
Nonetheless, a mistranslation that “affect[s] the basic accuracy” of the
speaker is problematic under the Commission’s standard. . . .
Changing “Jew” to “kike” may be as blatant a distortion as changing a
163. Discussions of rising anti-Semitism in post-Soviet Ukraine were common in news sources
other than 60 Minutes at the time as well. See, e.g., James F. Clarity, Free Ukraine’s Nationalism: Will
Pride Become Prejudice?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at A10; Marcia Kunstel & Joseph Albright, The
Holocaust: Many Say Extremists of 90s Feeding New Fires of Hatred, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Mar.
20, 1994, at A6; Marcia Kunstel & Joseph Albright, Ukraine’s Holocaust Story at Last Begins to See
Light, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 27, 1994, at A35; James Meek, Ukraine Feels the Pain Contained in a
Street Name, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 20, 1992, at 12; Bohdan Nahaylo, Political Extremism
in Ukraine Part II: The Move Toward Fascism, UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, May 8, 1994, at 2; Daniel
Sneider, Jews Find Complex Ties with the New Ukraine, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 20,
1994, at 4; Daniel Sneider, Parliamentary Poll Offers Platform for Ukraine’s Extreme, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1994, at 1; Ukraine Experiences Ugly Resurgence of Anti-Semitism (NPR
radio broadcast, Apr. 1, 1994), available at 1994 WL 8690228.
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“no” answer to a “yes,” so greatly does it alter the sense of the
speaker’s statement; if so, then the basic accuracy of the report is
affected.164
In addition to its apparent acceptance of the inaccuracy of the
translation, the court suggested that the simple use of an “inflammatory”
word such as “kike” should trigger an investigative obligation for the
licensee:165 “[W]hen the word chosen by the translator is an inflammatory
term such as ‘kike,’ the licensee could be expected to assure itself of the
accuracy of the translation; if it does not do so, the Commission may
appropriately consider that fact in reaching a conclusion about the
broadcaster’s intent to distort the news.”166
This position with respect to what we should infer from “obvious or
egregious” errors is a very significant extension of the FCC’s traditional
interpretation of the news distortion policy. The court’s reliance on FCC
precedent for the point that the inaccuracy of a broadcast can be indicative of
a broadcaster’s subjective intent to distort is unavailing.167
164. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1224. The court’s unreflective move from “apparent mistranslation” to
“mistranslation” in this single paragraph should be noted.
165. Id. at 1224.
166. Id.
167. The court cites to WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d 251 (1981) and CBS Program “Hunger in
America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 147 (1969). In WMJX, however, the station admitted that it knew its
broadcast to be false and intentionally aired it anyway. 85 F.C.C.2d at 266. The station simply
contended that it did not intend to mislead the public. Id. at 269. The Commission held that the
relevant intent was not the intent to mislead, but rather the intent to air knowingly false material and
thus found the station, by its own stipulation, to have the required intent for news distortion. Id. at 269-
70. The question was not (as the Serafyn court’s parenthetical suggests) whether the Commission
“implicitly concluded from broadcaster’s knowledge of falsity that it intended to mislead the public.”
Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1223. Rather, the Commission took the position that intentional airing, despite
knowledge of falsity— rather than an evil motive to mislead— was the meaning of “deliberate
intention” to distort in the news distortion policy. WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d at 269-70. Nor does the
court’s reliance on dictum in Hunger in America make the point. There, the Commission did say in
dictum that it would intervene in the unusual case where the truth of the matter “can be readily and
definitively resolved.” 20 F.C.C.2d at 147. The Commission was dealing with the immediately
factually verifiable issue of a medical diagnosis to be found on a death certificate. Id. at 145.
Admittedly, there is language in KTLK that suggests some degree of comfort with a reckless
disregard approach:
All that takes this licensee’s conduct from the core of the “wilful distortion” . . . is that there is no
evidence that the licensee knew the actual temperatures and, for motive, warped that information,
and although we have said that “[w]e do not sit as a review body of the ‘truth’ concerning news
events” . . . where, as here, there is the clearest evidence of reckless disregard for truth in a
licensee’s own news practices and the broadcast in no way smacks of a “commentary” type of
presentation, public interest questions are raised. Since in this case, there is extrinsic corroboration
of such reckless disregard of easily ascertainable facts and materials, the licensee’s conduct
warrants censure.
Action Radio Inc. (KTLK), 51 F.C.C.2d 803, 807-08 (1975) (citations omitted). However, in KTLK,
the issue was the licensee’s broadcast of suburban temperatures not based on any meteorological
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The court’s choice of the translation of “zhyd” as its “chief example” of a
factual inaccuracy from which one may infer distortive intent is a perfect
example of the problems with this extension of news distortion. The
complainants claimed that the Ukrainian word “zhyd” is a neutral term for
“Jew,” and that CBS mistranslated it in the broadcast as “kike.”168 The
support the complainants offered for this position consisted of (1) a page
from a Ukrainian-English dictionary, partly written in Cyrillic, with no
affidavit providing an explanatory translation;169 (2) a letter from Rabbi
David Lincoln of Park Avenue Synagogue, who stated that “in Western
Ukraine ‘Zhid’ is the word for ‘Jew’;”170 and (3) a letter from Lubomyr
Prytulak who, while admitting that “in Russian ‘zhyd’ is derogatory for ‘Jew’
and ‘yevrey’ is neutral,” and that “the same is true in heavily Russified
Eastern Ukraine, and even in Central Ukraine,” nevertheless contended that
in Western Ukraine “old habits persist,” and “especially among the common
people ‘zhyd’ continues to be as it always has been the neutral term for
‘Jew,” and ‘yevrey’ sounds Russian.”171
information. The station simply made up the temperatures. Id. The Commission was trying to explain
why the fabrication of this information should be sanctionable even though it did not constitute the
broadcast of knowingly false information. In this situation, the temperatures were presumably based on
total guesswork and would no doubt be correct sometimes. The Commission concluded that this is as
much news staging as the knowing falsification of facts. Id. at 808. This is not an equivalent to the
Serafyn court’s adoption of the “obvious and egregious error” standard.
168. Reply to Opposition of CBS Inc. to Petition to Deny at 12 (Serafyn Reply Brief), WGPR,
Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). See also Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (discussing claim).
169. Serafyn Reply Brief Ex. 11, WGRR, Inc. (No. 94-1027); Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d at 1218.
170. Petition to Deny Ex. 4, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). The word is
sometimes spelled “zhid” and sometimes “zhyd” in the documents cited in this Article.
171. Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 5-6, WGPR, Inc. (No. 94-1027). Lubomyr Prytulak’s letter was
apparently translated into Ukrainian and published in the anti-Semitic newspaper For a Free Ukraine
accompanied by anti-Semitic cartoons in 1996, leading to a critical statement in The Jewish Press
Magazine. See Lubomyr Prytulak, Enemies of Ukraine anti-Semitize The Ugly Face of 60 Minutes (on
file with author). In a statement recounting the story on the Ukrainian Archives website, Mr. Prytulak
asserts that he did not give the newspaper permission to print his article. His explanation for how his
piece was “anti-Semitize[d]” is as follows:
My initial thought was that this perversion of my work was attributable to patriotic Ukrainians
who were incensed at the injustices of the 60 Minutes broadcast, and who had been carried away
by their righteous indignation to express themselves in ways that were intemperate, ill-considered,
and ultimately self-defeating. Since that first interpretation of what had gone wrong, however, I
am inclined to a different view.
My reinterpretation now is that I am yet another Ukrainian who has been conscipted— in my case
unwittingly— into replaying the role of Trofim Kichko. This reinterpretation is based in the first
place on a CUI BONO analysis— I ask who gains and who loses by the Za Vilnu Ukrainu
creation? I lose in that my article which in reality was devoid of anti-Semitism is now rendered
crudely anti-Semitic. Ukraine loses in the eyes of anyone who sees the Za Vilnu Ukrainu article.
And who gains? Moscow, in making Ukrainians appear virulently anti-Semitic discredits and
destabilizes Ukraine. And Israel gains, in that Jewish Ukrainians are given one more reason to feel
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Yet the complainants’ own dictionary translates a related word under the
heading “zhyd” as “ugly (dirty) Jew.”172 In addition, sources other than CBS
have also publicly translated “zhid” as “kike.”173 Indeed, one such source
reports an announcement by the Ukrainian ministry of information in 1996
that the government planned to propose legislation banning the use of the
word “zhid” in the mass media.174 If the word were not perceived at least by
Ukrainian Jews as objectionable, it would hardly have been necessary for the
government to propose such legislation or, perhaps more importantly, for
Jewish organizations to publicize it. It should also be noted that use of the
word “zhid” was prohibited during the Bolshevik occupation.175 An article in
the Ukrainian Archive website— host to critiques of The Ugly Face of
Freedom— admits that the majority of Ukrainians and Jews today consider
“zhyd” offensive.176
In any event, the meaning of words is rooted in their particular linguistic
unwelcome in Ukraine and one more reason to emigrate to Israel. 
. . . .
Thus, I ask myself, who is behind Za Vilnu Ukrainu? Who supports this newspaper? Who gives it
donations? Who protects it from prosecution? Who suggests mistranslations and cartoons? A CUI
BONO analysis does not assign blame, but it does tell us where to start looking— Moscow and
Jerusalem. These are the two forces that gained by this travesty; Ukraine and I lost.
Id. Mr. Prytulak has posted an expanded version of his critique of the 60 Minutes program on the web.
See Lubomyr Prytulak, The Ugly Face of 60 Minutes, available at
http://www.ukar.org/60minart.shtml, (visited Sept. 24, 2000). His general characterization of the
program is that it is a “calumny” against the Ukrainian people by Jews: “From the beginning of the
affair, it could not escape notice that this broadcast was not only an attack upon Ukrainians and upon
the nation of Ukraine, but that it was a Jewish attack, this because every last person bearing
responsibility for the broadcast, from the very top of the chain of command to the very bottom, was
Jewish . . . .” Id.
172. See Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Petition to Deny Ex. 11, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R.
8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
173. See, e.g., Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, UCSJ Position Paper, Ukraine, Jan. 1, 1998,
available at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories.asem1uk2.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2000) (“The
Ukrainian ministry of information announced in December 1996 a plan to launch legislation to ban the
use of the word zhid [kikes] to refer to Jews in the mass media.”).
174. Id. (citing to the Antisemitism World Report 1996, Institute for Jewish Policy Research and
American Jewish Committee).
175. THE EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORTS: SELECTIONS FROM THE DISPATCHES OF THE NAZI DEATH
SQUADS’ CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JEWS JULY 1941-JANUARY 1043, at 188 (Yitzhak Arad et al. eds.,
1989) (“[W]hoever called the Jews Zhid (Yid) (which was at that time a curse word) and not Evrei
(Hebrew), was sent to prison [by the Bolsheviks].”) [hereinafter EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORTS].
176. Introduction to Excerpts from Roman Serbyn, “Zhyd” vs. “Yevrei” in the Sion-Osnova
Controversy, available at http://www.ukar.org/sebyn1.shtml (last visited July 18, 2000). The author
contends that the term “zhyd” was formerly the only term for Jew in Ukrainian and “carried no
pejorative connotation.” Id. However, “possibly through widespread Russification,” the “majority . . .
now find the term repugnant.” Id. That introduction precedes short excerpts from a paper by Roman
Serbyn recounting a dispute regarding “zhyd” and apparently taking the position that the word should
not be deemed offensive in Ukrainian as it was in Russian.
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contexts, their current uses, and their cultural history. Thus, changed context
can affect meaning. The attempt to communicate meaning across languages
requires translation. A translator has the task of finding equivalence in
meaning— selecting in one language a word best representing the meaning of
a word in another language.177 Such attempts to find equivalence require
familiarity with both the languages and the cultures of the source and target
words. Moreover, translation also involves choices of equivalent words from
dissimilar cultural contexts and always requires choices in meaning and
perspective.178 It requires interpretation. Different translators will translate
the same text differently. Often, linguistic and cultural differences lead to
gaps in interpretive contexts, where languages will not map. In sufficiently
dissimilar languages and cultures, some words will simply be
untranslatatable. Only when the social and cultural histories of the two
contexts have close correspondences will translators’ interpretive activities
be constrained. It therefore is a truism that the process of translation is
inevitably complex and contestible.
The Serafyn court purports to understand that “translation is a tricky
business, and it is axiomatic that one can never translate perfectly.”179 Yet, it
completely ignores the cultural complexities of translation. The difficulty
posed by translation, for the court, is simply that “[t]ranslating can be
compared to editing a long interview down to a few questions and
answers.”180 The standard for mistranslation is whether it affects “the basic
accuracy” of the report.181 Translation is much more complex than that,
however, particularly when dealing with “highly charged word[s]” and
“inflammatory term[s].”182
The word “zhyd” may be a perfect example of the translator’s dilemma.
The noun “Jew” in American English would probably not be perceived by
the majority of Americans as having pejorative overtones. By contrast, even
the complainants admitted that the word “zhyd” in Ukrainian is a complex
term that can be used both pejoratively and neutrally.183 This puts the
translator in an impossible dilemma. If she translates the word into American
English as “Jew,” then she chooses only one of the conflicting meanings it
177.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1189-1211 (1993)
(describing the process of translation in the context of developing an approach to constitutional
interpretation grounded on the translation metaphor and citing relevant sources).
178. Id. at 1196-1206.
179. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 5-6, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
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may have in Ukrainian. That choice will not capture the interpretive
complexity admitted by the complainants. The same is true if the word is
translated as “kike.”184 Under these circumstances, the translator is left with
an interpretive decision. Allowing that interpretive decision to be influenced
by a sense of how the word might have been understood in societies with a
history of anti-Semitism is not an irrational choice. We could say that the
decision may be made by an analysis of context, but the identification and
interpretation of context itself is necessarily contextual and socially
grounded. It should not be in the province of judges and administrative
agencies to reject a contextually grounded interpretive translation.185
Although there may be some disagreement among translators as to
whether the meaning of the word “zhyd” could ever vary with context, or
might be used by Jewish Ukrainians or non-Jewish Ukrainians who were not
anti-Semitic, many translators appear to recognize the fundamentally
derogatory and negative meaning of the word in the general course of use in
Ukraine.186 Some suggest that the term has an extremely negative
connotation and point, among other things, to the adjectival use of the word
to describe negative characteristics such as greed or craftiness about people
of any ethnicity. At worst, even if every person in Western Ukraine who uses
the word “zhyd” would not invariably do so in an anti-Semitic way, the
complainants’ own expert admits to the negative meaning of the word in at
least some parts of Ukraine. Thus, contrary to the court’s acceptance of the
charge of mistranslation, CBS had a very strong position that its translation
of “zhyd” as a derogatory term was entirely supportable.187
184. It might be argued that the translator could choose a less intensely derogatory word in the
language of the translation. Thus, for example, CBS might have translated the word as “Jewboy” or
“Hebe” or “shylock”— assuming that such references might be seen as slightly less derogatory than
“kike” in English. How one could establish relative degrees of offensiveness and derogation is a
difficult question, however. People might disagree— making this issue also a matter of cultural
interpretation. Moreover, it is unclear whether words with slightly less derogatory meanings would
address the complainants’ concerns.
185. Cf. Nat’l Assoc. for Better Broad. v. FCC, 591 F.2d 812, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming
FCC’s decision to grant renewal despite petition to deny for refusal to remove racial and ethnic slurs
and quoting FCC opinion for proposition that the agency would not “arbitrate the definition of vague
terms” which “fairly lend themselves to varying interpretations”). While we may take exception with
the Commission’s general statement that characterization of language as a racial slur was “merely a
matter of subjective interpretation,” the FCC’s recognition of the difficulty posed by having to
arbitrate the definition of vague terms is a useful analogy to the Serafyn situation. Id. at 819.
186. Translations on file with author. See also Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, UCSJ Position
Paper: Ukraine, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/asem1uk2.shtml (Sept.
24, 2000) (describing complaint by Ukrainian Jew about use of the word “zhid” to refer to Jews,
suggesting that at least some Jewish Ukrainians find the word offensive).
187. In any case, based on the Prytulak letter submitted with the complaint, there would appear, at
a minimum, to be sufficient complexity surrounding usage of the word as to preclude a prima facie
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Obviously, the meaning of words will also depend on the linguistic
context in which they are used. Words often have multiple meanings—
sometimes even contradictory meanings— but the context of use is supposed
to signal the intended meaning to the hearer or reader. An assessment of the
word “zhyd” in its local context— in the 60 Minutes program— also reveals
the court’s error. In every instance in which “zhyd” was used in the
broadcast, it was derogatory or decidedly unflattering. Assuming that the
word “zhyd” should have been translated as “Jew,” one speaker, a Ukrainian
man-on-the-street, said that Ukrainians “do not have to rely on America[]
and Jews”— a statement which unmistakably reveals both a homogenizing
characterization and a dislike of Jews. The second speaker, the editor of the
daily newspaper For a Free Ukraine, which has published articles blaming
Jews for Ukraine’s current economic condition,188 related a joke in which the
abbreviation for the Soviet Union was said to stand for “three Kikes and a
Russian,”189 suggesting that the Soviet regime, long despised by many
Ukrainians, was dominated by Jews. The following dialogue with the same
editor also appeared in the broadcast, once again assuming that “zhyd”
should have been translated as “Jew”:
MAN #2: [Through Translator] Jews have better chances here than
even the original population.
SAFER: Than the Ukrainians.
MAN #2: [Through Translator] Yes. This newspaper considers the
government’s chief task should be in the well-being of the Ukrainian
population, first and foremost.190
In this exchange, the speaker accuses the government of favoring Jews
over “the original population.”191 By excluding Jews from the population
whose well-being should be “the government’s chief task,” his statement
betrays segregationist and anti-Semitic sentiment. In short, even if “kike” is
not in the abstract the best translation for the word “zhyd,” it would not have
changed the anti-Semitic nature of the remarks in question.
finding of intentional news distortion based on the broadcast’s translation.
188. U.S. Department of State, Ukraine Human Rights Practices, 1995, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DISPATCH, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Department of State Dispatch File; Union of Councils for Soviet
Jews, UCSJ Position Paper, Ukraine, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/
asem1uk2.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
189. 60 Minutes: The Ugly Face of Freedom (CBS news broadcast, Oct 23, 1994). See supra Part
II.B.2.
190. 60 Minutes: The Ugly Face of Freedom (CBS news broadcast, Oct 23, 1994).
191. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
1062 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1005
There is very little evidence that should lead to the conclusion, virtually
assumed by the Serafyn court, that the word “zhyd” was mistranslated. The
court’s standard— whether the translation “affects the basic accuracy” of the
statement192— assumes either that there is a fixed meaning to the word and
the translation is wrong, or that the translation is clearly wrong in the context
of a particular statement. No one in the case disagreed that the word “zhyd”
could carry the derogatory implication of “kike.” Thus, the first alternative—
that the word has a fixed meaning which is simply mistranslated— does not
apply in this situation. Therefore, the court must focus on the second
alternative reading of its test— whether the translation is wrong in the context
of a particular statement. On this reading, if we assume the accuracy of the
complainants’ statement that the word can have a neutral meaning, then it
would in context appear questionable to translate “zhyd” as “kike” if two
western Ukrainian peasants said: “There used to be many zhyds in this area”
absent any other indication in tone or facial signals that the speakers were
anti-Semitic. But that was not the nature of the statements in the program, as
discussed above.
Furthermore, the court, in attempting to narrow the sweep of its
suggestion, concludes that if historical research were necessary or credibility
of interviewees needed to be weighed, “then any alleged inaccuracy is almost
certainly neither egregious nor obvious.”193 It is difficult to understand why
this caveat should not apply directly to the issue of the word “zhyd” in the 60
Minutes story. After all, translation of “inflammatory” words in particular
requires reference to historical and cultural usages and meanings. What
makes a word “inflammatory”? To what degree is the word “inflammatory”?
Did the meaning change over time? Does the word have different uses
depending on social class? Are there geographic differences in the meaning?
Are there different sorts of contexts in which the interpretation of the word
would change?
It is even possible to argue that the court’s desired attempt to distinguish
between derogatory and neutral meanings of an ethnic descriptor is
misguided by definition. Linguistic references to subordinated groups often
reflect the groups’ subordination. It is difficult to define as “neutral” a
descriptive term used by the majority culture to refer to members of a
subordinated ethnic group. The term would inevitably be understood against
a background or culture of hierarchy which would inform its meaning.
Even were the Commission to contemplate adoption of the Serafyn
192. Serafyn v. FCC, 14 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
193. Id.
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court’s standard, the court does not address the difference between “obvious”
and “egregious” as standards for the nonextrinsic standard it proposes.194
What if a statement of fact is obviously wrong, but not very important to the
thrust of the program? Or what if the error is in fact egregious, but not
obvious? How are the obviousness and egregiousness of the factual errors to
be gauged? By reference to what standard will we decide that the error was
so obvious that not spotting it should be a presumptive admission of
subjective intent to distort? How shall the FCC justify its decision in one case
that the error was sufficiently egregious to justify the inference of distortive
intent, but in another case that it was slightly less egregious and therefore
passable?
This is, in fact, an even less satisfactory standard than that of the much-
maligned “reckless disregard” standard in the public figure defamation
context, and perhaps even more of a threat to the important value of a free
press.195 The Commission should not adopt a policy of inferring an intent to
distort from “egregious or obvious” errors because, among other things, such
a policy would ensnare the Commission in a quagmire of “actual malice”
type motion practice and evidentiary hearings, without even the requirement
of an individual plaintiff who has been personally libeled to limit the number
of such cases. Nothing in the Court’s decision requires the Commission to
adopt such a policy.196
The Serafyn court does suggest in a footnote that if the Commission were
to exclude evidence of fact inaccuracies from its analysis of broadcaster
intent “for prudential reasons,” this would be “an exercise of judgment within
its discretion if not unreasonable.”197 Given that the news distortion doctrine
is not specifically mandated by the Communications Act, prudential
considerations would counsel very strongly against extension of the doctrine
in the fashion envisioned by the court. This conclusion is compelled not only
by the obvious dangers of the policy itself, but also by the ease with which a
court like that in Serafyn could argue for intrusive review with hardly any
recognition of the dangers posed. Ironically, the analysis of The Ugly Face of
194. Indeed, the court uses the terms in the disjunctive in some parts of the opinion and in the
conjunctive in others.
195. See discussion of the defamation standards infra Part III.B.
196. The basis for this argument is the Court’s statement in a footnote that “counsel for the
Commission was unable to say at oral argument whether the agency simply did not believe that such
evidence [i.e., of egregious and obvious factual inaccuracy] could ever be probative— which would be
a mistake— or understood the point we are making but chose to exclude such evidence for prudential
reasons— which would be an exercise of judgment within its discretion if not unreasonable.” Serafyn,
149 F.3d at 1224 n.*.
197. Id.
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Freedom itself should indict the Serafyn court’s proposals for extending the
news distortion policy.
3. Second-Guessing Editorial and Production Choices
The second prong of the D.C. Circuit’s proposed news distortion policy
revision would permit the FCC to draw negative inferences from the
broadcaster’s editorial choices in the production of its story. Specifically, in
Serafyn, the court focused on decisions regarding the selection of expert
consultants and asserted failures to assure the accuracy of “inflammatory”
statements.198
a. Decisions on the Selection of Experts
The Serafyn court criticized the FCC for finding that the network’s refusal
to accept help volunteered by the complainants’ expert should not be
interpreted as evidence of subjective intent to distort.199 The D.C. Circuit
found that because the broadcaster has complete discretion to choose its
consultants, its decision “may be probative on the issue of intent.”200 The
court concluded that “[b]efore the Commission may reject this evidence . . . it
must explain why CBS’s decision to employ one expert over another— or not
to employ one at all— is not probative on the issue of its intent to distort.”201
Complainants contended that CBS’s failure to consult their proffered
expert constitutes extrinsic evidence of intentional news distortion because it
indicates that CBS “[was not] interested in the truth.”202 The Commission
rejected this argument, finding that while CBS’s decision was “extrinsic” to
the broadcast, it “falls far short of demonstrating intent to distort the . . .
program” because the “[d]etermination[] as to which experts to utilize is a
198. Id. at 1218-24.
199. Some months prior to the broadcast, Lubomyr Luciuk, a Professor of Politics and Economics
at the Royal Military College of Canada, apparently wrote to CBS, offering to assist with the report.
Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Petition to Deny Ex. 1, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995)
(No. 94-1027) (Declaration of Lubomyr Luciuk dated Feb. 6, 1995). In his letter, Professor Luciuk
indicated that he had written a doctoral dissertation on western Ukraine during the Second World War,
including Ukrainian/Jewish relations and “related themes.” Luciuk also stated that he had interviewed
dozens of veterans of the Galicia Division and “written extensively on that unit’s wartime record and
post-war experiences.”
200. Indeed, by contrast to the Commission’s position— which was to stay away from evaluating
broadcasters’ editorial decisions about which experts to utilize— the court took the position that “it is
only because the broadcaster has such discretion that its ultimate decision may be probative on the
issue of intent.” Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1223.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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decision solely within the province of the broadcaster.”203 The Commission’s
approach had precedent in previous cases under the news distortion policy.204
The court found this reasoning “too loose.”205
At bottom, the court’s demand equates a broadcaster’s deliberate intent to
mislead its audience with a government agency’s determination as to whether
the broadcaster was fair in its selection of experts and its presentation of
viewpoints. This is problematic both as a matter of inference and of
constitutional law.
First, it is inappropriate to presume too much from the simple editorial
203. Id. (citing WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140, 8148 (1995)).
204. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. (Synanon), 90 F.C.C.2d 395 (1982) (rejecting Synanon’s claim
that the FCC erred in concluding that the record did not show that station ignored Synanon’s views or
comments in connection with pending news stories); Accuracy in Media, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 416, 421
(1973) (rejecting claims of news distortion about PBS programs “the three r’s . . . and sex education”
and “Justice?” on ground that even if viewpoint of particular experts were not presented, “the selection
of spokesmen is entirely within the discretion of the licensee and there is no evidence to indicate that
PBS acted unreasonably”), recon. denied, 43 F.C.C.2d 851 (1973), and recon. denied, 47 F.C.C.2d 37
(1973), aff’d sub nom. Accuracy in Media Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Universal
Communications Corp., 27 F.C.C.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1971) (rejecting complainant’s claims that station
had suppressed and distorted news regarding Mobile’s African American community). In Universal
Communications, the Commission explained:
Complainants have merely established that they disagree with Universal’s news judgments. . . . It
is well established, of course, that the Commission does not sit to review the broadcaster’s news
judgments. Clearly, the Commission cannot decide that a broadcaster erred in its choice to present
film of one speaker instead of another, or that one story should have been covered instead of
another on a particular day.
Id. Admittedly, the Synanon case is not on all fours with Serafyn because in Synanon ABC was a
defendant in a suit Synanon brought. 90 F.C.C.2d at 396 n.3. Nevertheless, the Commission rejected
Synanon’s invitation to inquire into the station’s decisions not to consult with Synanon or use their
denials. Id.
In Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA claimed that ABC deliberately distorted facts in a series
of reports about allegations of CIA involvement with a then-bankrupt Honolulu investment firm that
allegedly defrauded investors. 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1543 (staff ruling), aff’d, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1544 (1985). The Commission dismissed the complaint because the CIA did not provide “‘direct
extrinsic evidence that [ABC] possessed a deliberate intent to distort the news.’” Am. Legal Found. v.
FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting CIA Complaint at 7, CIA v. FCC, FCC No. 85-374
(Commission order dated Sept. 11, 1985), Joint Appendix at 7). When the CIA declined to seek
judicial review, the American Legal Foundation, a conservative media watchdog organization, pursued
the matter to the D.C. Circuit. The court found that the ALF did not have standing to obtain a review
of the Commission’s decision. 808 F.2d at 92. Interestingly, the CIA had argued that ABC deliberately
reported false information about the CIA’s ties with the firm because (1) ABC did not attempt to verify
claims of interviewees, (2) ABC improperly refused to accept CIA’s denials as true, (3) ABC ignored
information from public documents that suggested that the CIA was not significantly involved with the
firm, and (4) ABC broadcast statements by a source “when . . . [ABC] knew that he was a completely
untrustworthy source.” Id. at 86. These claims are very similar to those made by the UCCA parties in
Serafyn. The American Legal Foundation court did not address those claims, even in dictum— leaving
in place the Commission’s rejection of the requested hearing— in contrast to the Serafyn court’s
approach.
205. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1223.
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decision to use one expert rather than another or to reject a complainant’s
expert. There may be many reasons for preferring one expert over another.
Some of those reasons will be substantive— the producer agrees with the
expert’s views— and some will have to do with other considerations. Often
relevant, among others, are factors such as reputation, stature, credentials,
credibility, style, availability, degree of diversity, convenience, familiarity
with broadcasting generally (or the program specifically), experience, and
apparent degree of knowledge in the field. The journalistic desire to consult
neither side’s expert when covering a controversy is also often relevant.
Inevitably, however, complainants will argue that the broadcaster’s rejection
of their volunteer expert was due to bias and that all the other listed factors
are nothing more than pretexts used to disguise the ideological selection.
What are the FCC and courts to make of those claims? Is this a prudent
degree of involvement with the editorial processes of the press? As a
practical matter, how should (or can) the network prove that its decision to
employ one expert over another is not probative on the issue of its intent to
distort? Moreover, the court’s approach creates an incentive for individuals
with particular agendas to volunteer their services as experts, be refused, and
then claim that the broadcaster distorted the news by not using their services
or adopting their views. In Serafyn, there was no indication that CBS News
did not use experts in preparing its program. Indeed, the network could have
chosen not to use experts at all. Even though this would doubtless be an
example of bad news reporting, it should not necessarily be considered
evidence of news distortion.
The First Amendment forbids any branch of government from demanding
“fairness” in a newspaper article or a particular broadcast.206 It protects the
one-sided expression of particular viewpoints, including those which are
“vehement, caustic and . . . unpleasantly sharp.”207 How, then, can a
government agency be asked to consider sanctioning a broadcaster based on
whether it is satisfied with the broadcaster’s explanation of why it selected
one expert rather than another to be interviewed for a particular report? How
can a court bootstrap an obligation to justify editorial decisionmaking onto
the very editorial discretion guaranteed by the Constitution and the FCC’s
policies?
206. Even under the Commission’s repealed “fairness doctrine,” a broadcaster was only obligated
to present contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance in its overall
programming— not in any individual broadcast. See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C.2d
1, 10-11 (1974).
207. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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The D.C. Circuit’s approach comes uncomfortably close to government
choosing the press’s authoritative sources. At the least, the court seems to be
smuggling back the fairness doctrine by an extreme interpretation of the
news distortion policy— although the D.C. Circuit previously decided that the
Commission possessed the authority to eliminate the fairness doctrine.208 The
Serafyn court’s inferential approach to the broadcaster’s decision not to
consult a particular expert is tantamount to imposing an obligation to present
contrasting viewpoints.209
Interpreting the news distortion policy to require the broadcaster to justify
its selection of experts simply because some individuals who disagreed with
the approach of the program were not consulted is dangerous, inconsistent
with First Amendment norms, and unlikely to lead to the kind of full-fledged
discourse that the FCC intended to promote with the news distortion policy.
b. Investigative Obligations for “Inflammatory” Statements
The Serafyn court’s second interference with editorial choices related to
an extraordinary burden on licensees to assume affirmative investigative
obligations “when the word chosen by the translator is an inflammatory term
such as kike[.]” 210 Specifically, according to the court, “the licensee could be
expected to assure itself of the accuracy of the translation.”211 Thus, the
Commission could reasonably assume a broadcaster’s intent to distort the
news if news personnel did not assure themselves of the accuracy of
translation of inflammatory words.212 But how is the Commission to
determine whether a particular word is “inflammatory” enough to trigger the
obligation? What if, as will likely be the case, translators disagree about the
nuances of the meaning? How is the broadcaster to “assure” itself of the
accuracy of the translation? Will consulting another translator be sufficient?
Must the broadcaster justify to the Commission and the D.C. Circuit its
selection of translators and its reasons for finding them credible? How can a
broadcaster ever satisfy this burden in a situation, such as the one in Serafyn,
where linguistic dissimilarities make exact translations difficult, if not
impossible? Isn’t such a burden fundamentally inconsistent with
constitutionally grounded commitments to editorial independence? Isn’t there
208. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also supra note 3.
209. For an argument that the Serafyn court’s interpretation of the news distortion doctrine
imposes a more intrusive obligation on broadcasters than the general fairness doctrine obligation, see
infra Part V.B.2.
210. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
211. Id. (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying note 193.
212. Id.
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a high degree of likely chill if broadcasters are compelled to participate in
hearings on these sorts of definitionally vague editorial issues?
4. Judicial Revision of the Extrinsic Evidence Standard as Applied
The third aspect of the new substantive approach proposed by Serafyn for
evidence of news distortion is the court’s revised application of the
Commission’s extrinsic evidence standard.213 The new standard appears to
give significant evidentiary weight to reaction evidence— a kind of evidence
to which the Commission did not traditionally give much credence.214 This
213. One difficulty with the Serafyn court’s criticism of the Commission’s procedure in news
distortion cases is the court’s analytic approach to weighing proffered evidence. The D.C. Circuit’s
opinion suggests that the Commission improperly analyzed the proffered evidence of distortion by
isolating each piece of evidence rather than viewing the evidence as a whole. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at
1220. What would a wholistic approach entail? The court implies that even if each piece of evidence
might not be sufficiently probative of distortive intent, such intent might be suggested by the whole
evidentiary mosaic. While a good argument can be made that the court misread the Commission’s
method, the more interesting issue is the implicit analytic method suggested by the court’s language.
Must the administrative agency adopt a news distortion policy that assesses all proffered evidence as a
whole, implicitly adopting a presumption of distortion, or may it choose to interpret the evidence in a
manner protective of speech values? The court’s probabilistic approach does not fit easily if each piece
of proffered evidence is itself ambiguous and the question is the defendant’s intent. In other contexts,
it is a standard mode of analysis to conclude that individually inconclusive pieces of evidence, when
addressed in their multiplicity, make particular factual interpretations more probable. See, e.g., ALBA
CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE LAW AND PRACTICE, 468-73, 483-85 (3d ed.
1994) (describing totality of the circumstances approach in hostile environment workplace sexual
harassment cases). However, in news distortion cases, the issue is not whether a reasonable third party
would interpret a series of ambiguous comments as offensive in their totality, but whether a
multiplicity of ambiguous evidence should lead to the conclusion that the licensee intended the false or
misleading meaning.
It does not logically follow that if a piece of evidence is subject to multiple interpretations— some
culpable and some not— it would be more justifiable to choose the culpable interpretation simply
because there are other pieces of evidence subject to the same kind of interpretive choice. Otherwise,
the approach would constitute a particularly troubling bootstrap in the First Amendment context. Even
if there were a multiplicity of errors in a broadcast, there is no reason to conclude that simply the
totality of such errors demonstrates knowing and deliberate distortion. For example, it is perfectly
predictable that some broadcasters, particularly under economic pressure, will engage in sloppy
journalism. This will inevitably lead to a series of mistakes and false statements. This is not the kind of
specific evidence of subjective, deliberate intent to distort that the Commission has required in the
application of its news distortion policy.
Moreover, there is a real question whether the Commission should use the “totality of evidence”
approach suggested by the court in news distortion cases. A similar issue arises in the copyright
infringement context when a court must decide whether to assess infringement with regard to a work
as a whole— including its otherwise uncopyrightable parts— or after an excision of the uncopyrightable
material. There are contending views, even in the copyright context, about how to proceed because
courts realize that the evidentiary issue is often outcome-determinative. The copyright analogy should
make clear that the choice between the “filtration” and the “gestalt” models is based on contending
policy considerations.
214. For a discussion of the Commission’s traditional approach to extrinsic evidence, see supra
Part II.A.
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approach is based on faulty logic and is also inconsistent with First
Amendment norms.
a. Privileging Certain Types of Reaction Evidence: After-the-
Fact Complaint Letters
While the court accepted the Commission’s finding that the outtakes of
60 Minutes’ interview with Rabbi Bleich did not evidence CBS’s intent to
distort, it did question the Commission’s treatment of the proffered evidence
of viewer complaint letters.215 Thus, through its criticisms of the FCC, the
215. The broadcast excerpt of the Bleich interview did not include the positive statements he made
about Ukraine. However, the Commission did not find this misleading because other language in the
program preceding the broadcast of Bleich’s remarks made clear that his comments concerned
extremist groups in Ukraine. WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140, 8147-48 (1995). On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit found that the FCC was “not unreasonable in finding that Safer’s phrase ‘some Ukrainians’ and
his other references to extremist groups effectively limited the scope of Bleich’s comments to ‘a
segment of the Ukrainian population.’” Serafyn, 149 F.3d. at 1222 (quoting WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at
8147-48) (citations omitted).
One of the Serafyn complainants’ chief allegations was that Rabbi Bleich’s interview statements
were taken out of context to make it appear that he believed all Ukrainians were anti-Semitic; in fact,
Bleich was referring only to right-wing ultranationalists. See WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8147. The initial
complaint attached, as an exhibit, a fax from Rabbi Bleich to the Ukrainian Heritage Defense
Committee in which he claimed that his words were quoted out of context. Petition to Deny Ex. 3,
WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). The publicly available outtakes of Rabbi
Bleich’s interview show that his comments quoted in the broadcast were made in response to questions
about radical nationalists. His positive statements about, for example, the Ukrainian government’s
efforts on behalf of human rights, were not used in the broadcast. Portions of Rabbi Bleich’s outtakes
were included in the material the complainants submitted to the FCC and the court. There is no
indication that they obtained the outtakes from CBS. See id.
The complainants made much out of the Rabbi’s claim of being quoted out of context. It may be
said that CBS sacrificed the complexity of Rabbi Bleich’s position in order to provide elements of it
elsewhere in the program, uttered by others. However, his characterization is properly irrelevant to
whether the broadcast overall distorted the story.
Moreover, neither the Commission nor the court addressed Rabbi Bleich’s fiduciary role or the
institutional concerns of Ukraine’s Jewish community. Rabbi Bleich is the American-born Orthodox
rabbi of Ukraine. He must deal with the Ukranian government every day in order to enable his people
to practice their religion. If the rabbi lambasted that government, effectively dismissing the state’s
efforts to combat anti-Semitism and allow a resurgence of Jewish worship in Ukraine, it could harm
his constituents. Thus, Rabbi Bleich had a structural interest in providing a nuanced and balanced view
of the events in modern Ukraine. This is not to say that Rabbi Bleich lied or temporized in his 60
Minutes interview or his letter charging the network with quoting him out of context. It is, rather, to
say that Rabbi Bleich doubtless had a specific political motive for wanting all of his statements— in all
their complexity and balance— to be reported in the program. That is what CBS did not do.
Nor did the initial Petition to Deny quote the full text of Rabbi Bleich’s comments. In addition to
his statement that “my words were quoted out of the context that they were said” and that “the CBS
program was unbalanced since it focused on a very small minority, ignoring the majority and the
positive achievements of Ukraine in its three years of independence,” the Bleich letter also noted “the
danger of the extreme nationalist parties such as UNA-UNSO who proclaim ‘Ukraine for
Ukrainians.’” Petition to Deny Ex. 3, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). Further,
while Bleich complimented the administration of the previous Ukrainian President for publicly
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court effectively adopted a reading of extrinsic evidence that would ground
news distortion on post-broadcast audience complaint letters. The D.C.
Circuit emphasized the potential probative value of complaint letters,
contending that even people without direct personal knowledge of intent to
distort may possess “relevant information that constitutes circumstantial
evidence about such intent.”216 The complaint letters CBS received, while
considered evidence extrinsic to the program, were dismissed by the
Commission because the letter writers were neither CBS insiders nor people
apologizing for the crimes of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators during World War II, he suggested that “it
would be appropriate for the present government of Ukraine to publicly denounce anti-Semitism and
any other form of bigotry.” Id.
What is of particular interest in connection with the prudential exercise of FCC power, however,
is the interpretation and use of Rabbi Bleich’s statements in an analysis supporting the Serafyn
complaint. The following language from an exhibit appended to the initial complaint and purporting to
analyze the program speaks for itself:
A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. Jews have lived with no other peoples as intimately and for as
long as they have with Ukrainians. In this shared history, there have been bright periods and dark
episodes. It is possible to imagine a shared future in which the bright periods predominate and the
dark episodes are banished. This is the future that Ukrainians and Jews should strive toward, this is
the image that should guide them in their dialogues and that should have guided Mr. Safer in his
broadcast. Perhaps it is already the attitude that inspires the majority of both Ukrainians and Jews.
The Jewish claim to a share of the newly-created nation of Ukraine is as tenable as that of the
ethnic Ukrainians and of the ethnic Russians and others who reside there. At present, all three of
these groups are beginning to mine that claim in relative peace. Differences are being overlooked,
cooperation is the norm, a bright future is possible.
Into this scene burst immature and undiplomatic people like Morley Safer needing a
sensational story, Simon Wiesenthal desperate to retain his relevance in the modern world by
having it believed that 1941 is repeating itself, and Jacob Blike disoriented by having been
plucked from the United States to fill this exotic role of Rabbi of Ukraine— and these three show
no grasp of the political situation, no comprehension of the complex world that they are
simplifying into their stereotypes, no sympathy for impulses toward reconciliation that are
manifest on all sides, certainly no sense of responsibility for nurturing these impulses. This gang
of three has no stake in Ukraine— Mr. Safer leaves for home immediately after reading his lines
into the camera, Mr. Wiesenthal lives in Vienna (where needing to get along with Germans but
not Ukrainians, he expediently concludes that Germans weren’t as bad as Ukrainians), and Jacob
Blike— unhappy in his discovery that in slinging mud he has become muddied, every day more
deeply convinced that he has been miscast in this role of Rabbi of Ukraine— we may expect will
shortly be catching a plane for home. What do any of them care if they are stirring up a hornet’s
nest in Ukraine?
The Jews who are left behind in Ukraine, who have a stake in Ukraine, who need to get
along— to these 60 Minutes does not give air time. It’s the irresponsible ones with nothing to lose
who are able to offer the more sensational testimonials.
And not only does 60 Minutes’ trio of provocateurs have nothing to lose from chaos erupting
in Ukraine, they have this to gain— that if chaos does erupt, they will be able to play the role of
prophets who foretold its coming, and they will do this quite overlooking that they helped it come.
Petition to Deny Ex. 9, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027) (letter from Lubomyr
Prytulak to Laurence A. Tisch, President, CBS, dated November 15, 1994). For further views
expressed by the author of that exhibit, visit http://www.ukar.org.
216. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1222.
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with “direct personal knowledge of intent to falsify.”217 The Serafyn court
criticized that approach.218
The court is obviously right in its initial statement that letters, even from
people without direct knowledge of the broadcaster’s intent, may provide
factual information from which, when viewed with other pieces of evidence,
intent may be inferred.219 However, the court’s choice of an example for the
proposition that such letters can convey direct information about the
producers’ state of mind shows the failure in the court’s application of its
inferential principle. Indeed, there is a hidden danger in the court’s approach
that the subjective intent to distort a broadcast will be inferred from some
generalized notion, after the fact, that the broadcaster’s newsgathering
process was not as candid as a court might wish. This is a rather profound
extension of the news distortion principle as traditionally applied by the
Commission. It entails seriously press-restrictive consequences.
This result is most clearly illustrated by looking at the specific evidence
of complaint letters in Serafyn itself. There, the court recommended the
following upon remand:
[The Commission] may wish to consider separately two types of
letters. First, there may be letters that convey direct information about
the producers’ state of mind while the show was in production. For
example, Cardinal Lubachivsky charged that the producers misled him
as to the nature of the show. Second, there are letters that point out
factual inaccuracies in the show. For example, Rabbi Lincoln, a
viewer, wrote in about the mistranslation of “zhyd.” Although letters
of this type may not have independent significance, they may yet be
probative in determining whether any error was obvious or egregious,
and if so whether it bespeaks an intent to distort the facts.220
A close look at the court’s example of Cardinal Lubachivsky’s complaint
will concretely illustrate the danger of the court’s overbroad statement. The
cardinal’s complaint that the 60 Minutes producers had misled him as to the
217. Id. (quoting WGPR, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8148) (citation omitted). In addition, the FCC argued that
letters sent by viewers subsequent to the broadcast were evidence “clearly incapable of going to intent,
because intent is a state of mind accompanying an act, not following it.” Id. The Serafyn court
skewered this argument, contending that “evidence that sheds light upon one’s intent is relevant
whether it was prepared before or after the incident under investigation; consider, for example, a letter
written after but recounting words or actions before an event.” Id. More charitable readings of the
Commission’s position are possible.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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nature of the show must be read in proper journalistic context.221 Traditional
principles of journalistic autonomy counsel against giving too much
information or editorial input to the subjects of news reports and
documentaries.222 Because any news event could conceivably be reported in
a number of different ways, a broadcast story will often be different from any
particular interviewee’s expectations. Moreover, there is a considerable body
of opinion in the journalistic community that it is acceptable— if not
admirable— for a reporter in the newsgathering process to do or say whatever
is necessary to “get the story,” especially if it is important.223 The misleading
character of the newsgathering process, however, says nothing about the
accuracy of the program as broadcast.
In the Cardinal Lubachivsky example, the most that can be said was that
the Cardinal misunderstood the thrust of the program and might not have
participated had he realized that its actual intended focus would be on anti-
Semitism in Ukraine. It does not follow, however, that the use of the
Cardinal’s statements was in any way misleading to the public or intended to
be so. And that is the nub of the news distortion policy. Moreover, the
question whether the broadcast segments of Cardinal Lubachivsky’s
interview were accurate or misleading is more directly and accurately
answered by comparing outtakes of the interview with the broadcast version,
as was done in the Rabbi Bleich context. Not much weight should rest for
purposes of a news distortion inquiry on Cardinal Lubachivsky’s subjective
impression that he was misled as to the nature of the show. Finally,
Commission precedent demonstrates that the news distortion policy is not to
be used to revise erroneous impressions left either with interviewees or,
unintentionally, by broadcasts.224
221. Id.
222. Giving the subjects of news reports any significant control over the broadcast undermines
both journalistic autonomy and judgment and also journalistic credibility with the public.
223. Admittedly, this approach to newsgathering has its detractors. As the initial Food Lion case
demonstrated, courts increasingly look askance at misleading newsgathering techniques. Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev’d, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
1999).
224. See, e.g., Polly Sowell, 48 F.C.C.2d 494, 494 (1974) (rejecting a news distortion claim by
interviewee who claimed she consented to an interview only because the reporter promised that the
interview would be broadcast in its entirety and further claimed that airing half the interview left an
“erroneous impression” about the Republican Party’s position on the Nixon impeachment matter);
Citizens for Abraham D. Beame, 41 F.C.C.2d 155, 155-56 (1973) (rejecting a news distortion claim in
which a political candidate alleged that the station’s editing of his answers to questions left the public
with the misleading impression that he would not engage in debates). See also CBS Program “Hunger
in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (noting that the FCC will not investigate “the type of
situation frequently encountered, where a person quoted on a news program complains that he very
clearly said something else” and that “[t]he Commission cannot appropriately enter the quagmire of
investigating the credibility of the newsman and the interviewed party in such a type of case”).
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A parallel argument can be made about the court’s second suggestion in
the passage quoted above, that the Commission consider viewer letters
pointing to factual inaccuracies as probative of broadcaster intent to
distort.225 There is no particular reason to give letters from viewers, whoever
they may be, a privileged position simply because they assert factual
inaccuracies. Surely that determination (leaving aside the question whether it
is appropriate in the first instance) is far more reliable if it relies on experts in
the field rather than on the fortuity of viewer mail.
The court may mean that such letters should be considered probative
because their existence, particularly if they are numerous, proves that the
inaccuracy was obvious. But this is a dangerous approach to inference. That
someone did or did not complain is not necessarily related to the obviousness
of an error; it only reflects the efficacy of an organized letter-writing
campaign on a controversial topic. Under the D.C. Circuit’s approach, even if
there is some controversy about the accuracy of a factual assertion, courts
might find the broadcaster’s chosen interpretation to be incorrect simply
because the majority of people writing in took that position and called the
error obvious.226 The court’s principle is both underinclusive and
overinclusive. There may well be factual inaccuracies that slip by because
people did not write to protest. There also may be factually correct
statements that will unleash a storm of protest because a significant number
of people strongly disagree.227
b. Improperly Inferring General Patterns of Distortion: Public
Statements on Newsgathering and the Presence of Written
Policies on Distortion
Finally, with respect to the Commission’s alternative ground of decision
that the plaintiff had not alleged a “general pattern of distortion extending
225. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1222. For a further elaboration of the difficulties with the court’s
“obvious or egregious” test, see discussion supra Part III.A.2.
226. Ironically, the court’s discussion of the “mistranslation” of the word “zhyd” is a perfect
example of this type of dangerous inference. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a.
227. If the court implicitly means that viewer letters about inaccuracies become probative of the
broadcaster’s subjective intent to distort when and because the broadcaster does not respond to such
claims, this is an even more radically intrusive stance. There is no reason to read undue meaning into a
broadcaster’s decision to ignore viewer letters, particularly when there is little indication that the
letters are from neutral, knowledgeable, and expert people. Requiring broadcasters to accept or
investigate all claims of inaccuracy, including claims made strategically by viewers with a particular
viewpoint or hidden agenda, would grind news operations to a halt. The journalistic community views
the editing process as sacrosanct, and courts are deferential to the press’s editorial choices. The reading
of the Serafyn court’s language explored here would unduly undermine that principle without a
countervailing good reason.
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beyond that one episode [The Ugly Face of Freedom],”228 the Serafyn court
greatly expanded the type of circumstantial evidence from which the FCC
could infer a broadcaster’s general pattern of intentionally distorting news
programming.229 In the fourth aspect of its new model, the Serafyn court
suggested that negative inferences might plausibly be justified by station
employees’ public comments about the licensee’s approach to newsgathering
and by a station’s failure to have an explicit policy prohibiting news
distortion.230 Indeed, the court went so far as to suggest that a general
practice of inaccuracy and distortion— far beyond the accuracy of a single
report— might be inferred from such evidence.
Complainants in Serafyn argued that 60 Minutes had no policy against
news distortion and indeed considered some distortion acceptable.231 To
support this, they submitted a Washington Post article in which Mike
Wallace was quoted as saying “[y]ou don’t like to baldly lie, but I have” and
Don Hewitt observed “[i]t’s the small crime versus the greater good.”232
Further, complainants cited some comments by Don Hewitt to the effect that
he “wouldn’t make Hitler look bad on the air if I could get a good story.”233
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found the Commission’s failure to consider
the above evidence “troubling”234 and thought the comments to be “to say the
least, suggestive”235 regarding CBS’s general policy about distortion in its
overall programming. Indeed, the court found, “because of the importance
the Commission placed upon the supposed lack of such evidence, its
presence in the record casts the Commission’s alternative ground into
doubt.”236 Having characterized Hewitt and Wallace as “likely members of
the ‘news management’ whose decisions can fairly be attributed to the
licensee” under the Commission’s standard for materiality in news distortion
findings, the court suggested that their statements would undermine not only
The Ugly Face of Freedom itself, but more generally the FCC’s rejection of a
general pattern of distortion by CBS.237 The court also gave inferential
weight to CBS’s asserted failure to adopt internal policies prohibiting news
228. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220.
229. Id. at 1219-22.
230. Id. at 1220-21.
231. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1218.
232. Id. at 1218. See also Colman McCarthy, The TV Whisper, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1995, at A21.
233. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1218. See also Richard Jerome, Don Hewitt (Executive Producer of the
News Program 60 Minutes), PEOPLE WEEKLY, Apr. 25, 1995, at 85.
234. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1221.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1221.
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distortion.238
However, the comments about acceptable deceptions attributed to Mike
Wallace and Don Hewitt in the Washington Post article were clearly made in
discussing newsgathering, not the presentation of the news.239 In further
explaining this point, Wallace apparently said: “It really depends on your
motive [for lying]. . . . Are you doing it for drama, or are you doing it for
illumination? Each one has to be weighed separately as to the cost-
benefit.”240 Hewitt, admitting to being “trouble[d]” by undercover
investigations using hidden cameras, justified the practice on comparative
moral grounds: “It’s the small crime versus the greater good. . . . If you can
catch someone violating ‘thou shalt not steal’ by your violating ‘thou shalt
not lie,’ that’s a pretty good trade-off.”241
While there is dispute within the journalistic community about the
appropriateness of certain types of surreptitious newsgathering techniques, it
is clear that even the reporters who engage in such newsgathering activities
do so primarily in order to present what they see as the “true” story to the
public. They may omit the truth or lie to the targets of their stories and even
to their sources, but all in the name of revealing the truth to the viewing
audience.242 This is very different from any kind of admission of lying to the
public with rigged, slanted, or distorted news. As for Don Hewitt’s remarks
about Hitler, they constituted a hyperbolic denial of the rumor that he had
deliberately tried to undermine another journalist on the air. In denying
rumors of his unprofessional conduct, Hewitt responded, “I made a pass at
her— I never denied that . . . But I wouldn’t make Hitler look bad on the air if
I could get a good story.”243 Moreover, elsewhere in the story cited by the
Serafyn complainants, Hewitt staunchly defended 60 Minutes broadcasts
against charges of bias by referring to the program’s fairness-testing editor.244
238. Id. at 1218, 1221.
239. Richard Harwood, . . . And Lying for a Story, WASH. POST, July 27, 1996, at A23.
240. Howard Kurtz, Hidden Network Cameras: A Troubling Trend? Critics Complain of
Deception as Dramatic Footage Yields High Ratings, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1992, at A1 (quoting 60
Minutes correspondent Mike Wallace).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Russ W. Baker, Truth, Lies and Videotape: “Prime Time Live” and the Hidden
Camera, COLUM. JOURN. REV., July-Aug. 1993, at 25; Kurtz, supra note 240. See also Tom Luljak,
The Routine Nature of Journalistic Deception, in HOLDING THE MEDIA ACCOUNTABLE: CITIZENS,
ETHICS, AND THE LAW 11-12 (David Pritchard ed., 2000) (suggesting that various sorts of deception
are common and that journalists employ deception to maintain a competitive edge in addition to
serving the public).
243. Jerome, supra note 233, at 85, 90.
244. Id. (“We have an editor . . . whose sole job is to compare the cut segment to the uncut
transcript and answer the question ‘Have we been fair?’”) (quoting 60 Minutes Executive Producer
Don Hewitt). Hewitt’s reference to a ‘fairness edit’ undermines complainants’ attempt to use this
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Thus, the difference in the contexts of the Serafyn claim and the Hewitt and
Wallace statements makes that “evidence” definitionally inapposite.
The court’s implicit approval of press interview statements as indicative
of general patterns of licensee programming distortion is problematic for
other reasons as well. Unlike affidavits in a particular litigation, news
interviews given by reporters to other news organizations in other contexts
are not sworn statements germane to the issue. In addition to the inevitable
questions about whether the meanings of the statements were properly
understood in context, reliance on such indirect statements of policy does not
account for misquotations and misunderstandings by the authors of the
underlying articles. If one news report in one medium is subject to charges of
slanting and bias, so may be the other report on which the news distortion
charge is based. In addition, if we believe that a reporter may lie and slant the
news he produces in one context, why should we assume that he would not
exaggerate or slant his answers to interview questions in other contexts for
his own purposes? There is no reason to privilege such “extrinsic” evidence
to the degree that the court in Serafyn assumes is appropriate.245 Moreover, a
review of prior cases in the area demonstrates that the court’s inferential
approach is unprecedented in the news distortion corpus.246
As for policies on news distortion, the Commission itself admittedly
article to prove Hewitt’s deliberate or reckless acceptance of falsity.
245. One could claim that if there are antidistortion journalistic norms and a reporter’s statement
appears to contradict them, we should think of the statement as a “statement against interest” and
therefore more credible. This does not address the issue of using the statement out of context. More
importantly, however, it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the journalistic norms applicable to
newsgathering and to reporting. These are different journalistic enterprises. Although strategic
deception in gathering news is controversial, there are those in the journalistic community who
approve of intrusive newsgathering techniques and even misleading a source to get a story. But even
particularly aggressive newsgathering techniques do not necessarily entail aggressive reporting
techniques. Having gotten the story “by hook or by crook,” a reporter can certainly thereafter take
exquisite care in the way in which it is actually reported on the air.
246. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 755 (1983) (rejecting the complainant’s
attempt to rely on comments in the station’s monthly newsletter and an announcer’s on-the-air
statement that the station was providing an alternative view, unavailable in mainstream newspapers,
about Central America, as extrinsic evidence of intent to distort).
In Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., the complainant submitted evidence that a reporter in a documentary
critical of truck safety had previously written articles in a dissident Teamster group’s newsletter. 73
F.C.C.2d 741, 757 (1979), aff’d, 656 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1981). The FCC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, did not order a hearing on the news distortion claim because the reporter
submitted an affidavit denying the charge and because the reporter’s articles criticizing the
administration of pension funds was not evidence that NBC distorted reports critical of the trucking
industry’s safety practices. Id. at 757. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the articles were not related to the
broadcast and called the complainant’s inferential argument a “non-sequitur.” 656 F.2d at 603. The
connection between Wallace’s and Hewitt’s generalized interview puffery delivered in an entirely
different context and the deliberate distortion claimed in Serafyn is even more attenuated then the
“non-sequitur” in Yellow Freight.
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opined in an earlier case that such policies were desirable.247 In Hunger in
America, the Commission wrote: “[w]e stress that the licensee must have a
policy of requiring honesty of its news staff and must take reasonable
precautions to see that news is fairly handled.”248 Serafyn did not establish
that the network did not have such a policy, however; indeed, the CBS News
Division did have a policy against news distortion.249
The court’s discussion of the question of distortion policies is
problematic. First, of course, it raises questions directed to the specific
case.250 Second, however, it raises questions regarding the inferential weight
apparently given to evidence of news distortion policies. Even if CBS did not
have a formal, written news distortion policy, should that necessarily lead to
a substantive conclusion regarding the nature of CBS’s news coverage? The
underlying issue is the degree of evidentiary weight to be given to the
apparent failure of a broadcaster to have a formal policy prohibiting news
distortion. The FCC’s policy prohibiting news distortion is on the books, and
247. CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150-51 (1969).
248. Id. at 151 n.6.
249. Indeed, the Commission asked CBS to set forth its staging policies as part of its sanction in
the Pot Party case. Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a
Marihuana Party (Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 139 (1969). CBS did so. At the time The Ugly Face of
Freedom was broadcast, the CBS News Standards provided: “Staging is prohibited. CND broadcasts
must be just what they purport to be. We report facts exactly as they occur. We do not create or change
them. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that these basic principles be adhered to scrupulously
by all CND personnel . . ..” CBS News Standards, at 38 (on file with author). The News Standards also
stated that “[s]ignificant errors in material facts must be corrected, clearly and promptly, in appropriate
broadcasts.” Id. at 5. CBS’s News Standards advised its staff:
It is not sufficient merely to report that the statement included in the original broadcast has been
denied. The accuracy of the denial must be specifically confirmed.
— It is not sufficient merely to include the accurate information in the correcting broadcast. The
fact that it is a correction must be specifically noted. 
— It is not sufficient merely to broadcast a letter from a viewer or listener which asserts we were in
error. The accuracy of the assertion must be specifically admitted.
Id. The CBS News Standards were subsequently revised, but continue to prohibit news distortion.
Nevertheless, CBS can be faulted for failing to provide evidence of its published news standards.
Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1998). CBS’s provision of such material would not
have constituted an official investigation into its news broadcasting.
250. The court’s unquestioning acceptance of the complainants’ contention that there were no
such guidelines is surprising in this context. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1218. Here, CBS took the position
that it would not address the charges substantively for policy reasons grounded on the First
Amendment. Id. It did not selectively provide and withhold documents and information as it pleased.
While the network’s resistance may not have been prudent, such resistance is different from a situation
in which a party with relevant information simply refuses to supply it. Admittedly, in many
circumstances, if a party with relevant information refuses to supply it, courts find it reasonable to
infer that the information is adverse to that party. This argument is much more problematic in the
speech context, however. CBS’s tactical position was presumably directed by First Amendment
considerations.
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neutrality in news reporting is a widely articulated journalistic norm.251 In
any event, distortion could very well take place against a background of
detailed antidistortion policies— the existence of the policy manual cannot be
determinative.
This is not intended to be an arrogant defense of the media on the ground
that broadcasters should simply be trusted not to violate legal or professional
norms. Rather, it is a criticism of the D.C. Circuit for having overstated what
we can reasonably conclude from a news organization’s failure to have a
specific nondistortion policy. If there is evidence of willingness to distort,
then that evidence should suffice on its own to prove the point. That there is
also no articulated policy does not necessarily enhance the evidence of
deliberate intent.
Ultimately, what is most troubling about the Serafyn court’s treatment of
the petitioner’s claims about CBS’s policy on distortion is that it takes Hewitt
and Wallace’s interview comments as evidence of a “general pattern of
distortion extending beyond that one episode.”252 The totality of CBS’s
approach to news presentation is thus assertedly rendered suspect on the
basis of comments whose completely different context is not even recognized
or addressed by the court. This is a significant extension of the traditional
news distortion policy.
B. Lessons from Defamation Law
When addressed in its broader doctrinal context, it is clear that an
invigorated news distortion policy allows administrative power to circumvent
tort law constraints. A comparison of the news distortion standard and
defamation law clarifies the degree to which expansive standards designed to
improve news reporting and public discourse are both inconsistent with First
Amendment values and unnecessarily create a conflict between
administrative and tort law.
The litigation in New York Times v. Sullivan,253 in which the Court first
articulated the constitutional limitations on state defamation law, was brought
to mute or suppress advertisements about Southern bigotry during the civil
rights struggle.254 The Court in Sullivan found a constitutional privilege to
251. On journalistic norms of objectivity and neutrality, see, for example, MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
DISCOVERING THE NEWS (1978); Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper
Ethics and Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 221 (1992) (citing to other relevant sources
therein).
252. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1220.
253. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
254. Id. at 256-59.
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criticize public officials in order to promote robust public debate— even
though a number of the details in the advertisement at issue were literally
inaccurate.255
News distortion claims such as the ones in Serafyn are similar to the
defamation claims in Sullivan. Moreover, they often arise in procedural
contexts in which complainants possess the same deterrence objectives in
invoking the administrative policy as plaintiffs do in politically motivated
defamation actions.256
1. The Meaning of Meaning and Truth
Under traditional defamation doctrine, meaning and truth are not defined
literally.257 Courts decide whether the “gist” of a statement is defamatory
falsehood or “substantially” true.258 The meaning of the statement at issue is
defined by context and in relation to the community whose norms are put at
issue by the plaintiff.259 Whether at common law where truth was a defense,
or since the progeny of New York Times v. Sullivan placed the burden of
proving falsity in public issue cases on the plaintiff, the statement is assessed
by reference to a standard of substantial truth and not literal accuracy.260 The
policy benefits from this approach are self-evident. Both reputation and the
press are protected by legal rules that focus on what was actually understood
in context. The Serafyn court’s adoption of an “obvious or egregious” factual
error standard as a litmus test for a finding of deliberate news distortion is
inconsistent with the approach to meaning in defamation law.261
255. Id. at 270-71.
256. Commission responsiveness to the public is in many ways laudable. However, an
orchestrated use of Commission policies by a group with a particular substantive point of view about
the truth is disturbing in light of its likely chilling effect and raises questions about the limits on
administrative responses to complaints from the public. See also infra Part V.B.3.
257. See, e.g., ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 3.7, at 3-14 to 3-19 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f, at 237
(1977).
258. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991); SACK, supra note 257.
259. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1996); Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to Meaning in Defamation Law,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 345-51 (1999) (providing a provocative discussion of the importance
of context in ascertaining defamatory meaning).
260. See, e.g., Masson, 501 U.S. at 517-18.
261. An inquiry into meaning in defamation law focuses on what was understood by the hearers of
the statement. Masson, 501 U.S. at 513. A finding of news distortion depends on the speaker’s
subjective intent. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The point here, however, is
simply that the adoption of an “obvious or egregious” error standard for the imputation of intent is
inconsistent with the highly contextualist approach to defining meaning in defamation cases.
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2. Comparison with Reckless Disregard
It might be argued in support of the Serafyn doctrinal extension that the
D.C. Circuit’s proposal is no more intrusive than the actual malice standard
in defamation law. In view of its focus on a subjective standard of intentional
news distortion, the FCC’s news distortion policy arguably has been applied
in a fashion analogous to the actual malice standard of the post-New York
Times v. Sullivan262 defamation cases. The only question is whether imposing
liability for what might be called “reckless disregard” as well as for actual,
subjective knowledge of falsity, is appropriate in the context of news
distortion in electronic media. Why, one might ask, should we eliminate the
news distortion policy as constitutionally suspect if we tolerate an analogous
analytic construct in the defamation area?263 The short answer is that
defamation doctrine, policy, and remedies cannot in fact serve as an
appropriate analogy to the news distortion context.
First, the FCC self-consciously differentiates between news distortion and
defamation standards. As the agency put it in Bruce A. Hassel (in which the
complainant argued news staging based on affidavits and depositions taken
from parties in a defamation suit against a licensee), “the standards used by
the courts in defamation cases . . . differ from those applied by the
Commission in reviewing allegations of news staging and/or rigging.”264 The
decision concluded that “[t]he allegations contained in the pending civil
complaint and submitted by [the complainant] in the petition to deny did not
meet the very high burden of pleading established by the Commission.”265
Similarly, in rejecting a malice-based alternative to the fairness doctrine, the
Commission concluded that even though a malice standard might reduce the
chilling effect of the fairness doctrine, it would not eliminate the effect.266
262. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (adopting a First Amendment constitutional privilege for libel
cases involving criticism of public officials). The Sullivan progeny extended the “actual malice”
standard to cases involving defamation of “public figures.” See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323,
334-36 (1974).
263. Indeed, in an attempt to impose a more stringent review standard in the fairness doctrine
context, commentators have argued implicitly that the extrinsic evidence standard of news distortion
cases should apply to all “improper news reporting” complaints in an analogy to the actual malice
standard in the defamation context. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 40, at 1248-50 & n.176. However, this
proposal was made when the fairness doctrine was still on the FCC’s books and when commentators
sought to limit the doctrine’s potentially broad and vague scope. Intent upon that project,
commentators like Jones did not adequately address the problems of the extrinsic evidence standard,
lest they win the battle to lose the war.
264. Bruce A. Hassel, 3 F.C.C.R. 6489, 6489 (1988).
265. Id.
266. Syracuse Peace Council, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035, 2037 (1988), review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
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There are also significant distinctions between defamation and news
distortion. Doctrinally, for example, plaintiffs in public figure defamation
cases involving matters of public concern bear the burden of proving the
falsity and defamatory character of the defendant’s statement before getting
to the question of actual malice.267 Opinion statements and rhetorical
hyperbole are not actionable.268
Moreover, in defamation doctrine, the standard for defamatory statements
about public figures is whether they were made with actual knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.269 Actual malice is only found if the
plaintiff can show with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had
at least serious doubts about the truth of its statements about the plaintiff.270
That standard, in turn, does not impose liability for what might be termed
professional negligence as judged by journalistic norms.271 A mere failure to
investigate does not itself prove reckless disregard.272 That is the case even if
the better journalistic practice in the situation would be to investigate the
allegation before publishing. Even if the plaintiff can show that journalistic
training makes reporters sensitive to the value of accuracy, courts do not
make inferences of actual malice from evidence that the reporters
nevertheless made errors for which they have no excuse.273 Only if the
plaintiff can shoulder the heavy burden of showing that the defendant had
sufficient warning as to the probable falsity of the statement so that not
investigating would be tantamount to “reckless disregard of the truth” can the
defendant be deemed to have acted with actual malice.274 The Supreme Court
has made clear that the reckless disregard prong of the actual malice standard
should not be liberally interpreted in favor of plaintiffs in public figure
defamation cases.
Even if the full actual malice standard were to be used in the news
267. See Pa. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
268. See Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (noting that opinion statements
which do not implicitly rely on unarticulated statements of fact are not actionable as defamation).
269. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
270. Pa. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) (establishing plaintiff’s burden in
public figure defamation cases); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (requiring
defamation plaintiffs to provide “clear and convincing proof” of actual malice).
271. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968) (establishing that failure to investigate
alone is not proof of actual malice under Sullivan). See also Zupnik v. Associated Press, Inc., 31 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 73-74 (D. Conn. 1998) (granting summary judgment for newspaper wire service in
defamation action grounded on false statement in news rewrite). For a critique of the subjective
wrongdoing requirement, see, for example, John L. Diamond, Rethinking Media Liability for
Defamation of Public Figures, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (1996).
272. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733.
273. See, e.g., Zupnik, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74.
274. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
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distortion context, its limitations would have to be respected as well. Any
interpretation of the news distortion standard that goes beyond the notion of
deliberate subjective intent to distort would be effectively an end-run around
the constitutional protections in the defamation context. Given that a
governmental agency would be engaged in specific oversight of program
content and accuracy, the Serafyn court’s approach presents an even greater
probability of censorship— self-censorship and governmental suppression—
than is the case in even the worst defamation scenario. The Serafyn court’s
“obvious or egregious” factual inaccuracy standard does not appear to satisfy
the more stringent definition of actual malice used in defamation cases.275
Different social policies also underlie the different rules. The traditional
reason for the defamation cause of action is the protection of reputation.
Although the interest in reputation is just as much of a social interest as the
interest in protecting the press and the free flow of information,276 the
underlying policy of defamation is the social norm that individual reputations
should receive protection against false and defamatory charges. By contrast,
the news distortion policy is not directed to the protection of individual
reputations. Rather, it appears to be designed to protect democratic
decisionmaking in the citizenry as a whole.277 It is a way of enlisting
government in making sure that the information needed for citizens in a
democracy is presented in an undistorted, truthful fashion.
The differences in remedies between the private civil action for
defamation and the license-denying power of the FCC in news distortion
cases implicate different degrees of exercise of governmental power in the
service of the relevant social policies. Ultimately, in a defamation action
against the press, a loss for the defendant means the imposition of damages
and the potential chilling effect resulting from fear of future damage
awards.278 By contrast, a successful news distortion claim could lead not only
to a letter of reprimand to the station279 but even to license revocation or
275. The Court’s approach in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991),
demonstrates that even a knowing falsification is not problematic in some circumstances. There, the
Court found that a reporter could knowingly edit the language of an interviewee’s statements while
still using quotation marks so long as the meaning of the statements was not substantially different. Id.
at 516.
276. Robert Post’s classic The Social Foundation of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986), points out that the traditional dichotomy— between the
individual interest in the protection of reputation and the social interest in the free dissemination of
information— is really a mischaracterization. Id. at 740-41. The real tension in cases like Sullivan is
the attempt to balance the contending social interests in reputation and a free press. Id. at 691-92.
277. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
278. SACK, supra note 257, ch. 10, at 10-1 to 10-32. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (addressing dangers of self-censorship resulting from damage awards).
279. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 1262-65 (1999).
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nonrenewal.280
Perhaps most importantly, application of a reckless disregard standard in
the news distortion context would likely lead to extensive evidentiary
inquiries, intrusive discovery, and lengthy deliberate distortion hearings. The
law reviews contain numerous articles criticizing the Court for allowing
extensive discovery of editorial processes in connection with actual malice
inquiries.281 Yet the threat posed by such hearings and fishing expeditions is
much greater in the news distortion context for the simple reason that while a
defamation case has one or a small number of identified plaintiffs, the
number of potential complainants about broadcast news programs has no
such limitation. Indeed, they needn’t be “defamed” at all. A peace group
might claim that a news program presents a distorted, falsely positive picture
of Pentagon weaponry. Or a conservative Jewish group might claim that a
program on Middle East peace efforts put Yassir Arafat in a falsely positive
light. Certainly the potential chill is much greater in that context.
3. The Administrative End-Run Around Tort Limitations: The Conflict
Between News Distortion and Group Libel Doctrines
Far from being consistent with the constitutional privilege in defamation
law, Serafyn demonstrates how in certain circumstances, the application of
the news distortion doctrine illuminates a conflict between tort and
administrative law. Thus, the difficulties detailed above in connection with
the application of the “new” news distortion policy are matched by an
interdoctrinal tension. Specifically, the news distortion claim in Serafyn by
the Ukrainian community groups was in effect a claim for group libel in the
administrative context, interpreting the program as inaccurately accusing all
Ukrainians of being anti-Semitic.282
It is clear that such a group libel claim would not be successful under
current defamation law because of the limitations on the group libel cause of
Monetary forfeitures are available only for violations of Commission rules, 47 U.S.C. § 503 (1999),
while the news distortion prohibition is only a policy.
280. 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(k), 312 (1999). See also ZUCKMAN, supra note 279, at 1261-62, 1265-66.
281. See, e.g., Jane Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1069, 1082-85 (1996) (criticizing cases such as Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979), and its progeny because these cases invite juries and appellate courts to decide whether
journalists acted in a “professional” manner).
282. Serafyn first argued that the program was a violation of the FCC’s personal attack rules, but
the Commission disagreed, holding that the personal attack rules could not apply to a claimed insult to
all Ukrainians. After losing the personal attack argument, the complainants then moved to the news
distortion claim. See supra note 96; WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140, 8140 n.2 (1995); In re Complaint
of Ukrainian Congress of America v. CBS, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 11,948 (1995).
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action.283 The question is whether the regulatory apparatus of the
administrative state should be used to achieve the same result.
Although in Beauharnais v. Illinois284 the Court found that a criminal
group libel statute was not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech,285 courts addressing the issue after the Court’s decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan have assumed that Beauharnais was tacitly overruled.286 In
light of the unavailability of criminal libel claims, plaintiffs in such cases
must proceed under the traditional civil defamation cause of action under
state law.
Courts have required group libel plaintiffs to satisfy the ordinary elements
of defamation at common law. Therefore, most such claims have foundered
on the courts’ finding that the claim was not sufficiently “of and concerning”
the plaintiff.287 This identification requirement has meant that the
determinative factor for a group libel claim is the size of the group. While
courts do not purport to ground their size cut-offs on any scientific principles,
it is clear that defamation of an entire people— what has been called “blood
283. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.32, at 1089-90 (5th
ed. 1995) (noting that “modern cases” reject the idea of group libel).
284. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
285. In Beauharnais, the petitioner distributed a segregationist leaflet defaming African
Americans. 343 U.S. at 252-53. He was convicted under a statute prohibiting publications portraying
“depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion which [exposes that class of persons] to contempt . . . or which is productive of breach of the
peace.” Id. at 251. The trial court refused to charge the jury that constitutional principles required them
to acquit unless the leaflet was “likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.” Id. at 253. The Supreme Court
held, in a 5-4 decision, that it was unnecessary to consider the issues behind the phrase “clear and
present danger” because libelous utterances were not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech. Id. at 253-57.
286. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985)
(reiterating the Seventh Circuit’s previous conclusion that “cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan
have so washed away the foundations of Beauharnais that it could no longer be considered
authoritative”), aff’d mem. 475 U.S. 1001 (1985); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir.
1978), (declining to apply Beauharnais to a Nazi march in Skokie); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d
1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (“[I]n view of more recent decisions, it is extremely doubtful that the
Illinois statute [in Beauharnais] would be upheld today.”); Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith v.
FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring) (“[F]ar from spawning progeny,
Beauharnais has been left more and more barren . . . .”). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 395-96 (1992) (striking down a hate speech ordinance on First Amendment grounds). For an
argument that the court should explicitly overrule Beauharnais, see Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More
Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications
Technologies Make it Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon its Inside-Out Approach
to Freedom of Speech, Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81
IOWA L. REV. 883, 950-52 (1996).
287. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory
Statements Directed at Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343 (2000) (reviewing group libel case law
and proposing numerical cutoff).
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libel”— would not fit under these quantity-focused approaches.288
288. In Neiman Marcus v. Lait, 14 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), a classic group libel case, the
court suggested the number twenty-five as an appropriate benchmark. See also Anyanwu v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 690, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing libel claim on behalf of 500
Nigerian businessmen); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900 (W.D.
Mich. 1980), aff’d, 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981) (dismissing libel claim on behalf of over one million
hunters); Talal v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. 186, 187 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (dismissing libel claim on behalf of
large group of Muslims); Webb v. Sessions, 531 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App. 1975) (holding that
individuals may not recover damages for defamation of a group consisting of more than 740 persons).
Recently , in a highly publicized “veggie libel” defamation action brought by a Texas organization of
cattle ranchers against talk show host Oprah Winfrey, the court held that the plaintiffs could not assert
a common law defamation claim against Winfrey for airing statements about “mad cow disease.” Tex.
Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Because there are “about a million”
cattlemen in the United States, and none of the plaintiffs were mentioned by name on the Oprah show,
the court found that the identification requirement of the cause of action had not been satisfied. Id.
(quoting Webb v. Sessions, 531 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App. 1975)). The court found that the cattle
ranchers’ organization could not assert a defamation claim for a group or class consisting of
“cattlemen” in the United States, and plaintiff therefore could not meet the “of and concerning”
requirement. Id.
Four individual commercial fisherman could not maintain a defamation action against four
television stations that continued to air commercials opposing commercial net fishing after the stations
received notice that the advertisements were false and misleading. Brown v. New World
Communications of Tampa, Inc., 712 So. 2d 395, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The court reasoned
that the commercials referred generally to “commercial net fishermen,” a class too large for plaintiffs
to meet the “of and concerning test.” Id. See also Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So. 2d
800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (same, but plaintiffs filed as class action); Adams v. WFTV, Inc., 691
So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (class action). Cf. Burns v. Gardner, 493 S.E.2d 356, 358-60
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (using law of standing instead of defamation law to dismiss claim that a
newsletter defamed “the Black Blind population of South Carolina”).
The by-now-traditional argument in support of that result is that if a defamatory statement is made
about a very large group, it will be interpreted by the listener as simply rhetorical hyperbole and
disbelieved. After all, goes the claim, surely no reasonable person can believe that all Jews are stingy
or crafty. While this conclusion is logically compelling, it simply does not account for the prevalence
and effect of ethnic stereotypes. Cabining group libel simply on the basis of this kind of audience
perception argument is not entirely satisfactory in the real world. Surely even the most virulent anti-
Semite does not believe that every single Jew is stingy. But there is enough of an underlying
assumption about the money-grubbing character of Jewish culture that the stereotypical comment
makes a mark— perhaps a presumption— in the dealings of many non-Jews with Jews. So it is an
overstatement to contend that defamatory statements about large groups do not reflect on the
individual members of the groups because the comments are dismissed as hyperbole. Even if the
defamatory statement is not believed to be literally true about every member of the group, it may
nevertheless reinforce underlying cultural assumptions from which the individual group member must
differentiate herself as an individual. Thus, defamatory statements about groups are likely to have
harmful effects on particular members of the groups to the extent that those individuals are associated
with or defined by their group characteristics. At the least, the listener may harbor two inconsistent
views in this type of situation: dismissal of the defamatory statement as rhetorical hyperbole with
regard to a specific person in a specific interaction, and, simultaneously, reinforcement of a
presumption of group difference that must be overcome by the particular individual in the process of
differentiating herself from her presumed group characteristics.
A different argument in support of the numerosity requirement in libel law today is that once a
statement is made about a very large group— ethnic, cultural, or otherwise linked by some affinity— it
should be dealt with as a political statement rather than a particularized false statement of fact about
each member of that group. This suggests that group libel is disfavored because statements of that kind
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the desirability in general of
recognizing currently unrecognized tort-like causes of action for group libel.
However, a claim can be made that even if it is appropriate for state courts
not to recognize class actions for libel, administrative recognition is
completely different. After all, general harms that do not have adequate
remedy in the civil litigation context are often subject to general regulation in
the regulatory state. State substantive law and federal administrative law
properly have different footprints. Civil litigation is purportedly designed to
compensate individuals for particular harms. But administrative regulation
may well appropriately extend beyond individual harm— to deter and punish
more general ills. So it might be said that there is nothing wrong with the
FCC choosing to redress the general harm of group libel even if state courts
do not.
To the contrary, however, I argue— for a number of reasons particular to
the administrative context— against allowing an administrative agency like
the FCC to use a news distortion doctrine to punish reputation-harming
statements like the ones identified by the plaintiffs in Serafyn. To extend the
news distortion doctrine in this way is far less justifiable than to recognize
group libel claims in tort law.
The viability of such claims in administrative proceedings is likely to
place far more pressure on First Amendment principles than their recognition
in the context of civil tort actions. First, defamation law is not designed
primarily for speech suppression; rather, its purpose is the compensation of
individuals for harm to their reputations.289 The speech-suppressive effect of
libel actions is only (although predictably) a byproduct of the compensatory
scheme. By contrast, suppression of speech— and not compensation— is the
entire goal of the news distortion doctrine in group defamation claims such as
the ones in Serafyn.
Second, the chilling effect on the press is likely greater in the
administrative context. Because the administrative arena may not afford the
equivalent processes to drop claims at a very early stage,290 or at least
are actually political statements. Thus, regardless of their harmful effect on individuals, such political
statements should be protected on this view because of our commitment to the robust and unfettered
discussion of political ideas. In Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS, the court suggested that
there cannot be defamation liability for large groups because the imposition of such liability would
“seriously interfere with public discussion of issues, or groups that are in the public eye.” 485 F. Supp.
at 900. See also Freedman, supra note 286, at 951-52 (discussing three lines of attack— including an
argument similar to that above— for arguing that group libel statutes are unconstitutional and that
Beauharnais should be overruled).
289. See Post, supra note 276, at 692-93.
290. The Commission’s use of staff review may be seen as equivalent to motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment in the defamation litigation context. But FCC staff review is subject to
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because of the drastic character of the potential sanction of license
revocation, the chilling effect of such “news distortion as group libel” claims
in the FCC context is potentially quite significant.291
Thus, the news distortion policy, especially as reinterpreted by the D.C.
Circuit, is in tension with defamation law and raises the kinds of First
Amendment concerns that led to the adoption of a constitutional privilege in
the libel context. Ultimately, an invigorated application of the news distortion
doctrine would create an unnecessary tension between the strictures of tort
administrative appeal with more stringent review than judicial review of dismissals in defamation
cases.
Admittedly, the Commission’s traditional rhetoric in the news distortion area emphasizes licensee
discretion and the Commission staff gatekeepers who address news distortion claims begin with that
presumption. On the other hand, the Commission’s staff responds to complaints. In the first instance,
they have little incentive to stop the inquiry from going forward, other than the Commission’s
nonintervention rhetoric. Even that brake might be released if the Commission adopts the D.C.
Circuit’s recommended approach in Serafyn. In any event, a staff inquiry on a news distortion claim is
effectively a governmental agent interrogating the station on behalf of the complainant. Although too
much should not be made of this, it stands in contrast to the procedural neutrality of the court in a
defamation action. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the FCC has jurisdiction over the station in
virtually every regard. Therefore, the licensee is in a continuing oversight relationship with the
Commission staff. The station’s interpretation of a Commission inquiry must always be assessed in
light of that continuing regulatory relationship. This regulatory aspect is conspicuously missing in a
classic tort action.
291. Admittedly, the Commission traditionally has relied on the First Amendment to reject
claims— under its personal attack rule, fairness doctrine, licensing precedents, or general public
interest obligations— by large groups complaining of reputational harms. See, e.g., Complaint of Anti-
Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 4 F.C.C.2d 190 (1966), aff’d sub nom. Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In B’nai B’rith, for example, the Commission
majority found that the First Amendment required the agency to recuse itself from substantive review
of offensive and false statements about Jews broadcast on public issue programming. B’nai B’rith, 403
F.2d at 171-72. Relying on the fairness doctrine and the reply right offered by the Anti-Defamation
League the Commission majority took an absolutist, speech-protective approach. The majority’s
refusal to review content complaints in the B’nai B’rith case is consistent with its subsequent decisions
concerning other ethnic slurs and group libel-like claims. See, e.g., Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943
(1978) (relying on First Amendment principles to reject complaint that station broadcast racial
epithets). See also Zapis Communications Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. 3888 (1992) (rejecting petition to deny
renewal on ground, inter alia, that program insulted and stereotyped minorities); Turner Broad. Corp.,
87 F.C.C.2d 476 (1981) (rejecting petition that alleged, inter alia, that the station aired “inflammatory,
racist and demeaning” statements); Avco Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 48 (1975) (rejecting complaint
that station broadcast ethnic slur that degraded Mexican-Americans); The Outlet Co., 53 F.C.C.2d 611
(1975) (same); Thaddeus L. Kowalski, 46 F.C.C.2d 124 (1974), aff’d sub nom. Polish-American
Congress v. FCC, 520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting complaint of Polish-Americans that ABC
aired “demeaning” jokes). This approach is consistent with the current jurisprudence of group libel.
However, if the Commission were to adopt an invigorated interpretation of its news distortion policy,
as recommended by the D.C. Circuit, it would either reverse that precedent in the personal
attack/public interest context or it would end up with an inconsistent set of precedents in the news
distortion area. Indeed, B’nai Brith’s reliance on the then-applicable fairness doctrine suggests that in
the absence of such precedent, there might be more pressure on the Commission to find some
remaining regulatory rubric under which to rid the air of such offensive discourse.
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law and the application of administrative rules designed for different ends.292
Whatever the ultimate merits of excluding group libel claims from traditional
defamation law, there is no good reason to allow the regulatory state to be
used in the direct suppression of speech.
Even after New York Times v. Sullivan, there have been numerous
instances of defamation suits apparently brought to establish historical truth
or to vindicate an ideological position (or even an entire people). Whether in
General William Westmoreland’s suit against CBS over its report regarding
troop strength during the Vietnam War,293 or in Ariel Sharon’s suit against
Time magazine for its coverage of the massacres in the Safra and Shatila
refugee camps during Israel’s Lebanese occupation,294 or in David Irving’s
recent suit against Deborah Lipstadt for having called him a Holocaust
denier,295 one of the underlying concerns of observers is that the actions
would put the judiciary in the impossible position of choosing historical truth
and naming it legal truth.
IV. TWO UNSATISFACTORY FALLBACK POSITIONS
A. Weaknesses of the “Traditional” News Distortion, Slanting, and
Staging Policy
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the FCC’s traditional news
distortion policy is the manner in which its porousness opens it to the kind of
expansion and elaboration suggested by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Serafyn.296 However, and less dramatically, the traditional news distortion
292. This is not to say that the current application of group libel law is particularly commendable.
A description of the quantitative approach employed by the majority of courts reveals its weaknesses.
More generally, the question arises whether there should be group libel claims at all. Many have
argued that there is a need for a powerful cause of action for group libel in contexts including
pornography, sexual harassment, and hate speech (on the Internet and elsewhere). While the particular
proposals differ, all begin with the proposition that harmful statements about groups generally have
harmful effects on individuals identified as members of the groups. For a recent student argument that
a narrowly structured “group vilification” tort would pass constitutional muster, see Mark S.
Campisano, Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1997). The broad question of
the desirability of group libel claims is beyond the scope of this paper, however. What is significant for
this Article is that attempts to prohibit news distortion in situations like that in Serafyn conflict with
the current law of group libel. Thus, allowing administrative control over news is likely to circumvent
the limits of traditional libel law for reasons unexplained by either the FCC or the Serafyn court.
293. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, Westmoreland v. CBS: Litigating the Symbols and Lessons of Vietnam, in SUING THE PRESS
198-237 (1986).
294. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
295. See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B. Apr. 11, 2000).
296. For a discussion and critique of the Serafyn court’s approach to news distortion, see supra
Parts II.B.4, III.A.
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doctrine is also subject to critique for its own requirements of extrinsic
evidence, significance, materiality, and direction by management.297 Even
without the analytic occasion provided by Serafyn, the traditional news
distortion doctrine would suffer from sufficient infirmities to support its
elimination. In light of Serafyn, those infirmities should loom large indeed in
terms of future policy at the FCC.
The first issue with regard to the application of the policy is the quantum
of proof required. Whether at the complaint or the hearing stage, the
Commission has made clear that a very significant showing must be made of
deliberate distortion.298 This requirement makes it difficult for complainants
to prevail in news distortion cases. At the same time, the policy gives the
Commission tremendous discretion in its interpretation of the significance of
the evidence adduced. By what yardstick is the Commission to assess the
“significance” of the evidence?
As previously described, the bottom line of the Commission’s traditional
approach— regardless of its statements about the importance of fair and
accurate coverage— seems to be that even if a broadcast is false, the agency
will not look into the making of that broadcast unless extrinsic evidence
triggers the inference that the untruth was deliberate and intended by the
broadcaster. The broadcast itself— an assessment of its veracity— will not be
sufficient to trigger a hearing, apparently because the falsity of the broadcast
could just as easily be due to mistake or because the broadcast could not
easily be susceptible to a determination of falsity. The required extrinsic
evidence, then, is not extrinsic evidence that demonstrates the inaccuracy of
the broadcast. Rather, it is extrinsic evidence that demonstrates the falsifying
state of mind of the broadcaster. As noted above, the Commission has never
defined such extrinsic evidence with specificity. Instead, the agency has
provided examples of what might constitute such evidence.
Some of the categories of extrinsic evidence the Commission has
mentioned in its news distortion cases— such as an affidavit from an
employee discussing instructions to distort or suppress the news299— are
perfectly predictable and fit well into the Commission’s model. The
prototypical case would be one in which a station manager advises a reporter
to slant a particular story or, more commonly, where he advises the reporter
not to report on some element of the news. An affidavit from the reporter
297. For a discussion of the FCC’s requirements and specifications for proper news distortion
claims, see supra Part II.A.
298. See id.
299. See, e.g., In re Pacifica Foundation, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 755-56 (1983). See also supra Part
II.A.
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swearing to the instruction is probative of the broadcaster’s intent to distort or
suppress. It is deemed to be direct evidence that independent and objective
news judgments have been displaced. Whatever it demonstrates about the
underlying falsity of the broadcast, it certainly evidences the licensee’s own
intention to distort or suppress.300
Even this apparently clear category of extrinsic evidence, however,
presents problems. First, the history of Commission decisions even in the
perfect “employee affidavit” cases is instructive: Simply put, the
Commission has not always rushed to credit the proffered accounts.301 This
300. In fact, this inquiry is a bit more complicated in the context of news suppression. In the news
staging or news distortion case, one can reasonably infer the licensee’s intent from employee evidence
of station instructions to stage or distort. One could also infer the licensee’s belief that its broadcast
could be viewed as false, distorted, or staged. These inferences are a bit more troubling in the news
suppression cases. News suppression claims allege that the news was “distorted” in the sense that the
broadcaster refused to air newsworthy information principally because of economic or ideological
imperatives unrelated to the news value of the information. In those situations, the affidavit of an
employee recounting instructions not to cover a story, for example, does not necessarily constitute
evidence of anything more than a policy of not covering the event. It does not evidence the proposition
that the news policy was motivated by economic or ideological interests rather than the broadcaster’s
perception of the public interest or a difference of opinion as to newsworthiness.
301. In Michael D. Bramble, 58 F.C.C.2d 565 (1976), Bramble, the former news director of
KBUN, alleged that the station dismissed him from his position because his news story about a public
interest research group’s grocery price survey was considered incompatible with the interests of local
merchants who advertised on the station. Id. at 565-66. Bramble said that the station’s general manager
specifically directed him to “kill” these stories because they displeased sponsors. Id. at 566. Rather
than holding a hearing because an “insider” had submitted extrinsic evidence of deliberate suppression
by top management, the Commission conducted a field investigation into Bramble’s allegations and
concluded that “it cannot be determined that the licensee did subordinate public to private interest.” Id.
at 572.
In KMAP, Inc., the Commission rejected a news suppression claim and granted the station’s
application for renewal despite extrinsic evidence of suppression by former employees. 72 F.C.C.2d
241, 245, 254 (1979). The Community Service Organization (CSO) and the United Farm Workers’
Organizing Committee (UFWOC) claimed that the license should not have been renewed because the
station suppressed news stories about the UFWOC. Id. at 241-42. The extrinsic evidence consisted of
affidavits from two former employees. Id. at 242. The employees claimed that they had displeased
station management when they broadcast information about the UFWOC and that station management
had issued strict orders that the station would not release any publicity pertaining to Cesar Chavez or
UFWOC. Id. KWAC responded that at the time that the complaining reporters worked at KWAC, the
United Farm Workers’ organizing movement had just begun and would “exaggerate the importance of
certain so-called newsworthy items.” Id. at 242. The station claimed that KWAC did not want to be the
propaganda mouthpiece for any movement and that management policy forbade carrying press
statements from controversial organizations as “news” without first checking them for accuracy. Id.
The station further claimed that the reporter was unduly sympathetic to the viewpoint of the farm
workers. Id.
The Commission admonished KWAC that it might “consider a programming policy of absolute
exclusion of information concerning a particular group or subject regardless of its newsworthiness to
be contrary to the public interest.” Id. at 243. The Commission also conditioned KWAC’s license
renewal upon its submission of a written statement “to make clear that the present and future policy of
the licensee is to present all news, announcements and other programming required by the public
interest, and that there is no exclusionary policy against the broadcast of such subjects.” Id.
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has been good for broadcasters in the past,302 but shows the porousness of the
test and the dangerous interpretive license it gives the Commission to make
credibility determinations in such a sensitive area.
Moreover, outside the core category of direct employee evidence of
falsity, the evidence inevitably becomes more ambiguous. For example, what
about quotations from statements in other contexts by agents of the licensee
purporting to admit to deceptive news practices? In Serafyn itself, the
plaintiffs produced some statements by 60 Minutes personnel in prior news
interviews as extrinsic evidence of intent to distort.303 Of course,
Apparently, KWAC fulfilled this condition in a statement that it filed prior to this decision. In their
petition for reconsideration, the UFWOC claimed that KWAC did not adequately respond to the
extrinsic evidence the UFWOC provided and that “because of KWAC’s unique concentration of
control over the distribution of news and information to its Spanish-speaking audience, KWAC had a
special obligation to be fair in its treatment of UFWOC.” Id. The Commission explained:
[A] pattern of disagreement between a licensee and an individual or group over the coverage of
news events or stories does not necessarily constitute news distortion or suppression. . . . Despite
petitioners’ submission of the affidavits . . . we acted properly in rejecting their news suppression
allegations. Although, as petitioners argue, many of their allegations admittedly were not stale
when made to the Commission, initially we note the affidavits contain no information as to how
the general “orders” or “directions” not to broadcast information about UFWOC were conveyed.
Further, petitioners have not attempted to rebut KWAC’s explanation of how its news policy of
seeking verification of statements and press releases by “controversial” organizations may have
been misinterpreted by affiants. Most importantly, however, the allegations of specific
occurrences of news suppression contained in the affidavits are, at best, vague and ambiguous. For
instance, in regard to the portion of Mr. Zapiain’s affidavit . . . any Commission inquiry into news
suppression must be predicated on information more specific and substantial than allegations that
an individual was “asked . . . indirectly, but in certain terms” to suppress news. . . . It appears
highly implausible a licensee would establish a policy of suppressing news about a particular
organization and then provide that organization with free time for psa’s and/or live broadcast of
one of the organization’s functions. . . . [I]t [also] appears implausible a licensee would offer an
organization the opportunity to have such formal input into its station’s operation while at the
same time maintaining a policy of “suppression” of news about that organization. In view of the
above, we again conclude petitioners have raise no substantial and material question of fact in this
regard.
Id. at 244-45 (internal citations omitted). This passage is a good example of the way in which the FCC
deals with the extrinsic evidence submitted. Although the FCC did admonish the station that it would
scrutinize the station’s next renewal application carefully, the Commission’s scrutiny was due to the
station’s “lax operating and bookkeeping practices” more than the news suppression allegations. Id. at
254.
302. For example, the Commission denied a complaint that CBS had distorted its coverage of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894 (1971). The complainant referenced a 60 Minutes
program in which Mike Wallace had claimed that CBS was unable to obtain an interview with even
one high Egyptian government official and provided the Commission with an affidavit from a
government official describing CBS’s failure to honor their interview appointment. Id. at 898. The
Commission said that this was “not the type of extrinsic evidence” to which the Commission referred
when it discussed news distortion. Id. This decision is, of course, extremely probroadcaster. The
Commission rationally could have said that if CBS was responsible for the failure to meet with an
Egyptian government official, then its knowing statement to the contrary was knowingly false.
303. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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characterizations of prior statements in different contexts are always subject
to differences in interpretation of meaning and context.304 What did the
statement mean in its original context? Is it in fact applicable to the current
context? Thus, even the most basic and arguably incontestable category of
extrinsic evidence from which to infer subjective distortive intent necessarily
requires interpretation and translation and is itself subject to ambiguity.
Third, the development of news distortion policy jurisprudence depends
entirely on the fortuity of having employees or others somehow personally
familiar with the situation willing to leak management memos or swear to the
licensee’s news distorting policies. Although some good cases will surely
come up for hearing under this kind of standard, the approach is not the most
efficient way to assure that the stations engaging in the worst sorts of
distortion or staging will be brought to the Commission’s attention. Because
the FCC’s policy relies on the fortuity and haphazard character of admissions
about distortion, it does not in application necessarily achieve its purpose of
enhancing the availability of truthful information for public deliberation.
What we may get is simply a haphazard set of news distortion complaints
determined largely by the availability of former employees willing to testify
about station news distortion policies. So the dangers of governmental
content review are not outweighed by an efficiently administrable standard.
On the other hand, the standard may also be overbroad. Although
whistleblowing in fact often brings to light many abuses that would
otherwise be concealed, not all whistleblowers necessarily tell the truth. In
some cases, whistleblowers’ claims may result from misinterpretations or
even personal disgruntlement or ideological agendas of the employees. Yet,
because hearings are predicated on such evidence, a Commission inclined to
investigate such claims more assiduously than the Commissions of the past
may well impose costly hearings on broadcasters who ultimately are
exonerated from the claims of distortion.305
Fourth, some other categories of what might be classed as “extrinsic”
evidence— evidence from outside the broadcast itself— may be problematic
from the outset. For example, in Serafyn, the plaintiff made the argument that
evidence from a dictionary which did not support the broadcast’s translation
of a significant word should be considered extrinsic evidence adequate to
304. See discussion supra Part III.A.4.b.
305. Of course, any legal system imposes costs on defendants who ultimately win, and similar
arguments can be made in numerous different legal contexts by prodefendant interest groups. What,
then, makes these limits inherent in any legal process especially problematic here? This Article claims
that these costs are unjustifiable when incurred simply in an attempt to find a proxy for direct
examination of broadcaster content decisions.
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trigger a hearing.306 Such evidence may suggest inaccuracy in the translation.
Given differences in dictionaries, however, it might just as easily suggest
simply an alternative translation.307 It would only be considered evidence of a
subjective intent to distort if the Commission employed some kind of
reckless disregard standard. Such a standard would require that in
“objectively verifiable” errors, the Commission should infer the requisite
distortive intent from the obvious difference between the translation used and
the one in the dictionary. Why should we charge broadcasters with the
knowledge of contradictory information outside the broadcast so long as
there is nothing about their translator’s credentials that is inherently suspect?
Wouldn’t this guarantee that, apart from problems of translation discussed
above, a broadcaster could never translate a word if it was described with
different meanings in various dictionaries?
More problematic yet is the FCC’s recognition of outtakes as the kind of
extrinsic evidence from which one could infer intentional distortion. The idea
behind including outtakes in the category of permissible extrinsic evidence is
that a comparison of what was broadcast and what was edited out can
provide mute testimony to what the broadcaster must have intended. The
nature of the editorial process, however, renders such a comparison fruitless
in the vast majority of circumstances.
What is the classic instance of this effect? One can imagine the FCC
constructing a hypothetical in which the outtakes include a clearly and
dispositively exculpatory piece of evidence, while the broadcast as aired
contains only a stream of circumstantial and implicitly inculpatory evidence.
Most outtakes will not present the clear case, however.308 Editing raw
videotape and crafting a story from the mass of visuals and interviews
available is the essence of the editorial function.309 It entails selecting and
organizing— and compressing— hours of often disconnected material into a
coherent story. It is not a mechanical process. Within the broad framework
provided by current journalistic norms,310 different producers, reporters, and
306. Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1218.
307. For a recent criticism of judicial reliance on dictionary definitions, see, for example, Samuel
A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999).
308. Arguably, even this “classic” use of outtakes may not fit into the extrinsic evidence model
the Commission adopted.
309. See, e.g., Note, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
746, 768-69 (1972) [hereinafter First Amendment and Regulation].
310. There is quite a bit of diversity even in the pool of common journalistic norms. From now-
traditional “objective” reporting to “public journalism,” there are a variety of models of good
reporting. Regarding public or community journalism, see, for example, DAVID MERRITT, PUBLIC
JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE: WHY TELLING THE NEWS IS NOT ENOUGH 113-22 (1995); Theodore
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editors will come up with different accounts, using and emphasizing different
aspects of the news material gathered.
In any event, very few cases will involve the clear choice between totally
exculpatory and totally inculpatory matter. In the context of virtually
unavoidable ambiguity, then, the notion that outtakes can reliably serve as
clear “extrinsic” evidence of news distortion is unpersuasive. After all, unless
there is direct corroborative testimony of intent to distort the news, the mere
fact that a producer selected some particular material rather than some
alternative footage from the mass of available film is no more probative of
intent than a claim that entirely extrinsic references to dictionaries or other
accounts of historical reality show the inaccuracy of the broadcast program.
Ultimately, the approach that looks at outtakes as extrinsic evidence of intent
to distort is actually circular. It is only by assuming the truth of the material
left out of the broadcast that the FCC could conclude in any given case that a
station’s knowing refusal to include the material in what aired must be
evidence of knowing distortion.
Finally, it may be that certain kinds of claims about news practices are
more capable of being subject to extrinsic evidence than others. If the claim
is one of rigging or staging, it may be possible to find evidence that someone
in the news department arranged for a truck to be blown up in exactly the
same kind of explosion that the program claimed occurred in the ordinary
course of use.311 Or if the claim is one of failing to disclose a conflict of
interest, it may be relatively easy to establish the relationships among the
participants and even the knowing decision not to disclose the
relationships.312 However, even if extrinsic evidence might be relatively easy
to imagine in these sorts of contexts, other types of more complex distortion
or suppression claims would be unlikely to be evidenced by clear extrinsic
documentation.
In addition to the problems of the extrinsic evidence standard, the other
limiting elements of the news distortion policy also make the policy so
difficult to apply that it may be ineffective in practice. The malleability of the
“significance” standard is self-evident. The very difference between the FCC
and the Serafyn court suggests that what counts as significant evidence of
L. Glasser & Stephanie Craft, Public Journalism and the Prospects for Press Accountability, 11 J.
MASS MEDIA ETHICS 152-53 (1996); Alicia C. Shepard, The Gospel of Public Journalism, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 1994, at 28.
311. See Tom Mashburg, GM Sues NBC, Says Crash Test Rigged, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1993,
at 1.
312. Even here, however, there are fine lines. There may be situations in which matters of degree
and judgment would lead one person to say that a conflict requiring disclosure existed while another
person might not be so sure.
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distortion (as opposed to immaterial, de minimis inaccuracy) can vary from
evaluator to evaluator.
It is also difficult to demonstrate that slanting or distortion has in fact
been undertaken in response to high-level managerial instruction. Rather than
adopting a more agency-based notion, in which the broadcaster would be
deemed liable for the foreseeable unauthorized actions taken on its behalf,
the Commission has adopted a requirement of direct licensee policy.313 As
noted above, FCC-watchers have argued that the doctrine is so seldom
applied that it is effectively toothless despite its lofty goals.314 If so, that
raises the question of what benefits, if any, are gained from its continued
existence.
Finally, the news distortion policy creates a significant sanction problem.
Because it is often claimed in the renewal or license application context, the
Commission has the choice either of denying the application for license or
renewal, or approving the application with an admonitory letter. The middle
ground of forfeitures and fines has not been traditionally available.315
Despite these various critiques— or perhaps because of the FCC’s
recognition of the difficulties with governmental review of news content in a
First Amendment culture— the Commission has not sought to apply its news
distortion doctrine aggressively. The continuing existence of the policy,
however, enabled judicial second-guessing of the Commission’s stance of
administrative prudence. Whatever its flaws as traditionally articulated and
applied, the policy as judicially revised in Serafyn is far more problematic—
both doctrinally and as a matter of policy. If the policy remains on the books,
it is sure to be an attractive nuisance to courts and policymakers seeking to
improve public discourse.
B. The Narrowing “News Staging” Alternative
Although this Article has criticized the administrability of both the
traditional and the “new,” post-Serafyn news distortion policy, it must still
address the question whether there is any aspect of the rule that can or should
be salvaged. Should the whole policy be scuttled or is a narrower
interpretation plausible? Is there some way of allowing the FCC to impose
sanctions on a limited category of “fabricated” or “staged” news, for
example? If so, is such a middle ground a good and workable idea as a matter
313. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
314. See RAY, supra note 28, at 4-7.
315. Indeed, this was the Commission’s articulated reason for adopting its rule prohibiting hoaxes.
Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Broad. Hoaxes, 7 F.C.C.R. 4106 (1992) (Report and Order).
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of mass communications policy?
This is not an entirely hypothetical question. Whether as a result of the
need for sensational news, particularly in investigative programs, or because
of cost and time pressures that push reporters and producers to cut
journalistic corners, or just as a result of bad judgment, there have been a
number of recent instances in which the press fabricated the news. A familiar
example in the broadcast context is the 1992 Dateline NBC debacle, in which
NBC News, without disclosure, rigged crash tests with remote controlled
flaming rockets in order to illustrate the possibility of fire during a program
questioning the safety of GM trucks’ gas tanks.316
The first issue, then, is whether there is a sufficiently principled— or at
least pragmatically serviceable— distinction between news staging and
rigging and news slanting and distortion to justify an FCC policy prohibiting
the former and avoiding review of the latter. This is not a new concern.
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson— in an argument for more precise FCC
standards regarding impermissible staging— demonstrated the difficulties
with the current FCC approach in 1969.317 Focusing on the vagueness and
overbreadth of the Commission’s definition of news staging when applied to
situations like the instigation of news events by the press, Commissioner
Johnson argued that the Commission should instead adopt more certain and
clearer newsgathering standards.318
The first pass at this question might focus on the distinction between the
media reporting on the news as opposed to making the news. However, while
viewers and listeners intuitively understand this distinction, we can also think
of any number of situations on the periphery which make it difficult to
maintain as a bright line.319 This is, inter alia, because it is very difficult to
316. See, e.g., Mashberg, supra note 311. Similarly, there have been claims of fabricated news in
print as well. See supra note 73.
317. Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party
(Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 143-61 (1969) (Comm’r Johnson, dissenting).
318. Id. at 152-55. Commissioner Johnson provided the following suggestions:
[A]nalysis [sh]ould include . . . (1) the extent to which television caused, or in some way
influenced the occurrence in question; (2) the legality of the event in question— and whether
society in general views the crime as forgivable (e.g., the dissemination of birth control
information) or unforgivable (e.g., the smoking of marihuana, prostitution, etc); and (3) the duty of
the broadcaster to inform the police in advance of an impending event’s occurrence instead of
filming it.
Id. at 156.
319. See also supra note 79 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing news staging from broadcaster
agreement to cover a future event); infra Part V.C. There are a number of editorial practices that
people might characterize as distortion or staging. Some examples include: retaping an interview to
catch both subjects’ reactions when only one camera is used, using old background film for a new
story without attributions, suggesting that other source’s film is the station’s own, using a voiceover or
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imagine any pure types either of slanting or of staging. News staging and
rigging and news distortion are often quite intertwined. Thus, one of the
particularly troubling things about the NBC “dramatization” of the truck
explosion is that the event had to be staged by the broadcaster because it did
not easily happen on its own.320 Therefore, in order to convince the audience
that these types of trucks are actually dangerous, it is at least arguable that the
broadcaster made the crash look easier and more common than it would be in
the ordinary course of events. That circumstance could well be characterized
as an example of news staging as inextricably intertwined with news slanting
or distortion.
Yet another rationale for why news staging is to be deemed “heinous” is
that it is akin to entrapment in the criminal law or to misrepresentation and
fraud in torts; it undermines the role of the press and imports an element of
corruption into the process. How is this different, one might ask, from
mistakes the news media make in sensationalizing and hyping the news for
their own economic interests and in order to titillate an increasingly jaded
audience? There may be a difference between making a mistake or
exaggerating an existing story that does not owe its origin in any specific
way to the media itself and the classic news-staging situation in which the
event was actually orchestrated by the media. In the latter instance, the media
is centrally part of the story being told. Putting the media at the center of the
story leads to two types of difficulties. One is the possibility of corruption
and self-serving decisions made by an institution that has abandoned the role
of neutral observer. The other is the effect of appearance— leading to the
deligitimation of the role, credibility, and accountability of the press.
Ultimately, I do not believe the distinction between news staging and
news slanting or distortion is sufficiently workable, especially at the margins.
The multiplicity of possible news staging scenarios emphasizes the difficulty
of distinguishing between fabricated news acted out at the behest of the press
and news events instigated or enhanced by press coverage. Nevertheless, if
the Commission feels it politically necessary to craft something akin to FTC-
like consumer protection rules against deception,321 then it should draft a
accompanying story to imply more than is actually on the tape, simulating actual events without
disclosure, and fabricating stories.
320. See Mashberg, supra note 311 (noting that NBC designed the test to “guarantee” a fire).
321. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates deceptive practices in addition to taking
other consumer and commerce-protective measures. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 57(a) (1999) (making
deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition unlawful and authorizing the FTC to adopt rules
pursuant to statutory authority). The Federal Trade Commission’s web site reveals a sampling of the
kinds of consumer protection initiatives undertaken by the Commission. See Federal Trade
Commission, Consumer Protection, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/consumer.htm (last visited Jan.
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policy very narrowly applicable to core examples of news fabrication.
V. NEWS DISTORTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: OF CONFLICTING
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
An analysis of the difficulties posed by the specifics of the FCC’s
traditional approach to claims of news distortion and by the D.C. Circuit’s
new slant on the issue raises the more general question: Can any news
distortion policy deliver on the promise of improving press accuracy and
political discourse without unduly trampling expressive freedoms? The
underlying problem is that fundamental democratic values are implicated on
both sides of the debate.
The interventionist argument, particularly in the current news climate, can
invoke sufficient examples of undesirable press behavior to serve as a viable
source of pressure on the Commission. At least until the appointment of
Michael Powell as the new Chairman of the FC, one could have predicted
that the likelihood of such pressure would be enhanced by the 1990s
Commission’s increasing reliance on expansive regulatory rationales far
beyond the scope of spectrum scarcity. Thus, during regulatory times in
which market failure and quid pro quo arguments are increasingly used to
justify FCC regulation of broadcast speech and behavior, arguments for
intervention to improve democratic discourse are viewed as increasingly
powerful.322 This Article argues that the interventionist choice with respect to
content itself is predictably worse than a market constrained by structural
rules, press self-criticism, and public pressure. The Article does not take the
position that any solution is perfect. Indeed, much can be said about the
degree of, and causes for, the failure of the electronic media to enhance the
public sphere. But in assessing the ‘second best,’ this Part argues that
regulating news distortion is likely both to fail in its ends and to impose other
public costs inimical to democratic norms.
A. Policy Arguments in Support of Regulating News Distortion
The desire to regulate news distortion comes from a perception that
slanted or rigged news is harmful to the public interest.323 As a policy matter,
then, we must first identify the harms of news distortion and the rationales
8, 2001).
322. See, e.g., supra note 15.
323. See CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (“Rigging or slanting
the news is a most heinous act against the public interest— indeed there is no act more harmful to the
public’s ability to handle its affairs.”).
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for regulation. We must then determine what, if anything, government
intervention can do to ameliorate those harms. Is the FCC’s intervention
justified by the rationales for regulating news distortion? Can the FCC
profitably address such concerns regulatorily using its traditional
interpretation of the news distortion doctrine? Do the recent developments in
the Clinton-era FCC’s regulatory rationales support such intervention?
1. The FCC’s Regulatory Values— Truth and Press Integrity
Although the Commission’s language in the exhortative portions of its
news distortion cases is rhetorically rich, it is not precise about either the
harms of distortion or the benefits of distortion policy in addressing those
harms. Rather, the Commission focuses on the benefits of news and the
importance of television. The cases reveal two interrelated arguments: one
focusing on the centrality of neutral news reports to the public and the other
focusing on the integrity of the press. Public confidence in the integrity of the
press is seen as essential to democratic functioning.
There is much dicta in the cases about the importance of news and the
centrality of television:
We have allocated so much spectrum space to broadcasting precisely
because of the contribution it can make to an informed public. Thus it
follows inevitably that broadcasting must discharge that function
responsibly, without deliberate distortion or slanting. The nation
depends on broadcasting, and increasingly on television, fairly to
illuminate the news.324
In midst of the Vietnam war— where television news reports transformed
the conflict into a highly controversial “living room war”— the FCC’s
language about the role of news emphasizes the importance of truthful,
neutrally presented news. This is seen as necessary to the public interest
because of its contribution to an informed public. Under this view, with
adequate information, the public will engage in rational self-governance and
make good decisions.325 The implicit contrast is an uninformed and
manipulated public. In Network Coverage of the Democratic National
Convention, one of the seminal slanting and staging cases, the Commission
characterized directed slanting as “amount[ing] to a fraud upon the public . . .
324. Complaint Concerning the CBS Program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150,
153 (1971).
325. See Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969) (noting that fair reporting promotes “robust
wide-open debate” on important public controversies).
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patently inconsistent with the licensee’s obligation to operate his facilities in
the public interest.”326 The FCC values news delivered without staging,
slanting, or distortion for its importance to self-governance and the
democratic role of citizens: to “the public’s ability to handle its affairs.”327
This approach also suggests that the public, which increasingly relies on
the electronic press, must be able to assume responsibility and neutrality on
the part of broadcasters.328 Thus, the Commission’s rationale is also based on
the need to have integrity in the press process.329 In one case, for example,
the Commission says, “[t]he integrity of news broadcasting is crucial to an
informed, responsible electorate and the Commission has stressed the
continuing duty of licensees to take adequate measures to insure such
integrity.”330
In its significant opinion in The Selling of the Pentagon, the agency
exhorted broadcasters to examine their editorial judgments because “what
ultimately is at stake in this entire matter is broadcasting’s own reputation for
probity and reliability, and thus its claim to public confidence.”331 The
connection between the public’s need to be informed accurately and its faith
in the institutions providing the information was well articulated by
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson in the infamous Pot Party case:
Charges [of news staging] are serious for a number of reasons.
Although for thousands of years many believed that when man looks
at the world he perceives not reality but some image of a greater truth
concealed from view, television and other modern forms of
communication have stood this ancient notion on its head. For many
326. Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969).
327. CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
The Commission, responding to a request for a declaratory ruling that the Dick Cavett Show made
changes in response to pressure from the White House, stated:
In sum, our policies are designed (i) to promote robust, wide-open debate involving both sides to a
controversy, to the end that the American public will be informed; (ii) to take action against
rigging or slanting of the news, wherever we may appropriately do so; and (iii) to avoid the
censor’s role, “including efforts to establish news distortion in situations where Government
intervention would constitute a worse danger than the possible rigging itself.”
Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 29 F.C.C.2d 386, 387 (1971), recon. denied, 32 F.C.C.2d 824 (1971)
(quoting Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969)).
328. This is not to say that the FCC requires only believable news, but rather that the news media
must be seen as believable and reliable. Otherwise, for example, there would be no reason for the
public to believe true but incredible news. Countering our false stereotypes may be especially
important and especially vulnerable to news distortion claims.
329. Inquiry Into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party
(Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 155-65 (1969) (Comm’r Johnson, dissenting).
330. Howard L. Gifford, 50 F.C.C.2d 125, 126 (1974) (rejecting news distortion claim arising
from television stations announcing election winners before votes were counted).
331. CBS Program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 154 (1971)
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today, truth is the image of reality seen on television. . . .
For this reason, the integrity of the mass media is essential to its
role of communicating honest opinion and accurate information.
When people lose their faith in even isolated incidents of news as they
are depicted to them, they will begin to distrust all news presentations.
It is therefore essential that no element of falsity or deception creep
into the news. Once it does, like the proverbial “rotten apple,” the rest
of the barrel will decay.
Especially important, democracies function, or fail to function, on
the accuracy of the information and opinion supplied to their citizens.
When voters cast their ballots for law and order and against violence,
for example, they do so on the basis of what they understand to be the
true state of the world. . . . If these events did not in fact occur at all,
the ballots cast become unjustifiable and irrational. Democracy ceases
to function, and arbitrariness and injustice enter.
It is essential, therefore, that public confidence in the integrity of
the broadcaster’s product be maintained.332
The harm of falsity under this view is not primarily that it will lead to bad
decisions in the specific instance, but that it will lead the public to opt out of
mainstream institutions for self-governance and thus undermine the overall
functioning of democracy.333
2. The Modern Reality of the Press: Public Ambivalence and
Structural Pressures on Press Objectivity
Most people today rely on television news for their knowledge of current
events.334 Yet that dependency is matched by a frequently articulated distrust
of the media.335 While media critics describe the importance to modern
332. WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C.2d at 145-46 (Comm’r Johnson, dissenting). Commissioner Johnson
therefore called for the FCC to “evolve rules and standards for proper licensee behavior in the area of
investigative reporting” in order to “formulate a consistent approach to the broad range of staging
problems.” Id. at 146.
333. For a view that questions the interest protected by the regulation of news content and the
concrete harm of falsehood, see First Amendment and Regulation, supra note 309, at 758.
334. Public Interest Obligations, supra note 1, ¶ 1 & n.1.
335. For an argument that the press’s current coverage strategies undermine its social role and
lead to public cynicism about the press as an institution, see, for example, Clay Calvert, The
Psychological Conditions for a Socially Significant Free Press: Reconsidering the Hutchins
Commission Report Fifty Years Later, 22 VT. L. REV. 493, 500-05 (1998) (citing other relevant
sources therein); Media Gets Vote of No Confidence, ROLL CALL, Jan. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL
7038417 (describing results of polls showing lack of public confidence in news media).
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journalism of the value of a neutral and objective electronic press, they point
to systematic constraints on the private media’s ability to achieve the goals of
neutrality and objectivity.336
The media is blamed for shaping and distorting events and not merely
reporting them, as conduits might.337 On one account, this is because of
specific substantive biases and agendas.338 On another account, it results
from structural and economic constraints that narrow the scope of what the
336. Media analysts describe numerous sorts of constraints on the media, including: commercial
pressure by advertisers, pressure by conglomerate corporate owners, competitive pressures to obtain
“scoops”, organizational cultures, capture by small groups of elite sources, and medium-specific sorts
of constraints (particularly in connection with telegenicity norms and particular types of recurring
narrative structures in the electronic media). Critics also challenge the news values of objectivity and
neutrality. See TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING 249-82 (1980); DORIS A. GRABER,
MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 69-102 (2d ed. 1984) (describing newsmaking and news
reporting models); MICHAEL PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: THE POLITICS OF NEWS MEDIA (2d ed.
1993); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS (1978); Robert Rutherford Smith, Mythic
Elements in Television News, in SOCIAL MEANINGS OF NEWS: A TEXT-READER 325-50 (Dan
Berkowitz ed., 1997); Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-
Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV 609, 680-83 (1991) (citing other relevant source therein); infra
notes 340-41; supra note 251.
337. Media theorists argue that such a shaping and agenda-setting function by the media is
unavoidable. See generally SOCIAL MEANINGS OF NEWS: A TEXT-READER (Dan Berkowitz ed., 1997).
It results from the fact that media workers at every bureaucratic level— reporters, editors, producers,
and publishers— have to select which of the day’s events should be covered, how, and in what order.
That process of selection is one of construction. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 179-
82 (6th ed. 2000) (addressing subjectivity of “objective” news); Stuart Hall, The Determinations of
News Photographs, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS 234 (Cohen & Young eds., 1981). Indeed, the
very definition of news as a selection from the day’s events assumes a narrow compass for what could
otherwise constitute news. Moreover, we cannot ignore the degree to which the prototypical press
conference, photo opportunity, rally, and hijacking are staged by their participants with a view to news
coverage. See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA
(1987).
Nevertheless, there is popular sentiment that the press is biased and manipulates events in a
fashion beyond the unavoidable. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert
Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1659-60 (1999) (citing JOHN ZOLLER, A THEORY OF MEDIA
POLITICS (forthcoming) (on file with Richard Hasen, author of Campaign Finance Laws and the
Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (regarding public perception of liberal media
bias)); Felicity Barringer, No President-Elect? Blame the News Media, NY TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at
C8. See also S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., THE MEDIA ELITE: AMERICA’S NEW POWERBROKERS (1986)
(providing social science study making the case for liberal media bias because elite journalists self-
identified as liberal).
338. See HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC
NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK AND TIME 304-08 (1980); GRABER, supra note 336, at 71, 342. As one
reporter put it: “The accusation that the news media are biased in favor of liberals, Democrats and
especially liberal Democrats has become the conventional wisdom of the age.” Eric Black, Slant on the
News; U of M Study Disputes Notion of ‘Liberal Media,’ STAR TRIB., May 5, 1998, at 16A. The same
theme has pervaded letters to the editor and op-ed pieces regarding media coverage of the 2000
presidential campaign. See, e.g., Elizabeth Jensen, “Nightline” E-mail Goof Renews Cries of Media
Bias, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at F2.
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private press can report.339 Media critics charge that structural constraints on
media independence have a deeply distortive effect on news coverage.340
Every significant electronic purveyor of news is now part of a large
conglomerate organization.341 The economic imperatives of increasingly
clustered information outlets may well lead corporate parents of news
organizations to discount and undermine journalistic norms of thoroughness,
neutrality, accuracy and investigative courage.342 Conglomerate control of
news reporting leads to obvious risks ranging from cross-promotions to the
avoidance of controversy that could affect the entity’s non-news businesses.
Regardless of whether even commonly owned mass communications outlets
will sometimes have economic incentives to provide diverse programming
generally, the increasing number of mega-mergers in the communications
market raises sharply the question of what will happen to news and public
discourse as a result. Will there be an adequate commitment to news
programming? Even if so, will the consolidations suppress adequate diversity
of news programming? Will the consolidations put increasing pressure on the
journalistic independence of news divisions? There are claims that it will be
very difficult for news organizations within large conglomerates with other
economic interests not to pander to those economic interests— whether upon
specific request and direction or because of self-censorship caused by
knowing where one’s bread is buttered. Even without corporate parents with
nonmedia interests, it stands to reason that advertising support alone can
affect television coverage for reasons other than journalistic newsworthiness
norms.
Both the right and the left criticize the electronic media for slanted
coverage of news.343 Critics charge bias both in what is covered and in how it
is covered. Some observe systematic failures to cover either particular groups
339. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337; EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988); GANS, supra note 338; GRABER, supra note 336, at 71-87.
340. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337; ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT
CITIZENS: MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH
MEDIA POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999).
341. For sources describing the consolidation, see, for example, BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337;
EDWARD S. HERMAN & ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE GLOBAL MEDIA (1999); David Waterman,
CBS-Viacom and the Effects of Media Mergers: An Economic Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 531,
541 (2000); Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our
Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551 (2000); Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 1,
2001, at 22-31.
342. For an argument calling for a governmental review of such effects, see, for example, National
Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713, 719-21 (1968) (Comm’r Nicholas Johnson, dissenting).
343. For example, both Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), a liberal group, and Accuracy
in Media (AIM), a conservative counterpart, claim that the media is biased against their respective
viewpoints.
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of people344 or particular types of stories.345 While claims of bias are directed
to the print press as well, the electronic media are often the primary focus of
arguments about media bias and harm.
With regard to the news that is actually covered, critics claim that
broadcasters are factually inaccurate, tell incomplete stories, are sometimes
biased, and are likely to exaggerate and sensationalize stories in the race for
ratings.346 Recent history of dramatizations without disclosure has also led to
charges that the need to sensationalize leads to actual staging of events to
achieve newsworthy effects.347
Critics claim that the effect of such direct and indirect distortions is to
undermine democratic values. Whether the press is seen as a primary shaper
of social values or simply as a significant social mechanism reinforcing
existing beliefs, media critics argue that the press has an undeniable impact
on public perceptions.348 When that impact is the result of biased and one-
sided accounts of important events, it is thought to be harmful both
substantively, because of its inaccuracy, and procedurally, because of its
effect on the ultimate credibility of the press.
Reliance on a diversity of outlets and counter-speech to counteract the
influence of false and bad speech or information may be, in the critics’ view,
increasingly unrealistic. With the many mergers both in the new and old
media,349 there is an undeniable consolidation of what were otherwise
independent news sources or potential sources. While magazines and
344. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337, at 45-46; CHRISTOPHER P. CAMPBELL, RACE,
MYTH AND THE NEWS (1995); ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE
WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA (2000); PAMELA T. NEWKIRK, WITHIN THE VEIL:
BLACK JOURNALISTS, WHITE MEDIA (2000).
345. See, e.g., BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337, at xxvii-xxix; GRABER, supra note 336, at 89-96;
SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? (1991) (suggesting that the episodic character of
television news coverage of politics reduces ability to see systemic problems); Stephen D. Reese, The
News Paradigm and the Ideology of Objectivity: A Socialist at the Wall Street Journal, in SOCIAL
MEANINGS OF NEWS 420, 422-27 (Dan Berkowitz ed., 1997) (describing news media’s use of the
objectivity paradigm to reinforce liberal capitalist hegemony); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Back to Bias, WASH.
POST, July 14, 1998, at A15 (describing FAIR report about media’s conservative coverage on
economic issues).
346. See, e.g., John H. Fuson, Protecting the Press from Privacy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 644-45
(1999) (tracing the evolution of sensationalistic news from William Randolph Hearst to Rupert
Murdoch); David A. Logan, “Stunt Journalism,” Professional Norms, and Public Mistrust of the
Media, 9 U. FLA J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 166-67 (1998) (tracing the increasing “tabloidization” of
television news). Authors who focus on the coverage of African Americans in the media discuss the
ways in which such coverage reflects racial stereotypes. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 344;
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 344.
347. See Mashberg, supra note 311 (discussing accusations that NBS “rigged” a truck to explode).
348. See, e.g., Lili Levi, supra note 336, at 672-73 & n.211 (1991) (citing other relevant sources).
349. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, FCC Approves AOL-Time Warner Deal, With Conditions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL-NYT 0101200061.
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newspapers do provide alternatives to news sources in the electronic media,
most Americans still get their news and information primarily from the
electronic media. Studies of work and leisure life in the United States show
that people have little time for participation in public life.350 What makes us
think that the average American, who has selected one or another of the
traditional news shows as his primary information source, will spend more of
his scarce time and resources in flipping to other channels or reading a
variety of different print sources in order to increase his exposure to various
different versions of the same news?
As for the Internet as a potential savior of the commons and public life,
current developments in that medium may be as worrisome as they are
hopeful. Having been characterized at the beginning by cyberlibertarians as
the new frontier of liberty and self-regulating social order, the current
generation of the Internet has actually become a two-track place. On one
track— a commercial, entrepreneurial model— information is viewed as a
commodity and purveyed for profit, thus raising many of the same issues of
economic influence discussed above in connection with television news. On
the other, “political,” track, there is admittedly an abundance of news and
information including otherwise previously untapped sources. However, the
“political” Internet has no quality filters and is also host to a proliferation of
easily accessible hate propaganda.351
3. Possible Interventionist Rationales
Stories of press bias, insensitivity, sensationalism, intrusiveness,
arrogance, superficiality, and timidity toward economic and political
authority naturally prompt reformist responses. The balancing effect of
effective counter-speech— the traditional constraint— is arguably limited for
many people. If history is a guide, this is likely over time to lead to
increasing pressure on the FCC to regulate. After all, the heyday of the
traditional news distortion policy was the early 1970s, when the FCC and
broadcasters suffered congressional and other inquiries into news staging and
distortion. The court’s approach in Serafyn reflects the cyclical character of
calls to regulate controversial speech.
Importantly, the new pressure to regulate comes in the context of a new
350. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE
OF LEISURE (1993).
351. For views on the increasing amount of Holocaust denial, especially on the web, see Credence
Fogo-Schensul, More Than a River in Egypt: Holocaust Denial, the Internet, and International
Freedom of Expression Norms, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 241 (1997-98); Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial
and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (1997).
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and more complex regulatory framework. The traditional rationale for the
reduced First Amendment status of the broadcast medium was the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies.352 For much of the history of radio as a mass medium,
the FCC used the notion of spectrum scarcity to subject broadcasting to a
degree of oversight foreign to the print world. Claims of scarcity were used
to justify not only regulations of industry structure, but also content
regulations.353 Communications regulation has changed significantly in the
352. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (relying on scarcity in rejecting
constitutional challenge to fairness doctrine); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(upholding Commission’s chain broadcasting regulations on scarcity grounds). See also sources cited
in supra note 13. Historically, the FCC has imposed three principal types of content regulations on the
electronic mass media. One type is designed to improve the political process directly. Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1999) (federal candidate right of access); id. § 315 (equal
opportunities for candidate advertising).
A second type of FCC content regulation is designed to benefit children. See Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (prohibiting regulation requiring that
indecency be channeled to late night hours); Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television
Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,660 (1996) (affirminative obligation requiring broadcasters to provide
three hours of children’s educational programming per week).
The third type of FCC content regulation was designed to improve the quality of news and
nonentertainment programming broadcast to the public. Over the years, the Commission adopted both
direct and indirect content-improving policies. For example, the agency first articulated in 1949 the
balanced programming obligations that came to be known as the fairness doctrine. See Report on
Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247-48 (1949). See also supra note 2. In
addition, the Commission in 1960 imposed an affirmative obligation on broadcasters to ascertain and
provide responsive programming for the needs and interests of their communities. See En Banc
Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). Although it emphasized broadcaster discretion in the
selection of nonentertainment programming, the Commission’s En Banc Programming Inquiry
nevertheless listed 14 program types “usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires
of the community.” Id. at 2314. In 1973, despite its previous statements, the Commission added a ten
percent informational programming “guideline” for Commission staff in acting on license applications.
Amendment of Part O of the Commission’s Rules, 43 F.C.C.2d 638 (1973). In 1975, the Commission
decided that all applications proposing less than five percent “local” and less than five percent
“informational” programming should be referred to the Commission for action rather than being
addressed at the staff level. Amendment to Section 0.281 of the Commission’s Rules, 59 F.C.C.2d 491
(1976).
Subsequently, the Commission eliminated its specific and highly detailed formal ascertainment
procedures in its radio and television deregulation proceedings, although it still retained broadcasters’
obligations to program in the public interest in response to ascertained community needs. See Report
and Order, Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements,
and Program Logs for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C. 2d 1076 (1984), recon. denied, 104
F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), rev’d in part sub nom. Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Commission also retreated from the program categories in the En Banc
Programming Inquiry report. Id. Finally, as pointed out supra note 2, the Commission decided to cease
enforcement of the fairness doctrine after concluding in the 1980s that the doctrine no longer served
the public interest. Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH(TV), 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff’d, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The Commission had also toyed with regulation of entertainment programming. For example, in
the early 1970s, it issued an order reminding licensees to consider the desirability of broadcasting
“drug-oriented” lyrics on the radio. Public Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971), modified by Memorandum
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past decade.354 Despite its appearance here and there in judicial opinions,355
the regulatory rationale of scarcity has decidedly taken the back seat. In the
1980s, the Commission began a deregulatory trend sparked by the
recognition that the spectrum scarcity argument could not bear the weight of
the content regulations it was supposed to justify. The elimination of the
fairness doctrine may well have been the apogee of this deregulatory trend, at
least symbolically. Adopting the rhetorics of deregulation, of parity between
the broadcast and print press, and of increasing media convergence, the
Commission dismantled many of its controls over both content and industry
structure.
Yet the deregulatory trend in broadcast content regulation did not end the
matter. Arguments for regulatory parity between print and broadcast were
overshadowed in time by a different type of regulatory discourse. Mass
media policy developed a schism. On the one hand, the Commission
embraced the rhetoric of deregulation in all but a few areas.356 On the other
hand, new regulatory rationales developed to replace scarcity. While the
most common of these new regulatory justifications is the protection of
children,357 both the Commission and media theorists have advanced
additional regulatory theories not as limited as the child-protection
rationale.358 Some characterize free spectrum allocation as an example of
government largesse deserving of a public interest quid pro quo on the part of
Opinion and Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971), aff’d sub nom. Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594
(D.C. Cir. 1973). During that decade, FCC Chairman Richard Wiley also pressured and threatened
broadcasters into adopting what came to be known as the “family viewing” policy, prohibiting the
early prime-time broadcast of entertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by general family
audiences. See Writers Guild of Am. W., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (finding
First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act violations in Chairman’s jawboning), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Writers Guild of Am. W., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979)
(vacating judgment and remanding to FCC on jurisdictional grounds for exhaustion of administrative
remedies).
354. See supra Part I.
355. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
356. Since the Chairmanship of Mark Fowler during the Reagan years, the FCC has undertaken
deregulatory efforts too numerous to name here. See Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC’s Recent
Approach to Structural Regulation of the Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 586-92
(2000) (addressing the Commission’s deregulation of its structural rules); supra notes 2-3 and
accompanying text (addressing the Commission’s elimination of the fairness doctrine).
357. For example, both the regulation of broadcast indecency, see Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and the imposition of children’s educational
programming requirements, see Children’s Television Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660 (1996), are
grounded on the need to protect children and enhance their development.
358. For a description (and critical review) of such regulatory rationales, see generally
RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed.,
1997).
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the regulated entities.359 Others ground regulation on the notion that the
broadcast airways are a public forum of sorts.360 Yet others more generally
focus on the impact of media.361 Still others would ground FCC intervention
on perceived market failure.362 All these arguments could potentially justify
content as well as structural regulations of the electronic media. Thus, what
we have today is in fact a mixed regime of deregulation and some pockets of
regulation— with potentially expansive theoretical justifications for
regulation.363
The news distortion policy is a useful litmus test for the potentially
expansive new regulatory framework. Regulatory rationales such as the
impact of television, the quid pro quo for free use of a public resource, or the
broad notions of market failure in theory could be seen as justifying the kind
of intrusive content review that the Serafyn court’s interpretation of the news
distortion doctrine might entail.
While no progressive media theorists have addressed the issue, it might
be argued that the current regulatory rationales would support regulation of
news distortion. After all, rationales that focus on the impact of the electronic
medium could justify arguments for regulation that would purport to
359. See, e.g., FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, “What Does $70 Billion Buy You Anyway?”
Rethinking Public Interest Requirements at the Dawn of the Digital Age at Museum of Radio and
Television, New York, New York (Oct. 10, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/daily_releases/
daily_businesses/2000/db1010/spwek023.html; Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A
New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687,
1725-48 (1997). See also RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 358, at 43-68 (criticizing
quid pro quo or “social compact” theories justifying regulation).
360. See Robert M. O’Neil, Broadcasting as a Public Forum, in RATIONALES &
RATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 358, at 125-50 (discussing public forum argument); Logan, supra note
359.
361. For reference to media critics who focus on harmful impact of certain types of television
programming on children and the social fabric, see, for example, Tim Kiska, Are Reality TV Shows
Going Too Far? New Programs May Be All the Rage, But Critics Say They Cheapen TV and American
Morals, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 9, 2001, at 1; Christopher Stern, FCC to Examine TV Sex, Violence;
Hearings to Focus on Harm to Children, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2000, at E3.
362. Much of former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt’s regulatory rhetoric, for example, used market
failure as a justification for regulatory interventions. See, e.g., Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airways:
What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089 (1996); Reed
Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear
Rules for Children’s Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11 (1996). See also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 62-75; C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997). For a critique of market-failure arguments, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Market Failure as a
Justification to Regulate Broadcast Communications, in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS, supra
note 358, at 151-82.
363. See Lili Levi, On the Mixed Cultures of Regulation and Deregulation, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 515
(1998) (reviewing RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 358). Both Congress and the FCC
have justified these areas of content regulation on the ground that they are narrow, limited, and
quantifiable. See, e.g., Reed Hundt, supra note 362, at 1091; Hundt & Kornbluh, supra note 362, at
20-22.
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minimize the harms of distorted news. Rationales grounded on a broad
interpretation of market failure might lead to the conclusion that the private
market for the production of news today is dysfunctional for systemic
reasons and must therefore be disciplined by FCC intervention. Rationales
that are grounded on a quid pro quo notion are quite boundless— so long as
there is some sense of parity between the quid and the quo, theorists
espousing these norms could support content regulation designed to balance
skews in public discourse. Minimal democracy-enhancing programming
rules do not per se violate such a balance. Indeed, media theorists who do not
simply argue that broadcasters should be treated like the print press but,
rather, who claim that the norms of the First Amendment itself require the
adjustment of expressive inequalities in the press as a whole,364 could claim
that the FCC should play a role in improving news coverage. For these media
theorists, the First Amendment would not preclude— and indeed would
support— affirmative governmental attempts to improve the public sphere.
B. Policy Arguments in Favor of FCC Retreat
Media critics’ concerns about the various possibilities of bias in the news
are doubtless real. But is the solution an invigorated application of an FCC
news slanting, staging, or distortion policy? Just as excesses of private
broadcasters doubtless have negative effects on public discourse, attempts to
regulate news distortion harm classic democratic values as well. Thus,
democracy-based arguments for the news distortion doctrine, while clearly
appealing, are challenged by contending democratic norms and founder on
the realities of news reporting.
1. The Democratic Harms of “Official Truth”
The fundamental problem, as Part III has demostrated in detail, is that
news distortion claims will all-too-often require an administrative agency or
court to establish an official “truth” against which the broadcaster’s claims
must be assessed. The news distortion policy is ultimately incapable of
application in a way that does not overly intrude into editorial judgments.
This itself undermines speech norms that shore up democracy.
There are a number of problems with the imposition of the government’s
version of historical truth, with adverse legal consequences, on a private
party. One obvious problem is the prohibitions of the First Amendment. Our
364. See, e.g., FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 15; FISS, THE IRONY, supra note 15; Owen
M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1215 (1999).
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constitutional structure is designed to avoid the authoritative selection of
truth by the state. Whether because of a belief in the marketplace of ideas, or
because of a commitment, prompted by counter-majoritarianism, to
governmental speech neutrality, our constitutional history suggests that a
press independent from government will more likely enhance democratic
discourse. It is a minimum requirement of our notion of democracy that the
state not dictate its vision of events to the press. This is not to say that
“censorship” practiced by the private press cannot undermine communitarian
norms of equal participation in public discourse. Several modern free speech
theorists argue that today, our concerns should focus more on the corrosive
effects on democracy of private, corporate censorship than on governmental
control of speech.365 However, a vigorous policy banning news distortion
implicates questions not about access to communications media, but about
courts and administrative agencies deciding the truth of controversial social
issues and historical facts.
The second difficulty in allowing governmental accounts of truth lies in
the fact that the government could simply get the story wrong, or select only
one aspect of a far more complex story and privilege that aspect to the
exclusion of others. Administrative agencies and courts will have to choose
one among various possible readings of a given press account and, on that
basis, to select between versions of facts in difficult and controversial
contexts, where sometimes history will ultimately be the best judge, where
facts are unclear, or where truth is somewhere in the middle ground. The
specific nature of the administrative and judicial process will also predictably
create certain sorts of skews potentially inimical to the public interest. As
further detailed above and in the Appendix, we can ironically level that
charge— that the government could get the story wrong— against the Serafyn
court’s interpretation of historical facts.
Ultimately, allowing the government such a role in enforcing a particular
official view of historical truth may have a negative impact not only on what
is available for public discourse, but also on the degree of public confidence
we may have in the judiciary and administrative state.
Potentially invasive regulation of broadcast content is not the appropriate
solution to structural problems posed by consolidation. To the extent that the
likelihood of bias can be traced back to the likely results of consolidation,
regulation of speech (rather than structure) should not be the proper price to
pay for the Commission’s retreat from economic regulation.
365. Owen Fiss, for example, is a leading exponent of this view. See supra note 364. Influential
media theorists such as Ben Bagdikian, see supra note 337, and Noam Chomsky, see generally NOAM
CHOMSKY & EDWARD HERMAN, MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988), express similar concerns.
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2. News Distortion Regulation as More Harmful to Speech Norms than
the Fairness Doctrine
Like the news distortion policy, the FCC’s fairness doctrine was designed
to promote the public interest. On many accounts, however, the history of the
FCC’s attempts to enhance the quality of news and informational discourse
through the fairness doctrine was hardly positive.366 In eliminating the
fairness doctrine, the Commission expressed concern that the policy
constituted a constitutionally troubling invasion into the editorial discretion
of broadcast journalists.367 The agency worried that the fairness doctrine in
operation— contrary to its intention in principle— had a chilling effect on
broadcaster coverage of controversial issues of public importance.368
The news distortion policy— particularly as reinterpreted by the D.C.
Circuit— presents significantly greater dangers of improper governmental
control over news content than the fairness doctrine. Thus, whatever one’s
view on the desirability of the fairness doctrine,369 a serious undertaking to
prevent news distortion presents a far greater threat to democratic values and
the public interest.370
When it was in force, the fairness doctrine consisted of a two-pronged
obligation. Broadcasters had an obligation to devote a reasonable percentage
of time to the coverage of controversial issues of public importance, and,
when they did so, to provide an opportunity for the presentation of
contrasting points of view.371 Yet, the FCC evaluated compliance with the
366. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 13.
367. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees (Fairness Doctrine Obligations), 102
F.C.C.2d 143, 147 (1985).
368. Id. at 184-86.
369. Some decry the elimination of the doctrine, suggesting that it could have had a salutary effect
on public discourse on the air. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, What Does the Fairness Doctrine Really
Mean?, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 205, 231-32 (1989) (arguing that fairness-like obligations
inhere in the public interest standard); R. Randall Rainey, The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs
Discourse, Democratic Governance and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public
Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269 (1993). See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at
54-55 (criticizing FCC’s rationale for eliminating the doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 101-02 (2000) (addressing potentially
positive effect on group polarization of something like the fairness doctrine).
370. The inevitable blurriness between claims of news slanting and distortion and those of unfair
or unbalanced news reporting under the fairness doctrine has been well catalogued. See Jones, supra
note 40, at 1241-44. While the proposal that the same standards should apply to both fairness doctrine
and news distortion claims is beside the point today, its rationale— the difficulty of distinguishing one
type of claim from the other in terms of complaints about news reporting— is not.
371. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards
of the Communications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 9-21 (1974), recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d
691 (1976), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
1112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1005
fairness doctrine in light of the overall programming of the station; applied
the doctrine only to controversial public issues (as defined by a pro-
broadcaster Commission with much deference to reasonable and good faith
broadcaster judgments); allowed for a significant amount of broadcaster
discretion with regard to both prongs of the doctrine; did not require the
broadcaster either to provide access to or to air the views of particular entities
with contrasting viewpoints; and did not permit inquiry into the subjective
intent of broadcasters.372 In addition, the FCC virtually never enforced the
doctrine.
The news distortion policy, particularly if applied pursuant to the Serafyn
court’s proposal, does not benefit from the limits of the fairness doctrine. For
example, complainants can file claims of news distortion regarding any kind
of news coverage, and not simply controversial issues of public importance.
News distortion claims can be grounded on a single news story, rather than
being assessed through a review of the entirety of the broadcaster’s coverage.
Additionally, charges of news distortion do not fit neatly into the bipolar,
proponent/opponent model of issue coverage promoted by the fairness
doctrine. The very presentation of an issue as one involving two contending
sides may itself be the basis of a news distortion complaint if the issue is
complex and not satisfactorily represented in a polar fashion. More
significantly, the fairness doctrine did not require the FCC to select the
meaning of broadcast content or to establish truth in a controversy— at least
to the same broad degree as required by the news distortion doctrine.
The FCC’s reasons for eliminating the general fairness doctrine obligation
clearly, and even more aptly, apply to the news distortion policy. Despite the
infrequent imposition of fairness doctrine sanctions the Commission’s
decision to eliminate the requirement373 hinged on the doctrine’s likely
creation of a chilling effect on the coverage of controversial issues.374 A
similar argument— with more bite— can be made with regard to the news
distortion policy.375
372. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 10-17.
373. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees (Fairness Doctrine Obligations), 102
F.C.C.2d 143 (1985). See also Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), recon. denied, 3
F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 7.
374. Fairness Doctrine Obligations, 102 F.C.C.2d at 185-86.
375. Of course, there is less empirical evidence to support the chilling effect argument in the news
distortion context than that adduced by the Commission when it repudiated the fairness doctrine.
There, at least, the Commission had anecdotal evidence of broadcasters avoiding controversial issues
for fear of running afoul of the fairness doctrine. The FCC has never held a notice of inquiry
proceeding, in which such evidence might have been gathered, in the news distortion context. Logic
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Journalism, particularly investigative news reports, typically operates
through the device of telling a story.376 The news distortion doctrine— even
more than the fairness doctrine— requires the FCC to select a particular
meaning of the story in order to address whether or not the challenged
account is accurate. And in the D.C. Circuit’s recent extension, the policy
requires the FCC to draw negative inferences from the broadcaster’s decision
not to present another possible account.
Moreover, having selected such a meaning, the news distortion
doctrine— particularly in its post-Serafyn interpretation— requires the
Commission to establish the truth or, at least, to take administrative notice of
the falsity, of the news report as articulated by the broadcaster. Even under
noninvasive news review standards, the Commission will likely be unable to
avoid addressing the substantive underlying claims of truth.377 As Serafyn
itself demonstrates, a news distortion decision turns the Commission and the
courts into partisan vehicles used by complainants to establish the official
version of historical truth.
suggests, however, that a doctrine designed to enhance ‘truth’— and that involves inquiry into the
broadcaster’s subjective intent to distort— would lead to a chilling effect at least equal to that discussed
by the FCC in connection with the fairness doctrine.
Some suggest that the news distortion policy was a relatively toothless regulation because the
Commission simply did not apply it in a draconian way. See, e.g, RAY, supra note 28, at 4-7. That
suggestion begs the question of what effect the very existence of the rule and its high-sounding
rhetoric might have had on broadcaster behavior, regardless of actual FCC enforcement. Despite the
FCC’s rather laconic news distortion enforcement record, the Commission’s rhetoric was quite
uncompromising and might well have had a hortatory effect. It is impossible to discern the answer to
the question of whether the broadcasters paid attention to the rhetoric or to the actuality of the
enforcement record, or both in some combination. At the very least, this suggests that the court should
not require the Commission to engage in stringent enforcement of the news distortion policy.
376. See, e.g., RICHARD CAMPBELL, 60 MINUTES AND THE NEWS: A MYTHOLOGY FOR MIDDLE
AMERICA (1991) (describing the narrative structure of 60 Minutes and its debt to traditions of literary
journalism and muckraking).
377. For years, there have been stories about the degree to which fictional works purporting to be
autobiographical to some degree can actually be subjected to traditional tests of truth. Jerzy Kosinski,
the prize winning author of The Painted Bird, has been criticized for making up some of the Holocaust
experiences he recounts. See David Treadwell, Novelist Jerzy Kosinski, 57, Kills Himself in N.Y.
Home, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1991, at A1 (recounting charge). Recently, Rigoberta Menchu’s account of
her struggle for the rights of indigenous peoples in South America has been challenged as inaccurate in
a number of details. See Larry Rother, Tarnished Laureate: A Special Report; Nobel Laureate Finds
her Story Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A1. As in the complex discussions of what
constitutes “substantial truth” in some defamation cases, there are always issues about how to define
“truth” in a particular situation. People argue that whether or not Ms. Menchu learned Spanish in a
convent school or was entirely self-taught later in life is immaterial to the larger “truth” of her book—
the truth of the collective pain and oppression of her people. To a certain extent, substantial truth
depends on the characterization and the statement’s level of generality.
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3. Factors Skewing Governmental Accounts of Truth: Chilling Interest
Group Strategies
Controversial issues by their very nature invite complaints of bias,
inaccuracy, or distortion.378 Yet, current controversial issues are precisely the
kinds of topics that broadcasters should not fear to address. Very few things
are exempt from debate. Because someone in the audience will always be
able to complain about slant or bias in the news, it is difficult to imagine the
FCC being able to apply a rational and sensible news slanting and distortion
policy without creating an undesirable chilling effect on the very type of
programming that the policy is designed to foster.379
In addition to arguments based on constitutional principle and the
inability to define truth, several factors have potentially skewing effects on
governmental accounts of truth. Most generally, but perhaps most
importantly, the fact that private groups rather than the FCC in the role of a
roving Commission instigate the adjudication of news distortion claims will
doubtless affect the issues as to which the government will authoritatively
opine.
While judicial and administrative processes may be ill-suited to the
determination of “truth” regarding news accounts, they may be quite
susceptible to capture by censorious private interest groups. The judicial
process often requires courts to make decisions on a cold or incomplete
record. The comparative acuity of the various sets of lawyers no doubt
influences resolutions both by the FCC and the courts. Extensive
administrative and judicial processes themselves likely impose speech-
suppressive costs. The administrative process sometimes provides an end-run
around less hospitable judicial processes.
Indeed, a policy that prohibits news distortion may function as a
particularly problematic invitation to a strategic use of the administrative
process. The chilling effect of the news distortion doctrine should be
addressed in light of the possibility that an invigorated policy might become
a potent tool in the hands of interest groups with clear agendas to dissuade
speech. In Serafyn itself, Ukrainian-American community groups staged an
apparently organized campaign to discredit the news program,380 to punish
378. See Jane Kirtley, Second-guessing News Judgment, 20 AM. JOURNALISM REV. 86 (1998).
379. This was a very powerful consideration in the Commission’s decision to eliminate the
general fairness doctrine obligation for broadcasters. Fairness Doctrine Obligations, 102 F.C.C.2d at
225. The argument is most persuasive in cases like Serafyn, and not cases of “faked” or “rigged” news.
The difficulty of rules regarding the latter is addressed supra Part IV.B.
380. Ukrainian-Americans offended by the broadcast apparently sparked a letter-writing campaign
to CBS, legislators, and CBS advertisers. See Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Petition to Deny, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/1
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CBS more broadly than a single program might reasonably warrant, and to
engage the Commission in the authoritative evaluation of the truth of the
program’s content.381 Grounding their argument on the basis that a
broadcaster who could air such inaccuracy once is likely to do so again and
ignore segments of its license community, the Serafyn complainants argued
that CBS should not be permitted to enter into license transactions and should
even lose its licenses for the unfitness suggested by the Ugly Face of
Freedom program. Serafyn itself provides a good example of the way in
which groups that would not have any other recourse under the libel laws can
use the news distortion doctrine as part of a chilling strategy.382
Why is the organized strategy of interest groups to influence broadcast
coverage such a bad thing? Particularly with a relatively laissez-faire FCC,
shouldn’t interest groups with particular viewpoints be able to use grass roots
methods to keep networks accountable? Isn’t this particularly necessary as
broadcasters seek to satiate our increasingly jaded appetites with increasingly
sensationalized programming?
This Article does not argue that interest groups convinced they have been
wronged by broadcast coverage should not freely use private means—
boycotts, newspaper editorials, protest meetings with broadcasters and the
community— to express their concerns. Indeed, the existence of these
alternative safety valves strengthens the case for eliminating the news
distortion policy. Rather, the Article highlights concerns with the potential
undue effects on broadcast coverage of attempts to use a multiflanked
strategy at the FCC. If the news distortion doctrine remains on the
Commission’s books and receives the kind of interpretation promoted by the
D.C. Circuit in Serafyn, it may be invoked in subsequent programs
addressing controversial issues because of the contested nature of truth in
608, Ex. 4, 5, 6, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
Interest groups have targeted other 60 Minutes programs as well. See AXEL MADSEN, 60
MINUTES: THE POWER & THE POLITICS OF AMERICA’S MOST POPULAR TV NEWS SHOW 113 (1984)
(providing specific examples of the “[p]ressure groups and special interests [that] inevitably react to
stories investigating their turf”).
381. For example, the complainants’ attorney stated at oral argument that “we want the record
clear” even if CBS did not lose its licenses. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Serafyn v. FCC, 149
F.3d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 95-1385). This statement suggests the complainants’ content-oriented
purpose.
382. The Serafyn complainants attempted to engage Congress in oversight of the CBS program,
including having Congressman Bonior read negative commentary on the program into the
congressional record. They also engaged in a letter campaign to CBS advertisers to convince them to
boycott. A sympathizer posted a web page purporting to address each of the program’s asserted
inaccuracies in detail. The Serafyn settlement is also telling. The complainants settled for their legal
fees and persuaded CBS to make the admissions noted above. It is clear that the UCCA parties’
intention was an ideological one.
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those situations.
Consistent application of the news distortion doctrine to controversial
issues becomes worrisome particularly because, despite their protestations,
broadcasters will often retreat from controversy in favor of more mainstream
fare if their economic interests so dictate. Serafyn again provides a case in
point. Rather than further litigate the matter, CBS— in the midst of corporate
changes and needing both FCC and community support— simply settled the
case even though it may well have prevailed on remand at the FCC. Granted,
CBS could have come to its settlement decision as a result of its own news
judgment that the story told in The Ugly Face of Freedom was not the story it
wished it had told in the particular fashion chosen. Or perhaps the network
did not see the need to expend additional resources simply for a narrow
principle— which the Commission would probably clarify at some point in
response to some declaratory request by the National Association of
Broadcasters in any event. The network might have thought it would be
important to indicate to the Ukrainian-American audience that it did not
intend to alienate that part of its viewership. As in all things, CBS’s decision
to settle was probably influenced by a variety of factors. It is nevertheless
useful— when addressing the policy wisdom of the news distortion
doctrine— to focus on the extent to which it can become a lever to influence
the programming of private broadcasters with significant economic interests
at stake.383
4. The Illusion of Neutrality and Accuracy
The news distortion doctrine disserves its goal to the extent that it is
designed to promote democracy pursuant to an unrealistic and conflict-ridden
ideal. While interrelated, the two democracy-based rationales articulated by
the FCC in support of the news distortion policy in fact point to different
sorts of remedial rules. The focus on the importance of truthful news to an
informed public engaged in self-governance naturally leads to a strict liability
notion: the government should step in substantively to correct error whenever
the news is inaccurate, false, or slanted. As noted above, there are significant
problems with the notion of the governmental correction of news error
regardless of intent to distort. Despite the importance of the need for truth,
383. Admittedly, 60 Minutes is no doubt a very profitable program; therefore, broadcasters can
conclude that controversy, too, is a valuable asset. See Logan, supra note 346, at 167. However, the
chilling effect argument does not deny that news programming about controversial topics makes
money. Rather, the point is that when faced with choosing among controversies, networks might be
swayed by the existence of a news review policy that may be used as a sword by organized interest
groups with resources to spare.
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the Commission appears implicitly to recognize the inevitability of error and
the importance of not adopting rules that will lead to a predictable chilling
effect.384 Licensees will no doubt make mistakes or take controvertible
positions about news events. Despite the belief that accurate and objective
news is imperative for the public, everyone understands that there will be
errors and there will be some circumstances in which a news story will have
multiple reportable meanings. Because the policy as interpreted requires
deliberate distortion— and not just mere inaccuracy— it cannot provide an
assurance of truth in fact.385 Requiring editorial decisions to hew to the news
interpretation of the FCC— particularly as that interpretation has been pushed
by particular interest groups— would constitute a perfect example of
censorship. Indeed, the agency has specifically noted that its news distortion
policy is designed to maintain the fine balance between the Communications
Act’s prohibition of censorship under section 326 and the Commission’s task
of assuring broadcasting in the public interest.386
As for the second rationale— public belief in the integrity of the press—
such a notion does not require that stringent a rule. Even if mistakes are
made, if the public believes that the press is responsible and attempting to
report neutrally and objectively without slanting or distortion, then
democracy as a whole will not be severely undermined. The news distortion
policy, however, cannot assure public belief in the press’s integrity either. At
most, the news distortion doctrine provides an illusion of neutrality which
may ultimately be more corrosive than the news decisions of private
broadcasters.
Some would challenge even the notion of a news distortion policy as
definitionally unworkable. For them, the traditional norms of truth and
objectivity are at the least unattainable and more likely unintelligible.387 Thus
384. See, e.g., Minnesota Farmer’s Union, 88 F.C.C.2d 1455, 1467 (1982) (“The Commission
recognizes that inaccuracies inevitably occur in the ordinary course of news reporting. . . . [and] that
the burden of proof is high and difficult to overcome, but we believe that anything less will ultimately
interfere with and endanger the important First Amendment rights involved— and, relegate this
Commission into the role of the ‘national arbitor of truth.’”).
385. This is merely a description of the FCC’s reliance both on “truth” and on “press integrity” as
rationales for its news distortion policy. It is not an argument that the policy is inconsistent with a
common legal goal of reducing or eliminating harm. The question, of course, is whether the news
distortion doctrine— although it does not eliminate falsehood— is likely to reduce significantly the
amount of false news broadcast.
386. The Commission’s stated rationales are reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s approach to the
adoption of a constitutional privilege for defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
387. Such press critics could take two positions. On one hand, they could argue that even though
journalistic objectivity and neutrality are theoretically possible, too many biasing factors make such
objectivity unlikely in practice. Those media analysts who are concerned about the distorting effects of
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any governmental intervention attempting to establishing a neutral truth
allegedly distorted by the broadcaster proves unavailing. Even under a less
severe interpretation, a strong argument remains that an FCC attempt to
prevent news distortion leads to nothing more than the illusion of neutrality.
Editorial judgment inevitably entails selection. Although reporters are
criticized for it,388 slant of some kind— defined as perspective and agenda—
is unavoidable in reporting.389 News accounts do not stand outside culture,
but are themselves products of culture— at least of journalism culture.390
“Framing” the news “is a question of slant, structure, emphasis, selection,
word choice, and context.”391 (As detailed in the Appendix, the real debate
between CBS and the Serafyn complainants was a fundamental disagreement
as to the proper frame for the account.)392 And that is what the news
distortion policy cannot fruitfully address except perhaps at the edges in
exceptional cases. While traditional norms of objective reporting still pervade
daily news reporting, reporters and editors cannot craft stories so neutral as to
have no context and no interpretive framework against which they are to be
read and understood. Even those journalists who hew to traditional norms of
neutral and objective reporting affect the story they tell by their selection of
sources to consult, experts to quote, and details to exclude.393 Cultural and
institutional traditions influence even what makes events “news.” Journalists
select particular stories from many possibilities according to the imperatives,
at a minimum, of their professional culture.
Some media will clearly have explicit and particular political agendas and
ideological perspectives on news issues. Others— the vast majority— will
commercial media ownership might take this position. See, e.g., BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337; HERMAN
& CHOMSKY, supra note 339; MCCHESNEY, supra note 340. Another approach would be to deny the
intelligibility of objectivity and neutrality even in principle— questioning whether there is a “real
world to be objective about.” Michael Schudson, The Sociology of News Production, in SOCIAL
MEANINGS OF NEWS 13 (Dan Berkowitz ed., 1997) (describing how proponents of the “social
organization of newswork” approach to news production reject journalism’s objectivity assumption on
such grounds).
388. See supra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 31 (1989); GANS, supra
note 338. For a criticism of the view that some “slant” is inevitable, see, for example, Elliot D. Cohen,
Journalism, Rational Subjectivity, and Democracy, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191 (1998).
390. See generally MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF NEWS (1995).
391. JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM: THE PRESS AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD 57 (1997).
392. See infra Appendix B.
393. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 389, at 192-93; Lili Levi, supra note 336, at 679-82 (citing other
relevant sources therein); Jarol B. Manheim, The News Shapers: Strategic Communication as a Third
Force in News Making, in THE POLITICS OF NEWS, THE NEWS OF POLITICS 94 (Doris Graber et al.
eds., 1998).
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reflect professional norms in the nature of their coverage.394 Those norms in
turn may differ, change over time, or depend on circumstances such as the
type of journalism, the form of media, or the category of programming.
Media will also often program pursuant to structural or procedural
requirements that affect coverage. This is not to say that the local television
station will subtly but intentionally support the Republican or Democratic
candidate in its news coverage. Rather, it is likely to generate a particular
type of political coverage because of a tendency to cover political contests as
horse races with a focus on the competitive aspect rather than on the
contrasts between the substantive views of the candidates on policy issues.395
Whether one believes that this sort of “slant” is not too harmful because it
does not entail any specific political influence, or rather, that it results from a
problematic commercial ideology that is no less ideological for being more
subtle and subtextual,396 it is surely dangerous and administrably problematic
for the FCC to assess the degree of slant or distortion.397
The very realities of modern media catalogued by critics to justify reform
ironically counsel regulatory timidity by the FCC regarding news content.
Admittedly, with cross-ownership of entertainment and other media
companies, there is doubtless pressure to shape news in cross-promotions and
other ways that promote synergy among the various corporate elements of
the conglomerate information entity. Further, control by corporate interests
may well hinder most major media from presenting a particularly critical
picture of prevailing economic power.398 At a minimum, few would argue
that media today are not concerned about their news budgets. Economic
394. See SCHUDSON, supra note 390, at 8-14, 182-85.
395. See, e.g., JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS (1996); THOMAS B. LITTLEWOOD,
CALLING ELECTIONS: THE HISTORY OF HORSE-RACE JOURNALISM 1-5 (1998); SUNSTEIN, supra note
15, at 56-58; Lili Levi, The FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 85, 201 n.349 (1996); Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free
Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 701-02 (1994). On “organizational biases” of commercial media,
see, for example, Edward Jay Epstein, Organizational Biases of Network News Reporting, in
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN JOURNALISM 244-49 (Elliott D. Cohen ed., 1992); Cohen, supra note 389,
at 204-05.
396. For important arguments about the ways in which the modern free speech principle protects
conservative ideology, see, for example, J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383 (identifying an “ideologial drift” in the
role of the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech
Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935 (1993).
397. Most would probably agree that there is a difference between the Hearst stations’ explicit and
substantive involvement in the news and politics of their day, and the more indirect “slant” or “bias”
that results from the economic and structural imperatives of commercial radio and television stations
today. However, it is unnecessary for the argument here to compare the degrees of harm to political
discourse posed by different types of “slanting”.
398. See, e.g., BAGDIKIAN, supra note 337 and text accompanying notes 337-42.
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pressures, especially at the local news level, reduce searching news coverage
and investigative reporting. Broadcasters place much reliance on government
sources for information.
Regardless, the slant or point of view often will be so hidden— even from
the journalists themselves— that it will not be susceptible to the kind of clear
proof the Commission requires. Further, it may best express itself not in the
specific way in which a station covers a particular story, but rather in what it
chooses to cover— a kind of news suppression charge. Every one of these
claims has been unsuccessful at the Commission.399
If the government applied the news distortion doctrine to address all these
“deep” claims of news distortion, it would clearly have an extraordinarily
invasive effect on broadcaster editorial decisions. On the other hand, if the
doctrine cannot appropriately address such claims, then its application
provides only the illusion of news neutrality. This, like the illusion of fairness
fostered by the former fairness doctrine, may ultimately be more harmful to
the values the distortion doctrine is designed to foster than the public
acknowledgment of the perspectivalism of news coverage.400 Indeed, a news
distortion doctrine may result in legitimizing news coverage that can only be
considered neutral and objective if its narrow and uncritical character is
wholly ignored.401
In sum, while complaints about the democracy-degrading character of
modern media can lead to renewed calls for FCC regulation to improve the
quality of broadcast discourse, the reality of such regulation will undermine
other democratic values— both in free expression and in the public’s
perception of courts and the administrative state. It will undermine such
values even more than did the fairness doctrine, will open the door to the
deployment of chilling strategies by ideological interest groups, and all for
little more than the illusion of neutrality. Even though various expansive
rationales have developed to replace scarcity as the justification for broadcast
content regulation, the news distortion issue is a fruitful context in which to
begin crafting their limits.
399. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
400. This is not an argument based on the notion that the news distortion doctrine creates a false
impression on the public. After all, only a small percentage of the public knows of the policy. The
average viewer’s vision of how objective and neutral a news broadcast should be is not likely to rest
on her knowledge of existing FCC policy.
401. There have been many critiques of the media’s claim of neutrality and objectivity. For one
argument that neutrality norms privilege the status quo, see Shiffrin, supra note 395, at 700-10. For
claims that objectivity norms were a response to publishers’ commercial considerations, see, for
example, Clay Calvert, The Law of Objectivity: Sacrificing Individual Expression for Journalism
Norms, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 19, 21-23 (1998-99); Jason P. Isralowitz, The Reporter as Citizen:
Newspaper Ethics and Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 227 (1992).
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C. The Democratic Value of Different Press Traditions
The preceding section has explored the negative argument counseling
FCC withdrawal from the news distortion area— an argument grounded on
the threats posed by well-meaning attempts to regulate press content. This
Part seeks to make an affirmative argument for FCC retreat— one grounded
on the democratic benefits to be gained from a diverse press culture whose
content is not governmentally regulated. When we closely examine the
actuality of news practices in today’s electronic media, it appears that the
application of the news distortion doctrine may well have disproportionate
effects on particular kinds of news programming. This in turn diminishes a
beneficial diversity of contending news traditions toward which we should
strive.
Some media theorists would challenge the FCC’s unstated assumptions
about the direct causal relationship between unbiased news reports and
participatory democracy. They would contend that “[w]ell-reported news,
free from censorship, does not a democracy make.”402 A national news
culture may lead to the “informational” citizen, but does not necessarily lead
to the “informed” citizen.403 Precisely what the media can do to enhance
democracy is a complex question as to which not much evidence is available.
Thus, perhaps the syllogism on which the FCC and, by implication, the D.C.
Circuit, rely in support of the news distortion doctrine is unrealistic and
ignores the multivalent character of news as culture. At a minimum, if
perspective and error are inevitable, then perhaps the fundamental thing we
can realistically ask of the media in terms of promoting democracy is
diversity.
In fact, it is unclear that we as a society have reached consensus on what
we would like the media to do in enhancing the public sphere. Indeed, media
organizations today espouse (or at least are held to) any number of not
altogether compatible roles. These roles include: providing fair and full
information for citizen deliberation; providing coherent explanatory and
interpretive frameworks to enable citizens to understand a complex political
environment; serving as transmitters of contending viewpoints in society;
representing the public and holding government accountable; functioning as
a democratic instrument by providing a forum for dialogue among citizens;
and even simply responding to the market’s measure of how much (and what
402. SCHUDSON, supra note 390, at 169 (situating the press as a social institution and cultural
form and questioning the extent of media power in shaping democracy).
403. SCHUDSON, supra note 390, at 169-88.
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types of) news and informational programming the public desires.404 Under
these circumstances, there may be an affirmative public benefit in contending
forms of press traditions.
The reality of the modern press is one of multivalence and complexity on
a number of fronts. Thus, television today airs daily “hard” news, some
documentaries, and a variety of newsmagazines.405 These different formats
reflect the simultaneous flourishing of both “objective” and investigative
reporting. Press norms validate both the press as an informational conduit
and the press as an investigator and detective.406 In terms of daily news
reporting, the press still functions under the aspirational goal of objective and
neutral reporting that has characterized press self-description in the latter half
of the Twentieth Century.407 Even press cynics who complain about media
bias implicitly assume the desirability of neutrality and balance as reportorial
ideals. At the same time, however, the history of the press as muckraker
persists. The post-Watergate press has the benefit of a mythology of hard-
hitting investigative reporting that unearthed corruption even at the highest
level of government and industry.408 Indeed, these two types of press roles
conflict— the virtues of one are the vices of the other.
The different genres of news programming also have different rules,
conventions, and styles. Broadcasters air television news for short periods of
time during the day, use one or two anchors in a studio aided by feeds from
various on-the-scene reporters, and effectively limit the news to the day’s
headlines. Hard news— the lead stories in the newspaper and the nightly
television news broadcast— is billed as needing to be current, accurate (to the
degree permitted by time constraints), and objective, with reporters and
anchors appearing as mere observers and rapporteurs of events.
By contrast, the newsmagazine format is based on a narrative, story-
telling kind of journalism in which the reporter is participant and hero.409
404. Id. at 28-29.
405. Originated by 60 Minutes in the 1960s, the newsmagazine format became increasingly
popular as a number of competitors challenged the mainstream magazine programs in the early 1990s.
Richard Campbell, Don Hewitt’s Durable Hour: A Pioneering Newsmagazine Hits 25, COLUM.
JOURN. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 25. Although some of the competitive newsmagazines have failed,
the format still remains popular. For a review of the development of newsmagazines, see WILLIAM C.
SPRAGENS, ELECTRONIC MAGAZINES: SOFT NEWS PROGRAMS ON NETWORK TELEVISION (1995).
406. See, e.g., ROBERT MIRALDI, MUCKRAKING AND OBJECTIVITY: JOURNALISM’S COLLIDING
TRADITIONS (1990).
407. See Isralowitz, supra note 401, at 243.
408. See generally MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY: HOW WE
REMEMBER, FORGET, AND RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (1992); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF
NEWS 142-43 (1995) (describing, then challenging, mythology).
409. Campbell, supra note 405, at 25. See also JOHN ELLIS, SEEING THINGS: TELEVISION IN THE
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 114 (2000) (distinguishing documentaries from news reports on the basis of
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Newsmagazines present different types of news than the breaking news of
the day. They often purport to result from investigative reporting.410 By
contrast to full-length documentaries, newsmagazine programs contain
several segments. The various segments— much more detailed than daily
news, but less so than documentaries— permit reporters to play a variety of
roles. In some segments, the journalists are detectives discovering and
solving a mystery.411 In other segments, they are analysts.412 In yet others, the
formula consists of adventure413 or arbitration.414 The effect, if not the
purpose, of this type of news programming is “consensus mythmaking,” in
which the show “mythologiz[es] . . . the core culture.” 415 The television
newsmagazine stories have a narrative structure— beginning, middle, and
end— with characters, drama, and a moral. Because these shows are aired
during prime time, against entertainment programming, producers talk
differently about their journalism than about hard news.416
Admittedly, each of the different approaches exhibits the vices of its
virtues. Each can be criticized as practiced. The hard news format can be
challenged by arguments that it is in fact far less neutral and objective than it
purports to be and that its excessive reliance on official sources blunts its
effectiveness as either government watchdog or simple reporter of events.
The newsmagazine format can be dismissed too. Critics argue that the
conventions of the genre and the economic pressures on a television format
which competes with entertainment shows will necessarily lead to more
sensationalistic and simplistic programming. Newsmagazines compete for
their “complete narrative”; MADSEN, supra note 380, at 45, 93, 226 (discussing drama in 60 Minutes
production).
410. Some critics question whether television newsmagazines in fact engage in investigative
journalism, suggesting that many simply dramatize stories that other media or other entities have
broken previously. See, e.g., Chistopher Georges, Confessions of an Investigative Reporter, WASH.
MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 36.
411. Campbell, supra note 405; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 376, at 43 et seq.
412. CAMPBELL, supra note 376, at 68.
413. Id. at 93.
414. Id. at 113.
415. Campbell, supra note 405, at 25 (stating that 60 Minutes “provides a ‘consensus narrative,’
. . . a group of stories that ‘articulate the culture’s central mythologies . . . an inheritance of shared
stories, plots, character types, cultural symbols, and narrative conventions. Such a language is popular
. . . because it is legible to the common understanding of a majority of the culture’”) (quoting David
Thornburn, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). See also CAMPBELL, supra note 376, at
137-83 (describing 60 Minutes as telling individualist and centrist narratives reinforcing consensus
mythology).
416. See Tom Rosenstiel, Not Necessarily the News, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1995, at 76. In many
newsmagazines, “[s]tories are ‘cast’ so that once you want to do a piece about a social problem, you
find a compelling character to be the protagonist. Many techniques from entertainment are used—
dolly shots, crane shots, dissolves— that have been forbidden on the evening news. The medicine is
coated with sugar.” Id.
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ratings with prime time entertainment programs. Thus, “they are under
enormous pressure to tell clear, simple stories, with victims and villains,
preferably illustrated with eye-catching video.”417 As their numbers increase,
they also compete with one another for stories. This, critics say, leads the
newsmagazines to favor sensationalistic but simplified, “soft news”
programming that is entertaining to the public.418 It provides incentives for
unambiguous stories that titillate viewers without unduly challenging
mainstream values. The involvement of the reporters in the stories
necessarily undermines the impression of detached and neutral reporting. To
the extent that the newsmagazine reports are investigative, they may promote
an adversarial and prosecutorial mindset which can serve as a structural bias
against the investigator’s target.419 As the D.C. Circuit put it in the context of
a fairness doctrine dispute over an NBC documentary on private pension
plans in the 1970s: “Investigative journalism is a portrayal of evils, and there
may be a natural tendency to suspect that the evils shown are the rule rather
than the exception.”420 Finally, critics have charged that, outside the hard
news context, simplification and overstatement are more likely in the
newsmagazine than in the full-length documentary format because of the
shorter time available and the need to fit into particular narrative
417. Marc Gunther, The Lion’s Share, AMER. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1997, at 20. See also
Rosenstiel, supra note 416, at 76.
[W]hat is most poorly understood about newsmagazines . . . [is] that they are both the best and
worst programs produced by network news. The shows contain most of the investigative reporting
on television and the most carefully edited and produced interviews. They have saved lives,
caught criminals, and influenced legislation. They often surpass the best documentaries ever done
on TV.
What’s more, thanks to the magazines’ success, news is no longer in danger on network
television (for now). 
. . . .
But it’s the very success of the magazines that is driving their standards down, forcing them to
strain for attention, and lowering the quality of some of their most serious work.
Id.
418. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, supra note 416, at 76.
419. Media analysts contend that some producers and correspondents “act more like prosecutors
and judges than dispassionate reporters” because of “the pressures of prime time investigative
reporting.” Marc Gunther, supra note 417. See also JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF MASS
CULTURE: JOURNALISM, FILMMAKING, AND BROADCASTING IN AMERICA SINCE 1941, at 165-67
(1997) (describing 60 Minutes’ success and its hostile approach toward some subjects.); PETER
BENJAMINSON & DAVID ANDERSON, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 3-4 (2d ed. 1990) (describing an
investigative reporter as a person with “a faith that someone, somehow, is working against the public
interest”); Ricard Harwood, How Lies See the Light of Day, WASH. POST, July 13, 1998, at A21
(describing “zealots who set out to prove a thesis regardless of the evidence”). Moreover, “[t]he very
nature of an expose presumes a subjective, not objective, viewpoint, that is that whatever exposed is
wrong, whether morally or legally.” BENJAMINSON & ANDERSON, supra, at 156.
420. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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conventions.421 These concerns may be particularly apposite for the tabloid
newsmagazines, as opposed to the more established and less sensational
versions, such as 60 Minutes. On this view, public discourse on controversial
issues of public importance will be skewed given that the public believes
newsmagazine accounts of events.422
What should not be forgotten among the criticisms is that newsmagazines
like 60 Minutes and investigative journalists in general have generated good
and important stories with significant social impact.423 They have also
generated mass interest in current events. They have sometimes provided an
antidote to the mainstream press’s susceptibility to the claims of official news
sources.424 If anything, concerns about libel and other liability have led to
more timorousness than might be warranted.425 Moreover, the long-form
documentary is an endangered species in the commercial media because of
the current economic climate. Finally, different television formats have
cyclical life spans, thereby suggesting a future decline in the extreme ratings
421. Additionally, some argue that prime time ratings competition provides incentives to produce
news for impact and not illumination. See Gunther, supra note 417, at 20.
422. Recent polls suggest that the public believes the newsmagazines more than the nightly news.
Frank Newport, A Matter of Trust (News Sources Americans Prefer), AMER. JOURN. REV., July-Aug.
1998, at 30.
423. From Ida Tarbell and Upton Sinclair at the beginning of the century, to Woodward and
Bernstein with Watergate in the 1970s, investigative reporting has successfully exposed and helped
remedy wrongdoing. See, e.g., FRED J. COOK, THE MUCKRAKERS: CRUSADING JOURNALISTS WHO
CHANGED AMERICA 65-96 (1972); MITCHELL STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF NEWS 240 (1997); Sandra F.
Chance, The Media in the New Millennium: Exploring Myths and Misconceptions Before Shooting the
Messenger, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 171 (1998).
424. Media critics argue that mainstream journalists were captives of their official sources in the
McCarthy era and during the early years of the Vietnam War. A reinvigorated interest in investigative
reporting provided an independence-promoting alternative for the press. Admittedly, some media
critics claim that even investigative reporters, particularly those affiliated with the network
newsmagazines, still rely too much on elite (and often official) news sources. See Levi, supra note
336, at 671-89 (citing other relevant sources).
425. See, e.g., James C. Goodale, 60 Minutes v. CBS and Vice Versa, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1995, at 3
(analyzing potential Brown & Williamson claims against CBS for airing the interview with former
B&W executive Jeffrey Wigand); Lawrence K. Grossman, CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen
Interview, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 39; Howard Kurtz, ‘60 Minutes’ Kills Piece
on Tobacco Industry, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at A3 (reporting that CBS declined air taped
interview of a former tobacco company representative because the network feared a lawsuit). CBS
ultimately aired the Wigand interview several months later, after the Wall Street Journal published
some deposition excerpts. See Bill Carter, 60 Minutes Set to Interview Ex-Tobacco Executive Tonight,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, § 1, at 30. This event became the basis of a Hollywood movie, The Insider.
See also Jonathan Friendly, Investigative Journalism Is Found Shifting Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1983, at A16; Georges, supra note 410, at 36 (“The national media nurtures its reputation for accuracy,
preferring to kill or delay a story rather than risk getting it wrong. And that’s good. But at the same
time, important stories often sit on the shelf until government blesses them with an official
investigation.”).
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competition of the early 1990s newsmagazines.426 This will hopefully
enhance the likelihood of true editorial judgment— rather than simply ratings
competition— driving newsmagazine productions.
Perhaps most importantly, despite the litany of criticisms, there is surely a
significant social benefit to having a variety of news outlets and news
formats. Given that we cannot entirely eliminate the “bias” or point of view
inherent in the enterprise of editorial selection and decision, a variety of
options may benefit public discourse. Even if modern newsmagazines do not
currently serve journalistic diversity as well as we might wish, it is not in the
public interest to promulgate rules that would further speed their slide into
entertainment. An invigorated news distortion policy would likely have its
most significant effect not on “straight” news, but on certain other kinds of
investigative and literary news reporting. To the extent that such reporting
focuses on controversial public issues, public discussion would be disserved
by administrative policies that create disincentives for such programming. At
a minimum, the American press’s susceptibility to official sources and
authoritative government accounts of news suggests that there is social value
in a multiplicity of formats for the dissemination of news and information.
Ultimately, the scope and definition of the news staging issue effectively
rests on a number of important assumptions, including assumptions about the
relationship between the viewer and the media and what the viewer should be
able to expect from the press. Even Commissioner Johnson, a champion of
the public, stated in the news distortion context that “[i]t is not necessary or
desirable that a citizenry take literally, and accept whole, everything that
reaches it through the mass media. But a nation simply cannot function in a
climate in which people think you can’t believe anything you hear now-a-
days.”427 The issue becomes, what should the media be deemed to warrant to
the public? What is the appropriate middle ground in Johnson’s spectrum
between total gullibility and absolute distrust?
The public’s belief in the newsmagazines must be understood in context.
Polls show that the public does not much trust the media as a whole,428 so a
finding that viewers believe newsmagazines more than the daily news is not
426. Lawrie Mifflin, Big Television Shocker: Tabloid Shows Go Soft; The Mainstream Networks
are Co-opting What Was Once Too Lurid for Prime Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at C1.
427. Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Broad. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a Marihuana Party
(Pot Party), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 160 (1969) (Comm’r Nicholas Johnson, dissenting).
428. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, The Psychological Conditions for a Socially Significant Free Press:
Reconsidering the Hutchins Commission Report Fifty Years Later, 22 VT. L. REV. 493, 498-99 (1998);
Marta W. Aldrich, Public Distrust of News Media Cuts Support for First Amendment, ATLANTA J. &
CONSTIT., July 4, 1999, at A17; Geneva Overholser, The Public’s Growing Distrust of the Media,
CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1999, at 21.
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dispositive as to viewers’ assessment of journalistic accuracy. Moreover, poll
respondents may say that they find newsmagazines more credible precisely
because they do not claim the objectivity and neutrality of hard news. Given
the mixed character of newsmagazine programming, it is also unclear
whether viewers distinguish, regarding credibility, between investigative
segments and other subtypes of the genre. Further, the polls do not appear to
distinguish between the different sorts of newsmagazines and the different
stories even within one sort.
Logic and experience suggest that viewers do not understand all
journalistic efforts in the same way or believe them in the same degree. Some
kinds of news reports— particularly the traditional sort of “objective” news
reporting— are marketed as accurate and factual accounts of events. Whether
or not they credit the daily press, many Americans no doubt believe that
“front page” or “headline” news should constitute accounts of real events
neutrally and objectively reported. Different kinds of news programs are
designed to appeal to the American public in distinct ways, however. Readers
know the difference between the first page and the editorial section in a daily
newspaper; they have experience with opinionated news magazines. They
must know what to expect from newsmagazines, whether the tabloid variety
or the more serious examples.429 They understand that exposés presume a
point of view— an implicit statement by the reporters that whatever is
exposed is somehow wrong or harmful.
To the extent that we have a history of different kinds of press traditions
which are interpreted differently by the public, a news distortion prohibition
may needlessly promote one kind of journalism rather than another.
Particularly when the traditions of the genre provide viewers interpretive
cues, it would unnecessarily limit journalistic development and
experimentation to apply prohibitions on news distortion that, in application,
would target certain kinds of dramatic investigative reporting. What is at
stake counsels government content-neutrality.
This is not to say naively that television news will never distort events
and that such distortion will not harm public discourse. Rather, this Article
suggests that the stringent application of a news distortion policy, such as the
version proposed by the Serafyn court, is likely to lead to worse social harms.
This in turn does not mean that there is no recourse when faced with an
increasingly degraded public discourse. Possible constraining influences
include public clamor, evolving professionalism norms,430 and critical media
429. Gunther, supra note 417, at 23 (quoting former ABC President Roone Arledge for the same
point).
430. The press’s own ambivalence toward surreptitious newsgathering techniques and mainstream
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attention.431 While not universally available, unprecedented communicative
alternatives— such as the Internet— are now enabled by technology. Critics
of news broadcasts can easily express their views on their web pages,432 and
interview subjects afraid of being misquoted by the press can simply post
unedited videotapes or audiotapes of their interviews on the World Wide
Web.433 In the competitive world of journalism itself, print outlets are ready
to criticize broadcasters. Journalism magazines turn a skeptical eye on their
own industry. The public will often be able to distinguish true from false and
overstatement from accurate reporting. Finally, close FCC monitoring of the
journalists’ criticisms of tabloid-style investigative reporting may affect the direction of journalistic
ethics over time. In addition, the voluntary presentation of contrasting viewpoints may enhance public
discourse. In the case of The Ugly Face of Freedom, while CBS read some critical letters on later
editions of 60 Minutes, it did not publicly address the letter-writing campaign and the intensity of the
views of offended viewers.
431. Disciplining effects can occur in a variety of ways. For example, news outlets can criticize
one another’s coverage of particular news events. See, e.g., James Boylan, A Thousand Voices Bloom,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 34-35; Roy Peter Clark, Academia, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 50; Neil Hickey, Television, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 42;
James B. Kelleher, Alternative Papers, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 48-49; Jane
Pauley, Defending Dateline, THE QUILL, Nov. 1994, at 63 (describing criticism from other news
sources). While television news coverage was primarily criticized in the print press in the past,
broadcaster self-criticism has become more common in the wake of sensationalized coverage of the
Clinton and Lewinsky affair. See, e.g., Bill Kirtz, Disgust Within the Ranks, THE QUILL, May 1998, at
8. Media critics represent another source of journalistic self-analysis, both with regard to coverage of
particular stories and with regard to journalistic practices generally. See, e.g., JAMES FALLOWS,
BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1996). Admittedly,
media critics suggest that there is insufficient press self-criticism. See, e.g., Kristie Bunton, Media
Criticism as Professional Self-Regulation, in HOLDING THE MEDIA ACCOUNTABLE: CITIZENS, ETHICS,
AND THE LAW 68 (David Pritchard ed., 2000); Richard M. Cohen, Saving the Press From Itself, THE
NATION, May 12, 1997, at 11 (examining debate over national news councils); Geneva Overholser, It’s
Time for Newspapers to Do Real Self-Criticism, COLUMBIA JOURN. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 64;
Sydney H. Schanberg, The News No One Dares to Cover, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1999, at B1
(decrying lack of press self-criticism).
432. See, e.g., Lubomyr Prytulak, The Ugly Face of 60 Minutes, available at
http://www.ukar.org/60minart.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2001) (criticizing CBS’s broadcast of The
Ugly Face of Freedom); Infoukes, available at http://infoukes.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2001)
(providing articles that present alternative views on Ukraine).
433. See, e.g., Bill Carter, Anxious Pill Maker Puts Interview on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999,
at A20 (describing diet-product company’s posting of full unedited ABC News interview on the
Internet “in an effort to publicize its concerns that ABC would broadcast an unfair report on the
medical risks of its popular dietary supplement”). Although the article reports that broadcasters may
ask interviewees to sign agreements preventing them from releasing tapes of network material before
broadcast in order to prevent scoops by competitors, nothing would prevent postbroadcast
dissemination of the tapes. See also Seth Lubove, Gotcha!, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1999, at 145; Daniel
McGinn & Richard Turner, Battle Behind the Screen, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1999, at 53 (describing
Ford’s self-help methods in connection with investigative report on Ford car safety, including hiring
their own cameraman to videotape the Dateline interview).
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diversity-lessening effects of media consolidation can serve as a structural
lever less invasive than content rules such as the news distortion policy.434
VI. CONCLUSION
Electronic news media are by now increasingly consolidated. The cross-
marketing promoted by such consolidations gradually blurs traditional lines
between entertainment and information. At the same time, television
currently provides the principal source of news and information for most
Americans. Concerns about cost and a desire to satisfy the public’s
apparently voracious appetite for excitement have led to an explosion of
relatively cheap, tabloid-type “news” programs. It is already a truism that
broadcasters produce much local news pursuant to the maxim “if it bleeds, it
leads.” Fascination wars with distaste, however. Television triggers much
public ambivalence. The American public grouses about the competence and
integrity of the press. Despite its popularity, many cynically characterize
news programming as generally biased or slanted. Some complain about
substantive left- or right-wing bias. Others rue the social effects of television
coverage that sensationalizes news and imposes simple story lines on
complex issues. Yet others criticize the press for staging events in order to
capture the most dramatic moment at the lowest cost. In sum, while the
American public tunes into television for its news and public affairs, critics
complain about the democracy-suppressing effects of the modern news
media.
While the FCC has largely declined to regulate informational
programming since the late 1980s, both a recent judicial gloss on the
Commission’s news distortion policy and the development of new regulatory
justifications for Commission intervention have quietly provided a new
avenue for administrative attempts to enhance public discourse on the air.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Serafyn v. FCC, by adopting a disturbingly
extensive and invasive gloss on the FCC’s shadowy old news distortion
policy, has issued an invitation for a thoroughgoing review of the
434. Admittedly, the government’s approval of the recent communications industry mega-mergers
might suggest that FCC oversight is not particularly prohibitory. Nevertheless, the FCC recently
refused to eliminate some of its broadcast ownership limitations, suggesting that the agency is still
interested in promoting diversity of viewpoints indirectly through diversity of ownership. Biennial
Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, available at 2000 WL 791562.
As for legislative attention, Congress has also held hearings on news distortion on several
occasions in the 1960s and early 1970s. This obviously raises First Amendment concerns. See, e.g.,
Dyk & Goldberg, supra note 33, at 647-60 (questioning the appropriateness of congressional hearings
into particular broadcast news programs). Congress’s pointed inquiries would have an undeniable
chilling effect. Id. at 627.
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Commission’s role in electronic news delivery.
Despite the settlement of the complaints that spawned the decision, the
Commission will likely wish to clarify its interpretation of the news
distortion policy. This Article— having identified difficulties both with the
“new” model suggested by the court in Serafyn and with the traditional
Commission policy— has argued that the agency should take this opportunity
to eliminate the news distortion policy entirely. Otherwise, the Commission
will face regulatory pressures to expand news distortion regulation to fill the
void left by the elimination of the fairness doctrine, another rule designed to
improve public discourse.
The version of the news distortion policy advocated by the Serafyn court
interferes with broadcasters’ editorial decisions by requiring them to justify
their choices of experts to a governmental agency. Even more seriously, it
permits courts to infer intentional, deliberate news distortion— and, indeed,
generalized patterns of distortion— from “obvious” factual inaccuracies. The
facts of Serafyn itself demonstrate how such a standard cannot avoid the
governmental establishment of an “official truth” with respect to
controversial programming in which conflicting interpretations of facts are
likely to be strongly held by viewers. What might be seen by a court as
“obvious” factual inaccuracies— such as the purported mistranslation of an
epithet in Serafyn— in many instances will be far from obvious. For reasons
ranging from underlying factual complexity to linguistic incommensurability
and cultural contextuality, the very issues in which accuracy is most
significant to the complaining party are unlikely to be “obvious” or easy to
resolve. The possibility of the FCC and courts subjecting broadcasters to the
ultimate sanction for a finding of “obvious and egregious” error, without
more, would doubtless have a chilling effect on broadcasters’ reporting of
controversial issues. Certainly, in today’s climate of cost-conscious and
bottom-line-oriented news media, even the need to justify the content of its
news to the FCC would likely cast a chill on reportorial risk-taking. Indeed,
certain types of news formats— such as investigative journalism, tabloid
shows, and newsmagazines— may be particularly susceptible to an enhanced
enforcement of the news distortion policy. Neither Commission precedent or
defamation law supports this expansion of the news distortion standard. In
fact, such an expansion creates an unnecessary tension between
administrative and tort law.
Even the traditional news distortion policy, before its recommended
expansion by the court in Serafyn, results in greater costs than benefits. The
difficulties inherent in its careful balance between truth and editorial freedom
all too easily lead to the kind of challenge mounted by the Serafyn court. The
vagueness of the extrinsic evidence standard and the malleability of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/1
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
2000] REVIVAL OF THE FCC’S NEWS DISTORTION POLICY 1131
significance requirement make the policy both under and overinclusive. They
permit administrative second-guessing of broadcaster news judgments
without assurance of significantly improved public discourse.
It may be possible, in a practical (if not entirely principled) fashion, to
carve out a specific, narrow version of the news distortion doctrine to deal
with the problem of news staging and fabrication. However, the Commission
should eschew the option of an alternative, narrowed news distortion
doctrine. Even a narrowed doctrine presents too great a danger of more
expansive application— either far in the future or the next time a close case is
passionately litigated by a well-organized group with a particular economic
or ideological stake in the outcome. Despite the examples in recent memory
of such classic news staging as the NBC truck fiasco, true staging seems to
occur infrequently.
When it does, media competitors have a keenly-felt stake in exposing it.
The journalism industry itself has incentives to reveal many of the clear
fabrications that would likely be addressed by a workably narrow alternative
news distortion doctrine. Thus, it is probably unnecessary to run the risks of
the news distortion slippery slope simply to eliminate clear examples of
staging.
It might be said that there is no need to eliminate the doctrine because the
FCC can clarify its rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s modifications in Serafyn,
and because in its traditional application, the doctrine has not in fact posed
much of a threat to the editorial processes of broadcasters. Such an argument,
however, ignores both the pressure to enhance public discourse now that the
fairness doctrine is gone and the newly developing regulatory rationales
beyond scarcity that could be used to justify discourse-enhancing
governmental engagement.
The call to regulate press bias presents itself as new rationales are
developing to justify FCC content regulation. Scarcity has given way to the
protection of children and the regulatory quid pro quo as the modern
foundations for FCC intervention in broadcasting. That such rationales can
be stretched to validate the Commission’s news distortion policy in cases like
Serafyn is an object lesson in their limitations.
The question whether the Commission should retain or even expand its
news distortion policy is one that implicates conflicting democratic values.
On the one hand, recent media developments about which critics complain
do suggest that there are structural pressures on press objectivity. We cannot
realistically deny that private media serve to constrain available public
discussion; government is not the only speech suppressant. We might
conclude that a salutary intervention by the FCC into the worst of the tabloid
shows’ unsavory journalistic practices would actually provide a long-term
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benefit to the public. A wise Commission could help enhance both truth and
press integrity, reducing public ambivalence about the information necessary
to conduct its affairs.
Whatever the potential democratic benefits for public discourse of such
governmental intervention, however, it conflicts with other democratic
norms. The news distortion doctrine in fact presents far more serious dangers
for democracy than the fairness doctrine ever did. It is ultimately incapable of
application in a way that does not overly intrude into editorial judgments.
At best, the news distortion doctrine would provide the appearance of
neutrality and objectivity without addressing the underlying problems
catalogued by media critics. At worst, it would establish an “official truth” in
many controversial issues of importance to public discourse. Such an official
truth may well be wrong. In any event, it would be particularly problematic if
it were established in response to the selective chilling strategy of organized
interest groups with particular ideological aims. Unlike low value speech
such as indecency,435 news distortion concerns the kind of speech at the core
of First Amendment protection. Protecting editorial discretion in the context
of political speech is central to the protection of the First Amendment and the
democratic role not only of the press, but of the administrative and judicial
processes as well.
Ultimately, news production is part of culture and in that sense media
“bias” is unavoidable. The official authentication of news presents greater
public dangers than media voices whose content can be challenged in a range
of different venues.
435. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 744-51 (1978).
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APPENDIX: APPLYING THE “OBVIOUS” NEWS DISTORTION STANDARD
A. Close Analysis of Claimed Factual Inaccuracies in the 60 Minutes
Broadcast436
Having largely rested its analysis on the supposed mistranslation of
“zhyd,” the D.C. Circuit did not discuss each of the “other factual
inaccuracies” raised by the Serafyn complainants. Instead, the court
instructed the Commission on remand to “consider whether any other error
was sufficiently obvious and egregious to contribute to an inference about
CBS’s intent, and therefore to qualify as ‘extrinsic evidence.’”437
In attempting to narrow the sweep of its “obvious and egregious error”
standard, the court articulated the following guidance for the Commission in
that connection: “This is not to say that the Commission must investigate
every allegation of factual inaccuracy; if the broadcaster had to do historical
research or to weigh the credibility of interviewees, for example, then any
alleged inaccuracy is almost certainly neither egregious nor obvious.”438
The claims of inaccuracy in the Serafyn petition and supporting
documents entail precisely that sort of calculus, however. Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of any program concerning controversial issues of public
importance— and particularly dealing with historical matters— as to which
claims of material errors regarding content will be obvious or incontestable.
Despite the court’s language, the Serafyn claims usefully demonstrate this
point. They also serve to show the danger of the D.C. Circuit sanctioning
historical revisionism— particularly in the Holocaust context.
Certain key claims of inaccuracy purportedly illustrating intentional
distortion have been discussed above because of their specific role in the
D.C. Circuit’s decision. But the Serafyn complainants made a number of
other claims of error. Because the parties settled the case, we will never
know how the Commission would have addressed these claims. This
Appendix will examine the additional claims in detail. The analysis is
intended to serve as a concrete “object lesson” on the difficulty— if not
impossibility— of applying the D.C. Circuit’s news distortion standard
436. It is unnecessary to claim that my selection of historical sources is definitive. The account
and minute analysis above clearly establish at least that there is sufficient dispute to make it
completely inappropriate for the government to delve into the substantive details.
437. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Note the effect of the modifier
“other”. The use of this modifier reinforces the impression that the D.C. Circuit assumes that “zhyd”
was mistranslated in the program and that there were other errors as well.
438. Id. at 1223-24.
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usefully in the very contexts in which the policy will most likely be invoked.
This Appendix is not designed as an apologia for CBS’s journalistic and
editorial decisions in connection with The Ugly Face of Freedom. No doubt
the broadcast contained some factual inaccuracies and linguistic ambiguities.
No doubt some of its choice of language— particularly a reference to denials
by the Ukrainian government of “genetic[ ] anti-Semiti[sm]” in its people—
was ill-considered and inflammatory. The program’s dramatic style gave
significant emphasis to the story. As will be detailed below, different stories
could have been told about post-Soviet Ukraine. This Appendix is designed
to show two things: (1) that the Serafyn complainants’ evidence did not
support a claim of intentional news distortion and (2) that involving the FCC
in such inquiries will inevitably require the agency to opine on the truth of
historical claims.
1. The Galicia Division of the Waffen SS
The broadcast stated that “[t]housands of Ukrainians joined the SS and
marched off to fight for Nazism. In the process, they helped round up Lviv’s
Jews, helped march more than 140,000 of them off to extinction, virtually
every Jew in Lvov.”439 Arguing that the Ukrainian SS unit— the Galicia
Division— was not established until 1943 (when virtually all of Lviv’s Jews
had already been killed) complainants characterized this statement as a
“damnable lie” indicative of intentional news distortion.440 Moreover, they
attacked the broadcast for later “invit(ing) [the viewer] to look on in horror as
veterans of the Galicia Division return for a reunion, while Cardinal
Lubachivsky, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, gives his blessing.”441
There is in fact no dispute that the Galicia Division was not formed until
1943, by which time virtually all of the Jews of Lviv had been murdered.
However, the broadcast did not say that the Galicia Division participated in
these crimes. Rather, in a rather ambiguous narration line, the report stated
that “[t]housands of Ukrainians joined the SS and marched off to fight for
Nazism” and that “in the process” “they” helped round up Lviv’s Jews.”442
It is indisputably true that the Ukrainische Hilfspolizei (Ukrainian
Auxiliary Police)— established shortly after the German occupation of
Ukraine on the orders of Heinrich Himmler443— participated in the round-up
439. 60 Minutes, supra note 100.
440. Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Pet. to Deny, at 13, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140
(1995) (No. 94-1027).
441. Id. at 12.
442. 60 Minutes, supra note 100.
443. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST 1531 (Israel Gutman ed., 1990) (noting that Himmler
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and extermination of Ukrainian Jews.444 Given the broad historical support
ordered the establishment of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police on July 27, 1941, shortly after the German
occupation).
444. Shmuel Spector, a leading expert on the fate of the Ukrainian Jews, writes as follows about
the role of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police:
In the first few days of occupation, Ukrainian police, as an organized group or on an individual
basis, participated in pogroms against the Jews, in Lvov, in the cities of Eastern Galicia, and in
Volhynia. Later, when Ukrainian police escorted groups of Jews to places of work or were on
guard duty in the ghettos, they extorted money from the Jews, harassed them, and frequently shot
Jews merely for the sake of killing. When the ghettos were being liquidated, Ukrainian Auxiliary
Police took part in Aktionen: blockading the ghettos, searching for Jews who had gone into hiding,
and hunting those down who had escaped. They escorted Jews to their execution pits and served
as the guards surrounding the murder sites, barring access to them. They were known for their
brutality and killed many thousands of Jews who could not keep up on the way to the execution
sites, or who tried to escape.
Schmuel Spector, Ukrainische Hilfspolizei, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at
1531. Philip Friedman, a historian and one of Lviv’s few Jewish survivors, provides a similar account:
The principal collaboration with the Germans was through the Ukrainian semimilitary and police
formations. The Ukrainian auxiliary police, organized throughout the Ukrainian ethnic area,
including the Galicia District, was in effect subordinate to the Germans. One of its functions was
to assist the German police and the SS in their anti-Jewish campaigns. At first “assistance” was
confined to seizing and arresting Jews and delivering them to the German authorities, or to
participating in raids by the German police. But this “assistance” did not satisfy the Germans . . . .
Gradually the functions of the Ukrainian police were being extended. They kept watch over the
ghetto in the anti-Jewish campaigns, convoyed transports to the extermination camps, and directly
participated in the extermination of the Jews.
PHILIP FRIEDMAN, ROADS TO EXTINCTION: ESSAYS ON THE HOLOCAUST 185-86 (Ada Friedman ed.,
1980).
Raul Hilberg also writes of the important role the auxiliary police played in the extermination
process:
We come now to a second and somewhat more efficient form of local cooperation [than
pogroms], namely the help extended to the Einsatzgruppen [Nazi mobile killing units] by auxiliary
police. The importance of the auxiliaries should not be underestimated. Roundups by local
inhabitants who spoke the local language resulted in higher percentages of Jewish dead. This fact
is clearly indicated by the statistics of the Kommandos that made use of local help. As in the case
of the pogroms, the recruitment of auxiliaries was most successful in the Baltic and Ukrainian
areas.
. . . .
The Ukrainian auxiliaries appeared on the scene in August 1941, and Einsatzgruppe C found
itself compelled to make use of them because it was repeatedly diverted from its main task [i.e.,
extermination of the Jews] to fight the “partisan nuisance.” . . . The Ukrainians were used
principally for dirty work. Thus Einsatzkommando 4a went so far as to confine itself to the
shooting of adults while commanding its Ukrainian helpers to shoot children.
RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 312-14 (1985).
The role of Ukrainian collaborators is also emphasized in A History of the Jewish People:
The most active accomplices of the Germans in these acts of extermination were the Ukrainians
and the Lithuanians. . . . Among the Ukrainians and Lithuanians, traditional hatred of Jews was
combined with the political hopes they pinned on the victory of the Germans and the fulfillment of
their nationalist plans. This accounted for their extensive participation in acts of extermination
carried out by the Einsatzgruppen and in wiping out the ghettos. Their police personnel were
willing to search tirelessly for days and even weeks in order to hunt down one concealed Jewish
child.
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for the view that Ukrainian police units were significant participants in the
deportation and extermination of the Jews in Ukraine and elsewhere, the
broadcast’s arguably mistaken reference to the Galicia Division of the
Waffen SS as the unit responsible for these crimes cannot reasonably be
viewed as involving a significant matter. Moreover, whether the Galicia
Division itself was involved in wartime atrocities is a matter of considerable
historical dispute. There is no doubt that thousands of Ukrainians voluntarily
joined this German-formed unit and fought on the side of the Nazis. There is
support in historical accounts of the Holocaust for the conclusion that many
of the Ukrainian police units, which in fact assisted in the extermination of
the Jews in the early part of the German occupation, were later incorporated
into the Galicia Division of the Waffen SS.
Many Ukrainian nationalists, however, contend that Ukrainians
voluntarily joined the Galicia division not out of pro-German motives, but to
fight against the Soviet Communists whose rule of portions of Ukraine had
been marked by forced collectivization, mass starvation, and political
terror.445 They also contend that the Galicia Division was purely a fighting
unit that did not persecute civilians. This view is supported by the findings of
Jules Deschenes, who in a report to the Canadian government on possible
war criminals living in Canada concluded that “[c]harges of war crimes
against members of the Galicia Division have never been substantiated.”446
A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 1034 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976). See also LUCY S.
DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 400 (1975) (noting that “[t]he Baltic and
Ukrainian populations collaborated voluntarily with the Germans in murdering the Jews”); id at 279
(claiming that the Germans in the summer of 1941 “exploit[ed] the superstitious anti-semitic
prejudices of the . . . Ukrainians” and “harnessed the violent energies of these willing collaborators to
round up and kill the Jews”); REUBEN AINSZTEIN, JEWISH RESISTANCE IN NAZI-OCCUPIED EASTERN
EUROPE 337-38 (1974) (“In the [Volhynian] towns the slaughter of Jews was organized by the Nazis
with the help of the local Germans and carried out to a large extent by police battalions of local or
Galician Ukrainians.”).
Historians also point to the use made by the Nazis of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in non-
Ukrainian areas. As Philip Freidman writes:
The Germans dispatched them to Warsaw and to other Polish and Lithuanian ghettos. They were
also used as guards to carry out the work of extermination in various concentration camps . . . and
the death camps of Sobibor, Treblinka and others. Further, Ukrainian policemen were used to
guard prisons that held Jews, such as the notorious Pawiak prison in Warsaw.
FRIEDMAN, supra, at 186.
445. See generally ROBERT CONQUEST, HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND
THE TERROR-FAMINE (1986).
446. HONORABLE JULES DESCHENES, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON WAR CRIMINALS REPORT,
PART I: PUBLIC 261 (1986). Sol Littman, whose views are further discussed in the text, has called the
validity of Deschenes’ findings into question. See Sol Littman, The Ukrainian Halychyna Division: A
Case Study of Historical Revisionism, in HOLOCAUST LITERATURE: A HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND LITERARY WRITINGS 279 (Saul S. Friedman ed., 1993). Littman tells the following
story. In May 1945, the Division arranged to surrender to British forces in Austria. After the Division
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Others take a sharply different view. Sol Littman, head of the Simon
Wiesenthal Center in Toronto, Canada, has written that the Galicia Division
was recruited largely from the same Ukrainian police units “that served as the
chief executioners for the mobile killing squads known as
Einsatzgruppen.”447 Citing Polish, Soviet, and Israeli sources, Littman
describes a series of horrifying atrocities, largely against non-Jewish Polish
villagers, allegedly committed by this unit. Philip Friedman also notes that
“the official Polish investigation of German war crimes in Poland, conducted
in 1945, listed a number of executions of Poles and Jews by the Ukrainian
SS.”448 Echoing this finding, Reuben Ainsztein and Sol Littman write of the
Galicia Division’s crimes against Poles.449
At the very least, there is a question of whether the Galicia Division was
simply made up of patriotic Ukrainians who reluctantly joined forces with
the Germans to fight the Red Army, or whether this military unit also
committed numerous war crimes against helpless Polish and Jewish civilians.
This is precisely the sort of contested historical “fact” about the actions of
thousands of people in a war that neither the FCC nor the D.C. Circuit is
competent to consider or resolve in a news distortion case.
In any event, even if the statements were in error and if we were to
assume the mistake was deliberate, it should not support a claim of
had been held as prisoners of war in Rimini, Italy, for about three years, the British Labour
Department agreed to the conditional admission of the former Galicia Division members to Britain.
The prisoners were needed to meet a critical shortage of agricultural workers caused by the departure
of German POWs and the incomplete demobilization of British troops. Under this arrangement, a new
home was to be found for the Ukrainian Division members by 1950. After critical inquiries arose in
Parliament as to how such an ill-reputed unit could be admitted to Britain and it was discovered that
Division members had never been screened as possible war criminals, D. Haldane Porter of the
Refugee Screening Commission was sent to Rimini to investigate.
According to Littman, Porter’s report is “a welter of contradictions.” Id. at 287. Porter, he writes,
admitted that he had time to interview only a small number of Division members and that these
interviews were handicapped by the fact that neither Porter nor any of his staff spoke Ukrainian. Porter
“readily admitted that the officers of the division might be lying to him and that he had no alternative
but to accept what they said because he was unfamiliar with the unit’s history.” Id. Ultimately, he
concluded that, whatever the Division’s record, its members constituted no threat to security and could
be admitted to Britain for agricultural work.
In 1950, the British government, to fulfill its commitment to remove the Galicia Division
members that year, sought to place them in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Initially, Canada
objected, but relented after receiving assurances that Division members had been fully screened
regarding the commission of war crimes. Littman argues that when Deschenes was appointed in 1984
as a one-man Royal Commission to investigate the possible presence of war criminals in Canada, he
chose to rely solely on the Haldane Porter report to conclude that charges against the Galicia Division
were unsubstantiated. Id. at 291.
447. Sol Littman, supra note 446, at 283.
448. Despite this official finding, Freidman does allow that “it is possible that witnesses confused
the Ukrainian auxiliary police and HiWi with the Ukrainian SS.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 444, at 187.
449. AINSZTEIN, supra note 444, at 253; Littman, supra note 446, at 282-83.
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intentional news distortion. The mistake did not “involve a significant
[matter] and not merely a minor or incidental aspect of the news report.”450
Under its precedents, the Commission should not sit as a national arbiter of
truth, historical or otherwise. However, ample historical evidence exists as to
the significant participation of Ukrainian militia and auxiliary police units in
the round-up and murder of the Jews of Lviv and in Ukraine as a whole.
2. Events in Lviv
The next group of complainants’ allegations of intentional news distortion
all deal with the events in Lviv shortly before and after the German
occupation in late June 1941. The complainants alleged the following errors:
(1) Morley Safer erroneously stated in the broadcast that “even before the
Germans arrived,” Ukrainian police went on a three-day killing spree in
which, according to Simon Wiesenthal, between 5,000 and 6,000 Jews were
murdered. Complainants claimed that the dead in Lviv were killed by the
retreating Soviets and the invading Germans.451
(2) There were no Ukranian-initiated pogroms in Lviv. Complainants
referred to a German document, quoted by Raul Hilberg, which stated that
‘[a]lmost nowhere can the [Ukrainian] population be persuaded to take active
steps against the Jews.”452
(3) Historical footage identified in the broadcast as showing Ukrainian
brutality against the Jews was actually a staged “propaganda film” made by
the Germans, in which “street thugs” were recruited by the Nazis to strip and
humiliate some “former mistress of the [Soviet) NVKD.” The film’s purpose
was to create the false impression that the Ukrainian population was taking
spontaneous anti-Jewish actions.453
450. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing one element of the FCC’s
requirements for news distortion claims); Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(same).
451. Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Pet. to Deny (Serafyn Reply Brief) at 15, WGPR, Inc.,
10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027); Pet. to Deny Ex. 9, at 20-26, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140
(1995) (No. 94-1027). The historical argument of the initial complaint can be found in Petition to
Deny Ex. 9, WGPR (No. 94-1027). That exhibit argued that “[p]rior to the arrival of the Germans,
there was no anti-Jewish or anti-Communist violence” and that “[t]he most that the Germans could
incite [was] a small number of Ukrainians to contribute [to the killing of 130 Jews].” Petition to Deny
Ex. 9, at 22, 24, WGPR (No. 94-1027). The account further implies that such violence as the Germans
were able to incite occurred in retaliation for purported Soviet atrocities that the population may have
associated with Jews because “[i]t was commonly perceived by Ukrainians that Jews were
disproportionately represented among the Communists inflicting . . . suffering upon Ukraine.” Id. Ex.
9, at 21.
452. Serafyn Reply Brief, WGPR (No. 94-1027) (quoting Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg);
Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 22-24, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
453. Serafyn Reply Brief, WGPR (No. 94-1027); Pet. to Deny Ex. 9, at 26-27, WGPR (No. 94-
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(4) CBS used a discredited still photograph of a woman and girl following
the above film in the broadcast “to show that the girl was a rape victim of
Ukrainian anti-Semites.”454 Complainants noted that the photograph was
originally published in Time magazine, which subsequently retracted its
identification and apologized for its misuse.455
a. The Pre-occupation “Killing Spree”
There is no question that widespread pogroms lasting four days followed
immediately after the Germans entered Lviv on June 30, 1941. While
historical evidence supports Ukrainian participation in the Lviv pogroms,
there does not appear to be evidence to support the broadcast’s statement that
the Ukrainian police engaged in massacres in Lviv “before the Germans
arrived.”456 However, there was a long history of pogroms against the Jews
in Ukraine long before World War II and the 1941 Lviv pogrom.457 And
given the overwhelming evidence of the pogroms which took place
immediately after the German occupation and later, the factual misstatement
should not be considered significant.
1027).
454. Serafyn Reply Brief, at 16, WGPR (No. 94-1027); Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 27, WGPR (No.
94-1027).
455. Serafyn Reply Brief at 14, 16, WGPR (No. 94-1027); Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 27, WGPR
(No. 94-1027).
456. As Aharon Weiss writes of the beginning of the Petliura days on July 25, 1941:
[Groups of peasants] assembled in the courtyards of the Ukrainian police stations and then, joined
by the Ukrainian police and armed with sticks, knives and axes set out on their rampage. . . . The
next day, July 26, the participation of the Ukrainian policemen was especially prominent. In
groups of five, they raided Jewish houses and took the Jews they found inside to the warehouses
of the Axelbrod bakery on Zulkeyewska Street or to the Lunecki prison. There all the Jews were
severely beaten. Some were released after paying a ransom, some were killed on the spot, and
most of the others were killed the following day.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1126. See also John-Paul Himka, Ukrainian
Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During World War II, Sorting out the Long-Term and
Conjectural Factors (suggesting that, although the pogroms were “largely inspired by the Germans,
. . . there was also an element of spontaneity in them”), available at http://www.math.ualberta.ca/
~amk/zwoje16/text11.htm (last visited July 18, 2000). With regard to a different area of Ukraine,
Martin Dean has recently contended that persecution of the Jewish population by local Ukrainians in
the former Polish district of Volhynia “began even before the Germans had arrived.” MARTIN DEAN,
COLLABORATION IN THE HOLOCAUST: CRIMES OF THE LOCAL POLICE IN BELORUSSIA AND UKRAINE
20, 177 n.33 (2000).
457. W. BRUCE LINCOLN, RED VICTORY: A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 317-28 (1989);
RICHARD PIPES, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (Peter Dimock ed., 1996);
GERALD REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE THE JEWS OF EUROPE,
228-29 (1968); Schmuel Spector, Ukraine, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at
1525-27. See also Aharon Weiss, Petliura Days, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note
443, at 1126 (“Petliura . . . was responsible for large-scale pogroms against Jews in 1919.”).
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b. The Pogroms in Lviv
The pogroms which took place in Lviv in June and July 1941 are
indisputably established by historians. For example, writing in the
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, Aharon Weiss relates:
On June 30, 1941, the Germans occupied Lvov. The killing of Jews
began that same day, committed by Einsatzgruppe C, . . . German
soldiers, Ukrainian nationalists and plain rabble. The Germans and
Ukrainians spread a rumor that the Jews had taken part in the
execution of Ukrainian political prisoners whose bodies had been
discovered in the dungeons of the NVKD (the Soviet political police).
In four days of rioting, ending on July 3, 1941, four thousand Jews
were murdered. . . . From July 25 to 27 the Ukrainians again went on
the rampage, murdering two thousand more Jews. These pogroms
became known as the Petliura days.458
This account is echoed by that of Holocaust historian Lucy Dawidowicz:
Exploiting the superstitious anti-Semitic prejudices of the Lithuanians,
Balts, and Ukrainians and activating their accumulated hatred for the
Soviets, the Germans harnessed the violent energies of these willing
collaborators to round up and kill the Jews. . . . In Lwow the Germans
and Ukrainians, in house-to-house hunts for Jews, shot them randomly
on the spot. Belatedly avenging the assassination— by a Jew back in
1926 —  of Semyon Petlura, notorious anti-Semite and Ukrainian
national hero, the Ukrainians staged mammoth pogroms, slaughtering
thousands and carrying off other thousands of Jews to Einsatzgruppen
headquarters. Within hours or days, those Jews who had been taken
away were machine-gunned en masse at some remote desolate area.
The disaster was epic . . . .459
458. Aharon Weiss, Lvov, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 928-29.
459. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 444, at 279. Gerald Reitlinger writes that Ukrainian militia “killed
[Jews] in the prisons, the streets, and in the sports stadium.” REITLINGER, supra note 457, at 229. See
also DEAN, supra note 456, at 177 n.33 (citing Leon Berk’s estimate that in Lvov “some 6000 Jews
were killed on the three days from 30 June 1941, as the Germans gave the Ukrainians carte blanche to
murder them”) Philip Friedman describes the pogrom as follows:
From June 30 to July 3, German soldiers spread through the streets of the city in the company of
Ukrainian nationalists and an unruly mob of the local population. They fell upon Jews in the
streets, beat them murderously, and dragged them away for “work”— especially for cleansing of
prisons filled with corpses and blood. Thousands of Jews were seized and conveyed to the prisons
. . . and to the Gestapo headquarters. . . . A deadly fear gripped the Jews. They hid in cellars and
ceased to show themselves on the streets of the city. Then the destroyers, chiefly the newly
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The German perspective on events is reflected in a report dated July 16,
1941 to the Reich Security Main Office:
During the first hours after the departure of the Bolsheviks, the
Ukrainian population took praiseworthy action against the Jews. In
their assault upon the Jews inhabiting Lwow, they seized about 1,000
of them and brought them to a prison that had previously belonged to
the [Soviet] GPU and was now in the hands of the German army.
About 7,000 Jews were seized and shot by the police in retaliation for
the inhuman acts of cruelty [allegedly perpetrated by the Jews before
the departure of the Russians]; 73 persons regarded as officials and
spies of the NKVD were also shot. Forty persons were liquidated on
the basis of substantive information from the inhabitants [of Lwow].
The age of most of the Jews seized was 20-40. To the extent feasible,
the artisans and experts among them were set free.460
Against this evidence, complainants based their apparent denial of the
Lviv pogroms on a single report from Einsatzgruppe C— quoted and
commented on by Raul Hilberg— which complained of the unwillingness of
elements of the Ukrainian population to aid the Nazis in the destruction of
the Jews. The German report in question, dated September 18, 1941, states in
relevant part:
Almost nowhere can the local population be persuaded to take active
steps against the Jews. This may be explained by the fear of many
people that the Red Army may return. . . . In order to meet the fear
psychosis, and in order to destroy the myth which, in the eyes of many
Ukrainians, places the Jew in the position of the wielder of political
power, Einsatzkommando 6 on several occasions marched Jews
before their execution through the city. Care was taken to have
Ukrainian militiamen watch the shooting of the Jews.461
organized Ukrainian militia, began to roam through Jewish houses, to remove men— and
frequently women also— ostensibly for “purification of prisons.” Most of the Jews thus taken to
the prison courtyards never emerged again. They died after grievous agonies and tortures, or were
shot outright. Eyewitnesses who escaped from the hoodlums during these terrible days, relate that
the courtyard walls of the Brygidki prison were spattered with fresh blood up to the second floor,
and with human brains.”
FRIEDMAN, supra note 444, at 246-47. Eyewitnesses Leon Wells and Simon Wiesenthal also provide
accounts which are consistent with those quoted above.
460. FRIEDMAN, supra note 444, at 248. See also REITLINGER, supra note 457, at 228.
461. 1 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 309 (Holmer & Meier eds.,
1985). Commenting on this report, in a passage quoted by the Serafyn complainants, Hilberg writes:
“This ‘deflation’ of the Jews in the public eye did not have the desired effects. After a few weeks,
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The use of these statements is misleading in connection with the Lviv
pogroms. The September 1941 Nazi document and quotation from Raul
Hilberg on which complainants rely— which describe events in an entirely
different area of Ukraine— lend no credence to their denial of the pogroms
which took place in Lviv during the summer of 1941.
By July 1941 Einsatzgruppe C was deployed in the Zhitomir region,
which is far distant from Lviv and was east of the pre-September 1939 border
between Poland (of which Lviv was then part) and the Soviet Union.462 By
November 1941, the unit was deployed even further east near Kiev, having in
the interim participated in the infamous massacre at Babi Yar.463 Aside from
the fact that events in one area of a country or region say little about what
occurred hundreds or thousands of miles away, the difference in attitude
toward the Jews between the population of the Western Ukraine and those
Ukrainians living east of the pre-1939 Polish border has been the subject of
specific historical comment.464
c. Historical Footage of Ukrainian Brutality
The broadcast included certain historical footage accompanied by the
following narration: “These are remnants of a film the Germans made
showing Ukrainian brutality.”465
While agreeing that the Germans made the film, the complainants
contended that it was a staged “propaganda film” in which the Nazis
recruited “street thugs” to strip and humiliate some former “mistresses of the
Einsatzgruppe C complained once more that the inhabitants did not betray the movements of hidden
Jews.” Id.
462. Id. at 299. This is shown by maps in Hilberg’s book, which appear only a few pages from the
quoted passages.
463. Id. at 300.
464. Historian Reuben Ainsztein writes that “when the Germans occupied the Western Ukraine in
1941, they found there hundreds of thousands of people who . . . were ready to torture, massacre and
rob their Jewish neighbors.” AINSZTEIN, supra note 444, at 250-51. Noting that this “was something
exceptional even in Eastern Europe,” Ainsztein quotes a number of Nazi documents which report the
reluctance of various local populations to take spontaneous action against the Jews, including the
document the Serafyn complainants relied on. However, this document describes the behavior of the
inhabitants in Soviet Ukraine. Id. at 251-52. In that region, Ainsztein writes that the only people who
enthusiastically helped the Nazis murder the Jews were “the scum of the Ukrainian nation . . . [and] the
local Volksdeutsche.” Id. He concludes that:
The basic difference between the Ukrainians east of the 1939 border between Poland and the
Soviet Union and those west of it can be gauged from the fact that when the Ukrainian nationalists
began to massacre Poles in Volyn in 1943, many fled into the Zhitomir Region which lies east of
the pre-1939 Polish-Soviet border. There they were safe among the Soviet Ukrainians.
Id. at 252.
465. See 60 Minutes, supra note 100.
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[Soviet] NVKD.”466 The film’s purpose was to create a false impression that
the Ukrainian population was taking spontaneous anti-Jewish actions.467
The complainants cited no evidence to support this interpretation, other
than an article in a Ukrainian weekly newspaper.468 But even assuming
complainants’ characterization of the film was correct, no evidence was
offered to show that CBS personnel knew it to be a hoax. Moreover, even
assuming this fact as true, the Commission’s standards for making out a
prima facie claim of intentional news distortion would not be met. There is
overwhelming evidence to support the essential facts reported— for example,
that large scale pogroms took place in Lviv in June and July of 1941. Even if
proven, therefore, 60 Minutes’ knowing identification of generic German
“atrocity” footage as actually showing those events would constitute no more
than the kind of journalistic “window dressing” that the Commission has
expressly said before Serafyn would not support a news distortion claim.469
Regardless of whether it had been staged, the film did actually show
Ukrainians brutalizing Jewish women, even according to the Serafyn
complainants’ version of the facts.470 The complainants’ argument is an
attempt not to deny the fact that what took place on the film actually
happened, but more generally to use the staging argument to claim that
Ukrainians did not willingly participate in the Lviv pogroms. In light of the
overwhelming evidence based on historical and eyewitness accounts of the
Lviv pogroms against Jews and the participation of Ukrainians, the claim
about the alleged staging of the brutality footage supports neither the falsity
of the footage nor the falsity of the general claims about the Lviv pogroms.
Moreover, the complainants interpreted the historical footage as “not of
the Ukrainian populace attacking Jews, but rather the roughing up of
Communist collaborators.”471 To the extent that even nationalist historians
attribute many Ukrainians’ anti-Semitism to their association of Jews with
Bolsheviks,472 the complainants’ interpretive distinction appears somewhat
facile.
466. Reply to Opposition of CBS, Inc. to Petition to Deny, at 16, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140
(1995) (No. 94-1027); Petition to Deny Ex. 9, at 26-27, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No.
94-1027).
467. See Serafyn Reply Brief, at 15-16, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
468. Id.
469. Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
470. Moreover, much has been written about Ukrainian anti-Semites of the time associating
Bolsheviks with Jews. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 456, at 13.
471. See Serafyn Reply Brief, at 16, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
472. See infra notes 480 and 497.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1005 Levi.doc 04/24/01   5:00 PM
1144 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1005
d. The Time Magazine Photograph
The footage discussed above was followed immediately in the broadcast
by a still photograph of a young woman screaming in apparent agony. CBS
used this photograph in the broadcast without accompanying narration. In
1993, the same photograph was published in Time magazine over the caption
“a Jewish girl raped by Ukrainians in Lvov, Poland in 1945.”473 As
complainants noted, several weeks later Time ran a correction stating that it
had been “[un]able to pin down exactly what situation the photograph
portrays” and expressing regret that the caption “may well have conveyed a
false impression.”474 Complainants in Serafyn contended that CBS
executives “must have known” of Time’s statement regarding the
photograph, and that CBS’s use of the picture to illustrate Ukrainian pogroms
against Jews constituted extrinsic evidence of intentional news distortion.
There was no evidence that anyone at CBS used the picture in the
broadcast for the purpose of misleading the public. Even if CBS employees
could be shown to have been aware of doubts concerning what the photo
depicted, its use in the report was mere “window dressing” which did not go
to a significant matter— such as the 1941 Lvov pogroms. And there is
enough historical dispute about the picture that the Commission could not
possibly determine what it did and did not show.
The Serafyn parties quoted only a carefully selected portion of the Time
correction. A fuller version of Time’s lengthy explanation of the controversy
surrounding the photograph reads as follow:
More than 750 readers have written us so far about the photograph of
the young woman that accompanied our story on rape and the war in
Bosnia. . . . The picture’s caption, which said it showed a “Jewish girl
raped by Ukrainians in Lvov, Poland, in 1945,” struck a nerve with
readers of Ukrainian descent . . . . Except for the date, the information
describing the events in the photo was obtained from an employee of a
Holocaust museum in Israel. Subsequent research into the picture’s
somewhat murky past has turned up the following:
The photo was taken not in 1945 but in 1941 in Lvov (its Russian
name), or Lviv (its name today), Ukraine, shortly after the Germans
captured the city from the Soviets on June 30. Chaos in the form of
473. Lance Morrow, Unspeakable (Rape in Former Yugoslavia’s Civil War), TIME, Feb. 22, 1993,
at 48, available at 1993 WL 2931734.
474. Wartime Atrocities, TIME, Apr. 19, 1993, at 7.
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pogroms, rapes and killings swept the town at that time. The picture is
one of a series showing women being stripped, harassed and chased
by civilians. One school of thought holds that the women were Jewish
victims of the pogroms in Lvov. The Germans spread rumors that
Jews were responsible for the murders of several thousand political
prisoners found in the cellars of Soviet NKVD buildings, thus fueling
the hatred and the acts of revenge against local Jews that followed.
Other historians insist that the majority of the women pictured in the
series of photographs were mistresses the Soviets abandoned when
they fled Lvov to escape the German troops. The defenseless
collaborators were then attacked by resentful residents for consorting
with the Soviet enemy. Still another theory suggests the public
humiliation of the women was orchestrated by the occupying Nazis in
order to shoot an anti-Semitic propaganda film.
Despite our best efforts, we have not been able to pin down exactly
what situation the photograph portrays. But there is enough confusion
about it for us to regret that our caption, in addition to misdating the
picture, may well have conveyed a false impression.475
In this statement, Time magazine— like every other mainstream
journalistic outlet or academic source— treated the Lviv pogroms of 1941 as
historical fact. More substantively, however, the Time correction forcefully
demonstrates why the Commission should not attempt what Time’s editors
did not— to determine which “school of thought” concerning this photograph
is the correct one.
3. The Ukrainian “Boy Scouts”
The broadcast contained a number of scenes of marches and
demonstrations by UNO/UNSO, which has been widely described in the
press as being an extreme right wing, ultranationalist group.476 One of these
scenes near the end of the broadcast showed a torchlight parade, in which
475. Id.
476. See, e.g., Taras Kuzio, Paramilitary Groups in Ukraine, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV., Mar.
1994, at 123. See also Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, UCSJ Position Paper, Ukraine, Jan. 1, 1998
(describing UNA-UNSO’s circulation of anti-Semitic tracts), available at http://www.fsumonitor.com/
stories/asem1uk2.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2000) [hereinafter UCSJ]; Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian
Paramilitaries, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV., Dec. 1992, at 540; Julian Borger, Ukraine’s Far Right
Dons Khaki for Dry Run, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 21, 1994, at 9; James Rupert, Ukraine
Patriarch’s Unruly Burial Brings Church-State Ties to a Low, WASH. POST, July 23, 1995, at A16;
Bill Sloat, A Conflict with Russia Emerges, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 7B.
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some rather young people were seen participating. Without any supporting
affidavits, complainants asserted (1) that these were “Boy Scouts” whom
CBS sought to portray as “Hitler Youth” and (2) that CBS “overlayed the
soundtrack with the sound of marching boots” in order to “lend an ominous
militaristic flavor to the scene.”477 The complainants did not provide any
evidence, however, other than their own conclusions from the broadcast, that
60 Minutes deliberately and intentionally mischaracterized Boy Scouts as
fascists and enhanced the marching sounds in the segment. Indeed, the
credibility of the complainants’ assertion would appear to be drawn into
question by news accounts describing UNA officials as wearing “red and
black armbands featuring a black Germanic cross, intertwined with the Greek
letter alpha in white”— a description which matches the banners carried by
the putative “Boy Scouts” in the footage seen in the 60 Minutes
broadcast.”478
4. CBS’s Alleged Slander of Ukrainian “National Heroes”
The complainants’ argument that CBS intentionally distorted the news by
slandering a number of Ukrainian “national heroes” is another example of
their effort to have the Commission act as the judge of historical truth.
Simply put, evidence shows that each of these individuals is, to say the least,
controversial.
a. Stefan Bandera
Stefan Bandera was a principal leader of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN). While complainants state the broadcast’s alleged
description of Bandera as “the leader of a notorious army of murderers” is
merely “old Soviet propaganda,”479 sources characterize OUN as fascist and
Bandera’s followers as killing many Jews and Poles.480 Bandera did indeed
477. Serafyn Reply Brief, at 17, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
478. See Borger, supra note 476. See also 60 MINUTES, supra note 100. According to CBS, the
footage in question was obtained from the news agency Reuters. Telephone conversation with Howard
F. Jaeckel, Esq., Vice President and Associate General Counsel, CBS Corporation (July 28, 2000).
479. Serafyn Reply Brief, at 19, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
480. See, e.g., AINSZTEIN, supra note 444, at 252-54; See JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, UKRAINIAN
NATIONALISM 42 (2d ed. 1963); Littman, The Ukrainian Halychyna Division, supra note 446, at 296-
97. EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORTS, supra note 175, at 195 (describing Bandera members as “finishing off
Jews and Communists”). Indeed, a contemporaneous German account quotes an OUN position letter
as resting on an anti-Semitic platform. Id. at 210 (describing OUN letter calling for “greater
independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans” by sending “Poles behind the San, Germans
to Berlin, [and] Jews to the gallows”). See also SCHMUEL SPECTOR, THE HOLOCAUST OF THE
VOLHYNIAN JEWS 268 (1990) (explaining that the OUN movement “identified with the Nazi ideology
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/1
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fight the Nazis, as complainants claimed— after having fought with them
until they rejected his proclamation of Ukrainian independence and
imprisoned him in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.481 He and his
followers also fought the Russians and the Poles— not to mention Jewish
partisans and refugees in the forests.482
b. Simon Petlura
Simon Petlura headed the government (called the “Directory”) of a short-
lived independent Ukrainian state that was formed in 1918 during the civil
war which broke out following the Russian Revolution. The broadcast stated
that “[t]o Ukrainians Petlyura was a great general, but to the Jews, he’s the
man who slaughtered 60,000 Jews in 1919.”483
A wide body of Jewish opinion holds Petlura responsible for the massive
pogroms his forces committed during the civil war that broke out following
the Russian revolution.484 Some argue that Petlura was not an anti-Semite,
but was simply unable to control his troops.485 But whatever the truth of the
matter, it is incontestable that Petlura’s armies massacred some 60,000
Jews.486
and its aim to destroy the Soviet state [and] concurred with its view of the Jews as carriers of the
Bolshevik menace”). Accord ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 145-46, 153-32,
1029-30; FRIEDMAN, supra note 444, at 179-80, 187-89; SPECTOR, supra, at 234-35, 268, 270 (1990).
See also OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 441-43 (1988) (describing Ukrainian “integral
nationalism” during inter-war period).
481. See AINSZTEIN, supra note 444, at 252. Bandera was released in 1944 and his supporters
signed an agreement with the Nazis to engage in a joint struggle against the Soviet Union. See
Schmuel Spector, Bandera, Stefan, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 146;
Schmuel Spector, Ukrainska Povstanska Armyia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note
443, at 1532.
482. See, e.g., SPECTOR, supra note 480, at 270; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note
443, at 1029, 1097.
483. See supra Part II.B.2 (transcript of 60 Minutes broadcast).
484. See, e.g., Aharon Weiss, Petluria Days, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note
443, at 1125; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1525-26. See also LINCOLN,
supra note 457, at 320 (describing the killing of Jews by Petliurist forces).
485. For example, Sol Littman cites Stefan Possony for the proposition that Petlura created a
Ministry of Jewish Affairs in the Directory cabinet and “warn[ed] his troops that the death sentence
would overtake the perpetrators of pogroms.” Littman, The Ukrainian Halychyna Division, supra note
446, at 294.
486. See, e.g., 5 SIMON DUBNOV, HISTORY OF THE JEWS: FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO
THE EMERGENCE OF HITLER 844 (Moshe Spiegel trans., 1973); PIPES, supra note 457. In a 1994
report, National Public Radio stated that “[b]y the end of 1919, during the civil war that followed the
Russian Revolution, the Ukrainian nationalist gangs of Simon Petlyura had slaughtered 60,000 Jews.”
Ukraine Experiences Ugly Resurgence of Anti-Semitism (National Public Radio, April 1, 1994),
available at 1994 WL 8690228. Lucy Dawidowicz has described Petlyura “as a notorious anti-
Semite.” DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 444, at 279. And in HISTORY OF THE JEWS, Simon Dubnov writes:
It was evident that the supreme command deemed it impossible to halt the wave of pogroms
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In the context of reporting on Jewish fears of a revival of anti-Semitism in
Western Ukraine, and the reaction of Jews to the naming of a street after
Petlura, the broadcast stated that “to Jews” he was the man who had
murdered 60,000 people.487 This could not possibly be the basis for a prima
facie finding of intentional news distortion.
c. Roman Shukhevych
Complainants admit that Shukhevych was an officer of the Nachtigall
(Nightingale) battalion and was later the commander in chief of the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (known as the UPA), but they also insist that
“there is no evidence indicating involvement of Nightingale [or UPA]
members in anti-Semitic atrocities.”488
The Nachtigall and Roland battalions were Ukrainian military units
formed by the Germans in 1941 with the full support of Ukrainian nationalist
leaders such as Stefan Bandera.489 The Ukrainians, believing the breakdown
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to be inevitable, sought German military assistance to
expel the Soviets from Ukraine, planning then to establish an independent
state; conversely, the Nazis (although regarding Ukrainians as
untermenschen) saw Ukrainian nationalists as a potentially useful ally in the
invasion of the Soviet Union.490
The Nachtigall entered Lviv along with the first German units. The
Encyclopedia of the Holocaust notes that “[t]he soldiers of the battalion
participated, with the Germans and the Ukrainian mob in the city, in the riots
and the killing of Jews that took place between June 30 and July 3.”491 When
the Nachtigall and Roland units were disbanded in December 1942, Roman
Shukhevych became the commander in chief of the UPA, which had earlier
without detriment to the esprit de corps, which thirsted for Jewish blood. It is said that when a
Jewish delegation at one time appealed to Petlura to end the pogroms, he replied: “Please, don’t
get me into any quarrel with the army!” Shortly after that, the city of Zhitomar was subjected to a
second pogrom. Petlura happened to be at the railway station, a Jewish delegation turned to him
for help; he refused to receive the delegation. In the course of the first half of 1919, the pogroms,
by Petlura’s followers and other gangs, persisted throughout the Ukraine.
DUBNOV, supra, at 842-43.
487. See 60 Minutes, supra note 100.
488. Serafyn Reply Brief at 20, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
489. See Schmuel Spector, Bandera, Stefan, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note
443, at 146; Schmuel Spector, Orhanizatsyia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistin, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1097.
490. See, e.g., ALEXANDER DALLIN, GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA, 1941-1945: A STUDY OF
OCCUPATION POLICIES 118-22 (1957); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1029,
1096-97.
491. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1029, 1096-97. See also DALLIN,
supra note 490, at 119.
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been formed by elements of the OUN and units commanded by Maksim
Borovets (“Taras Bulba”). Although the UPA fought mostly against Soviet
partisans,
[i]n the course of the fighting, UPA units murdered Jews who had
taken refuge in the forests and in the villages. In March the UPA also
embarked upon the mass murder of Poles, first in Volhynia and later
in Eastern Galicia. The number of victims among the Poles is
estimated at forty thousand.”492
Reuben Ainsztein provides a similar description of UPA atrocities:
Assured of German assistance in arms and, when necessary, outright
military cooperation, the UPA gangs, which became known as
Banderovtsy [after Stefan Bandera], proved themselves under the
command of Shukhevych, now known as Taras Chuprynka, the most
dangerous and cruel enemies of surviving Jews, Polish peasants and
settlers, and all anti-German partisans.
. . . .
The fanaticism and nationalistic madness of the Banderovsty,
Bulbovsty and other Ukrainian nationalist gangs reached depths that
appeared incredible even to Soviet and Jewish partisans whose ability
to be horrified by what man could do to man was blunted by their
daily experiences of the Nazi New Order. The Jewish partisan
Bakalczuk-Felin . . . has left us a description of entire Polish villages
wiped out, their inhabitants invariably tortured and raped before being
slaughtered with knives and axes, the babies and children murdered
with the same kind of savagery as had been the fate of Jewish
children.493
Whatever the proper role of the Commission in a news distortion case, it
cannot be to conclude— as a matter of historical truth— that “there is no
evidence” that the Nachtigall battalion, and Roman Shukhevych’s UPA,
were “involve[d] . . . in . . . atrocities.”494
If Serafyn had not been settled, the Commission should have found that
the errors identified by the complainants were not sufficient— even under the
D.C. Circuit’s expansive test— to trigger a news distortion hearing. Despite
492. Schmuel Spector, Ukrainska Povstanska Armyia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST,
supra note 443, at 1531.
493. AINSZTEIN, supra note 444, at 253-54.
494. Serafyn Reply Brief at 20, WGPR (No. 94-1027).
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that plausible outcome, however, the detailed review above of the
complainants’ claims of inaccuracy in the broadcast demonstrates the degree
to which the Commission would be required to referee a factual dispute as to
historical truth amidst conflicting sources, at best.
Some Ukrainian nationalist historians virtually deny any institutional or
widespread Ukrainian persecution of Jews or collaboration with the Nazis.495
Those sympathetic to this approach criticize what they suggest is an
excessive public focus on Jewish suffering to the exclusion of Ukrainian
persecution.496 On this view, while regrettable instances of violence against
Jews may have occurred in Ukraine during World War II, no generalizations
about anti-Semitism in Ukraine follow therefrom. Still other Ukrainian
historians, while admitting to atrocities against Jews committed by
Ukrainians, attempt to provide nationalistic and political explanations for the
behavior rather than entrenched anti-Semitism or, instead, point to duress by
the occupying Germans.497
By contrast, many non-Ukrainian historians focus on the history of anti-
Semitic violence in Ukraine. Though there are disagreements as to the exact
numbers of Jews killed,498 these sources agree that anti-Semitic attitudes and
495. For denials of significant pogroms by Ukrainians against Jews, see Lubomyr Prytulak, The
Ugly Face of 60 Minutes (denying 1941 Lviv pogrom and suggesting that “during the very interval
that Morley Safer claims that Ukrainians were killing Jews by the thousands, in fact it was Jews that
were killing Ukrainians by the thousands”), available at http://www.ukar.org/60minart.shtml (last
visited July 19, 2000). Prytulak’s statement is an apparent reference to NKVD violence against
Ukrainians as Soviets departed the region.
496. For this view, visit documents authored by Lubomyr Prytulak at http://www.ukar.org (last
visited Sept. 24, 2000).
497. For example, despite a history of nineteenth century pogroms, some attribute Ukrainian anti-
Semitism to the population’s association of Jews and Bolsheviks. See, e.g., LINCOLN, supra note 457,
at 320-22; SUBTELNY, supra note 480, at 363-64; Taras Hunczak, Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During
the Soviet and Nazi Occupations, in UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II HISTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH
39 (Yury Boshyk ed., 1986); Spector, Ukrainische Hilfspolizi, supra note 444, at 1530. See also John-
Paul Himka, supra note 456. On this interpretation, Ukrainians blame Jews for the Soviet agricultural
policies that led to mass famine in Ukraine in the early 1930s. See also UCSJ, supra note 476. Note,
however, the conclusion in Martin Dean’s recent book that although “the perception among many non-
Jews, reinforced by their own prejudices, was that the Jews supported and profited most from the
Soviet system[,]” in fact “few local Jews obtained positions of power under Soviet rule.” DEAN, supra
note 456, at 13. Even those historians who do not explicitly adhere to the Bolshevik-oriented
explanation argue that the degree to which Ukrainians collaborated with the Germans had less to do
with overwhelming anti-Semitism than with overwhelming nationalistic and anti-Soviet sentiment.
See, e.g., Orest Subtelny, The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939-41: An Overview, in
UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II HISTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH 5, 14 (Yury Boshyk ed., 1986). For
accounts of Ukrainian collaboration as pragmatic and designed to promote Ukrainian independence,
see, for example, SUBTELNY, supra note 480, at 471; Hunczak, supra.
For a charge that Ukrainian nationalist historians have not yet adequately addressed the issue of
Ukraine’s role in the Holocaust, see Jack F. Matlock, Jr., The Nowhere Nation, NY REV. OF BOOKS,
Feb. 24, 2000, at 41, 43.
498. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 443, at 1547 (“In the western
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anti-Jewish violence were not new to Ukraine in World War II, that the
Jewish population of Ukraine was decimated in the Holocaust, and that
Ukrainian collaborators participated in the genocide voluntarily. Whether
they cite anti-Semitism as the principal motivation for anti-Jewish actions or
simply one of several impulses, these historians document “widespread and
active collaboration in the Holocaust”499 by local Ukrainians.500
In sum, as one chronicler of the Holocaust has noted, “[a] wide chasm
exists between Jewish and Ukrainian historians in the interpretation of their
joint history. The former emphasize the violence visited upon Jewish
communities by brutal Jew-hating Ukrainians, while the latter tend to
minimize the frequency and severity of the pogroms that periodically swept
through the Ukraine.”501 It is not properly the FCC’s role to purport to
establish the official truth of the matter.
B. On Perspective: Multiple Readings of The Ugly Face of Freedom
The story of post-Soviet Ukraine that underlies the Serafyn litigation is
complex and can be characterized completely consistently in several different
ways. The meaning of the program itself can be described at various levels of
generality. Yet, as described in text above, a stringent application of the news
distortion policy puts the Commission in the position of choosing a particular
account, with a particular meaning, out of a multiplicity of readings. Indeed,
it may put the Commission in the position of substituting its own news
judgment for that of the broadcaster. When evidence shows that an
Ukraine . . . the local population, assisted by the UKRAINISCHE HILFSPOLIZEI (Ukrainian
Auxiliary Police), staged pogroms in which thousands of Jews were murdered . . . in Lvov, 5,000 Jews
were murdered in two of these pogroms.”); PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI, A HISTORY OF UKRAINE 631
(1996) (stating that “about 4000 Jews were massacred between 30 June and 7 July [1941] by German
extermination task forces with the assistance of what some sources describe as ‘Ukrainian auxiliary
police’”).
499. DEAN, supra note 456, at 166. Dean’s account cites anti-Semitism as one among a number of
rationales for anti-Jewish violence. Dean states that, although there was anti-Semitism in Ukraine,
“without the presence of the Nazis with their radical ideology, a systematic programme of genocide
would have been unthinkable. Nevertheless, it was relatively easy for the Nazis to recruit people
locally who were prepared to carry out their terrible policies for a variety of different motives
[including anti-Semitism].” Id. at 13.
500. The heroic efforts of thousands of Ukrainians to save Jewish lives during the Holocaust, at
the risk of their own, is also a matter of historical record. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 444; NORA
LEVIN, THE HOLOCAUST: THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN JEWRY 1933-1945 (1968) (discussing the
actions of Metropolitan Sheptsky). Over 5,000 Ukrainians are honored as “Righteous Among the
Nations” at Israel’s Holocaust memorial, Yad Vashem. See Yad Vashem, The Righteous Among the
Nations, available at http://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/index_righteous.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2001).
501. Littman, supra note 446, at 293.
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interpretation is plausible, even if ultimately wrong, it should be difficult to
conclude that there was intentional news distortion.502
Moreover, when there are a number of stories to tell about something
topical, it should not be the FCC’s role to decide that the broadcaster did not
tell the best or smartest of the stories it could have reasonably told. There are
many stories that can be told about Ukraine. Admittedly, the Serafyn
complainants would propose a contending story instead of the one told by
Morley Safer. On that account, we would focus on democratic nation-
building emerging out of bloodless revolution. Despite a transition period of
economic difficulties and nationalism, the middle-of-the-road democratic
state would be pictured as emerging victorious against the constraining forces
of totalitarianism, excessive nationalism, and isolationism. Perhaps such a
story can function as a bulwark against antidemocratic developments. From
the point of view of a newly independent Ukraine with a democratic
government, a weak economy, and the need to build structures of stability
and legitimacy for the post-Soviet state, this version of the story may have
been both true and necessary to tell in that particular way.503
In The Ugly Face of Freedom, CBS chose not to present the more
502. The Ugly Face of Freedom may serve as an object lesson. CBS has characterized the
program most recently as follows: “In the view of the CBS parties, the report legitimately focused on
the revival of anti-Semitism among certain ultra-nationalistic groups in Ukraine, the historical
background of anti-Semitic atrocities committed in Ukraine under German direction in World War II,
and the resultant fears among the Jewish population.” Joint Pet. for FCC Approval of Settlement
Agreement, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027).
A cursory reading of the transcript suggests the following additional possible messages, among
others: (1) Given the history of anti-Semitic sentiment and violence in Ukraine, Ukrainian Jews are
particularly disturbed by the public renaissance of anti-Semitic expression and are leaving the country;
(2) Lest we be lulled into unquestioning celebration of the demise of the Soviet Union, journalists must
show us the nationalistic and anti-Semitic developments undermining the new democracy; (3)
Ukrainian culture has such a deep vein of anti-Semitism that it resurfaces even after generations of
Communist anti-clericalism; (4) Transitions from totalitarian states to democracy are hardly ever
smooth sailing. Whether due to economic problems or because of a lack of a philosophical or cultural
tradition of democratic norms and institutions, such transitions can often be dangerous. Indeed, it may
be the particular characteristic of democracy— a political theory grounded in a people’s freedom to
choose their leaders and institutions— that it is open to being undermined by its own tolerance toward
self-determination; and (5) Globalism and homogenization as a result of convergence at every turn
(from communications to forms of government) trigger nationalism, entrenchment, the need to define
and maintain boundaries and history.
503. CBS could have told other stories yet. One such alternative story could have been a more
nuanced study of anti-Semitism in modern Ukraine. For example, the program could have addressed
the relationship between the democratic federal government in Ukraine— with its liberal policies on
ethnicity— and the regional and local governments that apparently experience greater difficulties
dealing with ethnic relations issues at the local grass-roots level. A position paper of the Union of
Councils for Soviet Jews suggests that the central government’s liberal rhetoric did not effectively
regulate local governments, which were more retrograde and anti-Semitic. Union of Councils for
Soviet Jews, UCSJ Position Paper, Ukraine, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www.fsumonitor.com/
stories/asem1uk2.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
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balanced of the various stories. The program did not focus on what the
current government in Ukraine had done to improve the situations of
minority ethnic groups. Nor did it study the structure of anti-Semitism in
Ukraine. The program contained some unnecessarily inflammatory language
and told an old story— and maybe even half the story. Instead, one might say,
the important story about Ukraine at that time could have been about the new
direction of tolerance expressed by the central government as much as about
the rise of nationalism and anti-Semitism. CBS could have focused on the
renaissance of Jewish life in Ukraine since the country’s independence.504
The story CBS chose to tell was a warning: lest one believe all the claims
about functioning democracy in this fledgling postcommunist state, look at
all the danger signs— signs that are particularly troubling because of the
historical background of anti-Semitism in the region.
At the time of the 60 Minutes broadcast, there was a rather consistent
flow of news about the worsening economic situation in the former Eastern
bloc, as well as press attention to the rise of nationalism and its unfortunate
partnership with antiminority sentiment.505 The region was still in the early
stages of its transition from Soviet communism. In times of initial self-
definition, controversy and disagreement about social direction are
inevitable. Uncertainty about the role and status of various socio-political
movements can be expected. Given the uncertainty and controversy over the
fundamental character of societies and political regimes still in flux, there is
bound to be a particularly significant degree of journalistic discretion, and
disagreement, in reporting. It is precisely when the issues are timely,
important, and controversial that the Commission’s regulations should
promote— rather than chill— broadcaster news coverage and issue analysis.
Ultimately, what may have been the triggering factor in the Ukrainian-
American reaction to The Ugly Face of Freedom may have been the
program’s implication that Ukrainians are “genetically anti-Semitic.”506
While at the most literal level, the statement reports the Ukrainian
government’s denial of genetic anti-Semitism in Ukrainians,507 the phrase
provocatively suggests that despite governmental efforts, Ukrainian Jews still
see non-Jewish Ukrainians as “genetically anti-Semitic.” The use of the word
“genetic” in such a claim is particularly provocative in light of the Twentieth
504. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, Out of Ukraine’s Torment, A Jewish Flowering, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1995, at A3.
505. See, e.g., Frank Brown, “It’s the Jews’ Fault,” JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 23, 1998, at 64.
506.  60 Minutes, supra note 100.
507. “The Church and government of Ukraine have tried to ease people’s fears, suggesting that
things are not as serious as they might appear, that Ukrainians, despite the allegations, are not
genetically anti-Semitic.” Id.
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Century’s history of genocide. Especially in light of the Hitlerian attribution
of genetic inferiority to the Jews and the persistence of policies of ethnic
cleansing elsewhere in the world even today, the attribution of any “genetic”
ideology— including anti-Semitism— is doubtless inflammatory. Although it
is unlikely that the sophisticated American audience of the 60 Minutes
program would interpret the “genetic” statement as a literal, biological claim
about all Ukrainians, they might well interpret it as rhetorical hyperbole, as a
metaphor for persistent cultural myths despite the passage of time. They
might interpret the language as triggering the intense post-Hitler debate on
collective memory and collective guilt. Even though CBS did not literally
support the claim, The Ugly Face of Freedom might be viewed as giving
implicit credence to the charge that anti-Semitism is so culturally well-
grounded in Ukraine that it survived years of Communist leveling and
anticlericalism and remains foundational for all Ukrainians.
As a matter of editorial judgment, it was surely an error to use language
that, in context, would naturally be so highly charged. The use of such
dramatic and provocative language is in keeping with the theatricality often
associated with the newsmagazine format in television. Yet, this is probably
as good an example as any of the excesses to which the newsmagazine genre
can fall prey. Finally, however, the real issue is whether the FCC could
reliably measure the distortive character of such hyperbolic claims with a
neutral and informed yardstick. This Article has argued that the Commission
cannot do so. Nevertheless, the lengthy story of the Serafyn litigation should
serve as an object lesson to television newsmagazines at a minimum to avoid
inflammatory “rhetorical hyperbole”508 unnecessary to the story.
508. In its settlement agreement, CBS asserted that “nothing in the broadcast was intended to
suggest that the Ukrainian people as a whole are anti-Semitic.” Joint Petition for FCC Approval of
Settlement Agreement, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995) (No. 94-1027). The Joint Petition for
FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement contains the following language about the parties’ settlement:
While the UCCA Parties criticized the broadcast and the CBS Parties continued to stand by it,
they nevertheless resolved to put their legal disputes behind them. In so doing, the UCCA Parties
maintained their strongly held belief that the Ukrainian people were unfairly portrayed in the
broadcast, in particular in the report’s failure to make any reference to the vigorous efforts of the
current Ukrainian government to protect the civil rights of all its citizens, especially its ethnic
minorities, and promote Jewish life, and in a narration line which they believe suggested that the
Ukrainian people are “genetically anti-Semitic.” For their part, the CBS Parties reiterated that
nothing in the broadcast was intended to suggest that the Ukrainian people as a whole are anti-
Semitic. In the view of the CBS Parties, the report legitimately focused on the revival of anti-
Semitism among certain ultra-nationalist groups in Ukraine, the historical background of anti-
Semitic atrocities committed in Ukraine under German direction in World War II, and the
resultant fears among the Jewish population. Although the broadcast was not intended as a
comprehensive treatment of Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the German occupation, the CBS
Parties are well aware of the heroic actions of Metropolitan Andreas Szeptycki and other
Ukrainians to save Jews during the war, sometimes at the cost of their own lives.
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Appendix A to the Settlement Agreement was a letter to the UCCA Parties’ attorney, Arthur V.
Belendiuk, from CBS’s General Counsel, Louis J. Briskman:
Thank you for arranging our recent meeting concerning settlement. As a follow-up to those
discussions, let me again express regret on behalf of CBS over the fact that Ukrainian-Americans
were offended by the October 23, 1994 “60 MINUTES” feature entitled “The Ugly Face of
Freedom” and saw it as a generalized condemnation of persons of Ukrainian ancestry. CBS did
not intend to convey such an impression.
Indeed, I want to squarely address the suggestion that our broadcast intended to imply that
Ukrainians are somehow genetically anti-Semitic. Nothing could be further from the truth. This
was not our intention when we first broadcast the report nor is it our belief today. In fact, our
broadcast in 1994 contained an interview with Deputy Cardinal, Monsignor Dacko in which he
stated that identifying the entire Ukrainian society as anti-Semitic would be an injustice. We
certainly agree. Moreover, we are aware that, since its independence, the government of Ukraine
has vigorously defended the civil rights of all citizens, especially ethnic minorities.
While CBS and your clients may not agree about the merits of the “60 MINUTES” broadcast
and may have differences concerning possible future programs, I am hopeful that our meeting
helped to promote mutual respect and understanding. In this regard, let me assure you that CBS
has no “agenda” with regard to the Ukrainian people and country. Our desire is to maintain good
relations with all segments of the television audience and, obviously, the Ukrainian/American
community is no exception.
Finally, let me note that CBS typically consults with recognized experts representing a broad
spectrum of viewpoints on controversial issues. Should “60 MINUTES” or another CBS news
documentary program produce a further news feature focusing on Ukraine, you may be assured
that CBS will follow this practice and specifically consult with persons knowledgeable about
Ukraine. Of course, as you know, the ultimate editorial determination with respect to any news
report must remain solely with CBS. However, as always, we will be interested in having access
to differing points of view.
Joint Pet. for FCC Approval of Settlement Agreement app. A, WGPR, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8140 (1995)
(No. 94-1027).
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